

SŪTRAS OF BĀDARĀYANA

WITH

COMMENTARY OF ŚANĀYARĀCHĀRYA

PART II, QUARTER I

ORIGINAL SANSKRIT, WITH ENGLISH
TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

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THIRD EDITION

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WITH

THE COMMENT OF ŚĀNĀKARĀCHĀRYA

CHAPTER II, QUARTER I

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श्रीमद्वादरायणप्रणीतानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि

श्रीशङ्कराचार्यविरचित-

शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यसमेतानि

तत्र

अविरोधाख्यद्वितीयाध्यायस्य

प्रथम(स्मृति)पादः

Errata to Text

N. B.—The References are to Adhyāya, Pāda, Sūtra,
and Line.

	<i>Correct</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>
II. i. 1 ⁶⁵	वै(श्व)सूच्येण	वैश्वसूच्येण
II. i. 3 ¹⁸	मभ्यधिका-	मप्यधिका-
II. i. 11 ³⁴	प्रसिद्धा	प्रसिद्धा
II. i. 12 ¹⁰	परमगम्भीरस्य जग- त्कारणस्य	परमगम्भीरस्य
II. i. 13 ¹¹	भोग्ययोर्वि	भोग्ययार्वि
II. i. 13 ²³	स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य	स्रष्टुरेवत्विकृतस्य
II. i. 14 ⁹ , 14 ³⁸	[छा०, ६. १. ४] ।	[छा०, ६. १. १] ।
II. i. 14 ⁸⁵	कश्चित् ॥	कश्चित् ।
II. i. 14 ⁸⁶	वेदितव्यः ॥	वेदितव्यः ।
II. i. 15 ⁶	अग्निभाव एव	अग्निभावे
II. i. 27 ⁴²	नामरूप ^०	नापरूप ^०

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BRAHMANASUTRAS II. 1

WITH

THE COMMENT OF BAKARA



ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Errata to Translation

(ignoring broken and faint types)

N. B.—The References are to Page and Line

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Correct</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>
3	— <i>last</i>	ensues the contin- gency of	results the fault of
4	— 3	men-of-position-and- competence	those-entitled-to-res- pect
4	— 21	objects involving the exercise	the exercise
5	— 11	to the contingency of the fault of	to the fault of
5	— 32	embodied-existences	bodies
5	— 32	possessing eternity	the eternal
6	— <i>headline</i>	°BHĀSHYA	°BHĀSAYA
7	— 14	xii. 360. 1	xii. 360. I
8	— 1	intervention	intervension
12	— 20	organs	instrument
17	— 25,26	nature	true-nature
17	— 28	with either of them ;	with the attribute of any of them ;
20	— 6	of the objection that under this supposition	fo the objection that
20	— 7	remaining in-no-wise distinct from the cause becomes im- possible	can in-no-wise re- main distinct from the cause
25	— <i>last</i>	possessing as it does the power to convey mean- ing,	is the source of right knowledge, and
26	— 1	stands to reason that it should convey a sense invariable in its	can properly have a fixity of subject- matter and form of

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Correct</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>
27	— 27	be made to possess a sense other than the primary.	conform to this other means,
31	— 15	vi. 1.4	vi. 4.1
33	— 14f.	Brahman as one with, the Self [and as the only true Reality]	Brahman as the only true Reality
34	— 8	attainment	acquisition
37	— 23	conform to the aggregate of the bodies	conform to the bodies
39	— 38	origin-and-goal	stay-and-support
39	— <i>last</i>	origin-and-goal	stay-and-support
40	— 17	effect,	effect
46	— 10	are concealed from our sight),	are) concealed from our sight,
50	— 24	to it may	to it do
51	— 12	all dualistic	all kinds of
52	— 8	diversity in	manifoldness of
53	— 12	aggregation	presence
55	— 18	part-less	impartite
56	— 23	into the Existent.	into Existence.
57	— 23	<i>Second Chapter, entitled the Smṛiti-pāda.</i>	<i>Second Chapter.</i>

CHAPTER SECOND

QUARTER FIRST

TOPIC I : HETERODOX SMRITIS

(*Sūtras* 1-2)

[Page 1] In Chapter First it was demonstrated, by establishing the concensus of the Scriptural passages (on the points), that the Omniscient Overlord is the cause of the world's origin, like clay, gold, and so forth of pots, ornaments, and other articles; that of the world thus created, He is the cause of stability, as being its controller, like the magician of his magical-illusion; that of the extended world, He, finally, is the author of the re-absorption into His own self, like the earth of the four classes of beings; and that the same Lord is identical with the Soul of us all. The doctrines putting forth Pradhāna and the like as the (First) Cause were also refuted as being not borne out by the Scriptures. Now is commenced Chapter Second, which is to deal with topics such as: the refutation of the objections based on Smritis and on Logic against our own position [Quarter 1]; the presence of fallacious dialectics in the Pradhāna and other theories [Quarter 2]; and the absence of inconsistency in the creation and other theories set forth in the several Vedānta-texts [Quarters 3 and 4]. To begin with, the Author puts forth the alleged contradiction (of our theory) with certain Smritis, and then sets it aside :

If it be objected that our position is open to the fault of leaving no scope to certain Smritis, we demur, as there would otherwise result the fault of leaving no scope to certain other Smritis. 1

The statement that Brahman alone, the Omniscient, is the cause of the world is not admissible. Why? Since there results

the fault of leaving no scope to certain Smṛitis. Thus there is the Smṛiti known as the Tantra, composed by the Great Sage, and regarded authoritative by those-entitled-to-respect, and other (Smṛitis) also based upon the same, which would all have no scope (at all) in your theory. For, in these Smṛitis the non-intelligent Pradhāna is set forth as an independent cause of the world. As to the Smṛitis of Manu and others, they do have a scope inasmuch as they fulfil their anticipated purpose by prescribing various religious-duties like fire-worship (Agnihotra), which are laid down as injunctions: namely, that a specific caste is to have at a specific period its ceremony of Initiation performed according to specific ritual; that a specific course of conduct is to be followed (after the Initiation); that the Veda is to be studied in a particular mode; that the return (after completion of study) is to be accomplished in a given manner; and that a particular is the method of cohabitation with one's lawfully-wedded wife. Likewise do they prescribe different religious-duties proper to the castes or the life-periods (āśramas) and calculated to secure goals attainable by mankind. But there remains no such scope for the Smṛitis such as those of Kapila and others in regard to the exercise of some kind of an activity. For, these were composed [Page 2] with the exclusive object of teaching the right knowledge that is the means to Liberation. And if these are to have no scope in that connection also, there would result an entire purposelessness of them. Therefore, you must interpret the Vedānta-texts so as not to contradict the (teaching) of these (Smṛitis). — But how can the teaching of the Scriptures, viz., that Brahman, the Omniscient one, is the cause of this world,—after it has been once established by arguments like that [in Brahmasūtra, I. i. 5] about the "Seeing"—be again open to the attack on the ground of the fault of not leaving scope for certain Smṛitis? This attack (we reply) would be nugatory in the case of persons of independent intellect. But the generality of the people, lacking such independent intellect and so unable to ascertain the sense of the Scriptures independently, would have to depend upon Smṛitis composed by celebrated authors, and would accordingly endeavour to ascertain the sense of the Scriptures with their help; and they would have no reliance upon the interpretation put forth by us by reason of their reverence for the authors of these Smṛitis. That sages like

Kapila and others had unobstructed intuitive knowledge is declared in Smritis. There is also the Vedic text [Śvetāśvatara, v. 2] —“He who, in the beginning, supports by knowledge that sage Kapila when born, and who would see him while being born.” Hence it is not possible to imagine that the opinion of such persons is not conformable to truth. For they, moreover, establish their view by taking the support of reasoning also. Therefore, the objection is repeated that we must interpret the Scriptures in consonance with these Smritis.

This is our rejoinder. We deny (your contention), as it would lead to the fault of leaving no scope to certain other Smritis. If, on the ground of the fault of leaving no scope to certain Smritis, the view that the Lord is the cause is objected to, then in that case the other Smritis proclaiming the Lord as the cause would be void of any scope. We will cite these : Having introduced the Highest Brahman with the words [Mahābhārata, xii. 342. 30] —“That which is subtle and beyond knowledge,” —and having affirmed [ibid., xii. 342. 31] —“He is indeed the Inner Soul of all beings and is styled ‘Knower of the Field;’” —the text declares [ibid., xii. 342. 32] —“From Him, O Best of the Twice-born, the Unevolved, consisting of the three guṇas (aspects) sprang forth.” Also in another place [ibid., xii. 347. 31] —“The Unevolved, O Brahmin, is absorbed into the Person who is free from Qualities.” (And again), “Listen, accordingly, to this condensed statement : ‘The ancient Nārāyaṇa is all this; he creates everything at the creation-time and again consumes it (all) at the sublation-period.’” —This is declared in Purāṇa [cp. Mahābhārata, xii. 307. 115]. And in the Bhagavadgītā [vii. 6] it is said : “I am the source as also the dissolution of the entire world.” Āpastamba [Dharmasūtra, i. 8. 23. 2] likewise declares with reference to the very same Highest Soul : [Page 3] “From Him spring all bodies ; He is the root, the eternal and the unchangeable.” Thus in many a place even the Smritis show forth the Lord as being both the constituent and the efficient cause.

That unto an opponent who has based his objection on the strength of Smritis I should reply on the strength of the Smritis themselves—for this purpose it was that the fault of leaving no scope to Smritis was above set forth. That the Scriptures pur-

port to declare the Lord as the cause has been already shown. Hence when there ensues a conflict between Smritis so that only one (set) of them can be accepted and the other rejected, those Smritis that conform to the Scriptures are authoritative, the others being disregarded. This is declared in the treatise on Valid-proofs [Jaṃini Sūtra, i. 3. 3]—“When there is contradiction (of a Smṛiti with an existing Śruti or Scriptural text) the Smṛiti is to be disregarded; and where no Śruti (corresponding to a Smṛiti) is preserved, an inference (of its existence is to be made).” That any one can know matters beyond the purview of the senses without (the help of) the Scriptures, it is not possible to imagine, as there is no (valid) ground for it. (If one were to assert) that it is possible for perfect-sages like Kapila, as they have an unhindered knowledge (of everything), the reply is, No: for, this perfection is contingent. For, the perfection ensues from religious practices, and these are to be had from injunctions (given by the Scriptures). Hence the meaning of an already existent (Scriptural) injunction cannot be called into question on the strength of the words of a perfect-sage, who comes into existence after (the Scriptural injunction). And even if one were to turn to these sages (for the right interpretation of Scriptures), yet, as there are many such sages, whenever there results, as before indicated, a conflict between Smritis, there remains no mode of reaching a decision unless one resorts to the Scriptures. And for one who (is not such a perfect-sage, and who) derives his knowledge from others, it is not proper to conceive without reason a partiality for some specific Smritis, since, if one were to have such a partiality for some particular text, seeing that the opinions of people are extremely divergent, there would ensue the contingency of an absence of all definiteness as to the Reality. Hence, even the mind of such a (misguided) person one should endeavour to enlist to the right path by setting forth the divergent teachings of the Smritis, and asking him to discriminate between them according as their doctrines follow or do not follow (the teaching of the Scriptures).

As to the Scriptural-text exhibiting the perfection of knowledge of Kapila which was cited, on the strength of that it is not possible to rely upon Kapila's view even though it be against the Scriptures: for, the text contains merely the general word “Kapila”

and we know from Smritis of another Kapila, Vāsudeva by name, who burnt down the sons of Sagara ; and furthermore a passage can have no power (for establishing one thing) if its main topic be another thing, as it would then lack all probatory force with reference to the first thing. We also have another Scriptural-text proclaiming the greatness of Manu [Tait. Saṁ, II. ii. 10. 2] —“ Whatsoever Manu has declared is medicine.” And Manu has praised the oneness of the Self pervading all things with the words [xii. 91] —“ One who sees the Self in all beings, and all beings in the Self makes the (true) offering to the Self, and so wins Self-empire ” —and so it follows [Page 4] that he reprobates the opinion of Kapila. For, Kapila does not acknowledge the doctrine of the oneness of the Self in all, as he assumes a plurality of the Selves. In the Mahābhārata [xii. 360. I] also, after raising the question : “ Are there, O Brahmin, many persons or only one ? ” —and setting forth the opponent’s view [*ibid.*, xii. 360. 2’] : “ O King, there are, according to those that adopt the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view, many persons,” —the text refutes that view by the passage beginning with [*ibid.*, xii. 360. 3] : “ Just as of several persons there is only one source of origin (viz. the earth), so will I declare to you that Universal Person, excelling in qualities ” ; and it goes on to establish the oneness of the Self in all [*ibid.*, xii. 361. 4-5] by the words : “ The Self within me and that within thee and the others that are encased in the different bodies : of them all He is the spectator, not to be perceived by anyone anywhere. He is all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed : the one who moves unhindered and at will amidst all the beings.” There is also a Scriptural text about the oneness of the Self in all [Īśa Up., 7] —“ When unto the knowing individual all the beings have become one with his own Self, what infatuation, what misery, can there be for that one who realises the oneness (of all) ? ” Hence it is proved that the theory of Kapila runs counter to Veda, and to the words of Manu who follows Veda, also in its view about the plurality of the Selves, and not merely in its hypothesis of the Prakṛiti as an independent First-Principle. As to the Veda of course its authoritativeness in its own subject is not contingent upon anything, any more than that of the Sun in the matter of form-and-colour ; whereas that of merely human statements is contingent upon some independent external basis (the Veda or the actual reality), and is

further estranged (from reality) by the intervension of the speaker's memory. Hence in matters that go against the Vedas the objection that certain Smritis would be deprived of all scope is no objection. 1.

And for what further reason is the contention that certain Smritis would be deprived of every scope, not valid?—

And because there is no finding of the others. 2

Entities other than the Pradhāna, and as the evolved products of the Pradhāna, which are imagined in the (Sāṅkhya) Smṛiti, viz. the Mahat and others, are not met with either in the Veda or in ordinary experience. As to the elements and the organs, these can be asserted in the Smṛiti-text as they are well-established in the world and in the Veda; but Mahat and others to which neither experience nor the Scriptures bear testimony [Page 5], the Smṛiti can have no right to assert, any more than to assert an object cognisable by a sixth sense-organ (there being only five of them). And what appears to be a scriptural warrant for the entities in question has been explained by us as not referring to them in the Sūtra I. iv. 1, beginning with the words—"If it be urged that even the inferred entity (Pradhāna) in some textsetc." The point is that if the Smṛiti-statement is untrustworthy in respect of the effects, it is fit that it should not be trusted in respect of the (First) Cause taught by it. Hence also that a certain Smṛiti becomes devoid of all scope is no defect. As to the support from reasoning (sought for the Smṛiti) the Sūtrakāra will demolish it in the portion beginning with Sūtra II. i. 4—"No: by reason of the disparity-in-nature, etc." 2. Here ends the Topic (1) called Heterodox Smritis.

TOPIC 2 : YOGA-SMṚITI

(Sūtra 3)

Thereby is Yoga refuted. 3

By this refutation of the Sāṅkhya-Smṛiti even the Yoga-Smṛiti is to be understood as refuted: so he extends the application (of the same arguments). For, even in that Smṛiti are assumed, in

contravention of the Scriptures, Pradhāna as an independent first cause as well as Mahat and others as effects, none of which are warranted by experience and by the Scriptures. If that be so, because there is the application of the same reasoning, this is already implied in the preceding. Wherefore, then, make a special analogical transference? (We reply :) There is here a special cause for doubt, inasmuch as the Yoga is laid down as the means to right knowledge in Vedic texts like [Bṛih. Up., ii. 4. 5]—"The self is to be heard, thought of, meditated upon"; while we observe in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad [ii. 8] Yogic prescriptions with manifold details beginning with the assuming of postures etc. in passages like—"Having rendered the body with its three erect parts (the trunk, the neck and the head) even ..". And there are to be found thousands of references to the Yoga in the Veda, such as [Kaṭha, II. iii. 11]—"The steady curbing of the senses is what they call Yoga"; or [Kaṭha, II. iii. 18]—"This teaching as well as all the prescriptions about Yoga"; and so forth. In the Yogasāstra itself with (the Sūtra)—"Now, the Yoga, the means to the perception of Reality"—Yoga is acknowledged to be a means for right knowledge. Hence inasmuch as a portion of it is acceptable, the Yoga Smṛiti would become altogether free from objection, like the Smṛiti teaching the "Ashtakā" rites. It is this additional cause for doubt that is being removed by the analogical transference; since, although a part of it is acceptable, there is seen to be, as pointed out already, a divergence as regards another part of its teaching.

[Page 6] Although many are the Smṛitis treating of the soul and kindred matters, a special effort has been made to refute just the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga Smṛitis. For, Sāṅkhya and Yoga are well-known in the world as the means of reaching the highest end of man, are so accepted by persons-entitled-to-respect, and are armed with specific references to them in the Scriptures, viz. [Śvet., vi. 13]—"Having known that Cause, attainable by Sāṅkhya-Yoga—the God—one is freed from all fetters." The way out is given by the consideration that it is not by Sāṅkhya-knowledge or Yoga-method independently of the Veda that the highest goal is achieved. For, Śruti itself [Śvet., iii. 8] discountenances any other means of reaching the highest goal save the Vedic teaching of the oneness of the Ātman—"Knowing Him

along one goes beyond Death : there exists no other path for going (beyond)." The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga followers are dualists : they do not recognise the oneness of the Ātman. And as to the Śruti-text cited [Śvet., vi. 13]—"That cause, attainable by Sāṅkhya-Yoga....." etc.,—even there one must conclude that the knowledge and the meditation implied by the words Sāṅkhya and Yoga are no other than what the Veda gives, as is clear from the context. And we quite acknowledge that the Sāṅkhya-Yoga Smritis, in that portion where they do not contradict (the Veda), do have a claim to authoritativeness. For instance, the Sāṅkhyas assume the non-contamination of the Purusha by declaring him to be above all qualities ; and this is also vouched for by Śruti-texts like [Bṛih., iv. 3. 16] : "This person is free from attachment." So also the followers of Yoga prescribe house-less life and so forth, and in that conform to the teaching concerning renunciatory attitude well-known to Scriptural-texts like [Jābāla, 5]—"And then the wandering-ascetic with a discoloured raiment, shaven, and rid of all possessions.....".—The preceding reason should be taken to have refuted all Smritis founded upon reasoning (as opposed to Vedic Revelation). If these be thought to aid the perception of Reality by teaching how to reason and excogitate, let them do so. Our point is that the knowledge of the Reality proceeds merely from Upanishadic texts, as is clear from passages like [Tait. Br., III. 12. 9. 7]—"No one not knowing the Veda can have an idea of that Great One," or [Bṛih., iii. 9. 26]—"I ask unto thee that Person taught (only) in the Upanishads." 3. Here ends the Topic (2) called Yoga-Smṛiti.

TOPIC 3 : DISPARITY IN NATURE

(*Sūtras* 4-11)

No: by reason of the disparity of this (world) [from Brahman] ; and its being so (we learn) from the Scripture. 4.

[Page 7] To the view that the Brahman is the efficient as well as the constituent cause of this world, the objection based upon Smritis has been refuted. Now is to be refuted the objection based upon reasoning. How (one might ask) can there be room for an objection based upon reasoning urged against this

Vedic view already demonstrated? For, must not the Veda be deemed absolutely valid in its teaching concerning the Brahman, as in that concerning religious-practice?—This might have been a bar to further procedure if Brahman had been an entity cognisable only by the Scripture, and not open to the other means of knowledge, like unto religious-practice, which implies a specific course of action. But Brahman is declared to be (not the result of a process of action, but) an already accomplished entity; and in the case of such an accomplished and existing entity, for instance the earth, there is scope for the activity of other means-of-knowledge. Hence, just as, whenever Scriptural passages contradict one another, all the other passages are so interpreted as to conform to one specific passage, even so, when there is a conflict between the Scriptural passage and another means-of-knowledge the text in question ought to be always so interpreted as to conform to the means-of-knowledge. The more so, as reasoning comes nearer direct experience inasmuch as it establishes an unseen object on the analogy of a seen object; whereas the Scriptural passage is further removed (from experience) because it tells what it wants to tell as a mere “so it was.” And Brahma-knowledge becomes admittedly a means to absolution after removing away all ignorance only when that knowledge results in a realisation in one’s own experience: that being its actual, tangible fruit (distinguishable from the remote, intangible fruit of the Dharma or religious practice). Scripture itself [Br̥ih., ii. 4. 5] says—“The Ātman is to be heard, to be reflected upon.....”, and in this, by prescribing a ratiocination in addition to mere hearing, it shows that reasoning also is to be duly resorted to. Hence, once more, we repeat our objection on the basis of reasoning: “No: by reason of the disparity of this (world) [from Brahman].”

The assertion that the sentient Brahman is the cause and constituent of the world cannot be maintained. Why? Because this (world, the) effect is disparate-in-nature from its constituent-cause. For, this world which is alleged to be an effect of the Brahman is seen to differ in nature from Brahman, being non-sentient and impure, whereas Brahman is different in nature from the world, since the Scriptures declare it to be sentient and pure. And we nowhere observe the relation of cause and effect between things disparate in nature. For, effects like ornaments

can never be produced from the clay, nor pots and the like produced from gold. It is out of clay alone that products possessing clay-characteristics are produced, and out of gold alone, those possessing gold-characteristics. So similarly, this world possessing the characteristics of pleasure-pain-infatuation can properly become the effect of a cause which is constituted of the characteristics of pleasure-pain-infatuation, and not of Brahman, which is disparate-in-nature from it. And as to this disparity of the world from the Brahman it can be inferred from the appearance of impurity and non-sentiency. For, the world certainly is impure being constituted of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, as giving rise to happiness, affliction, and dejection, and producing conditions high and low like the heaven and the hell. The world is likewise non-sentient inasmuch as it makes up the bodies and the organs, and so subserves the purposes of a sentient being. For, where there is parity-in-nature there cannot obtain [Page 8] the relation of the principal and the auxiliary. Two lamps, for instance, cannot subserve each other's purpose.—One might urge against this that, on the analogy of the master and his servant, even a sentient body and instrument can subserve the purpose of the experiencing-soul. But no. In this case of the master and the servant it is the non-sentient part of the latter that subserves the purposes of the former who is sentient. It is, that is to say, just the intelligence and other non-sentient paraphernalia of the sentient servant that subserves the purpose of the sentient master; and it is not the case that the sentient soul (of the servant) does himself become subservient or recalcitrant with reference to the master's sentient soul. The Sāṅkhyas indeed maintain that the sentient souls have a nature not liable to accretion or depletion, and are devoid of any activity. Therefore the body and the organs (and all things that serve as instruments) are non-sentient. Nor is there any ground for the belief that objects like logs-of-wood or lumps-of-clay are sentient. In fact this distinction between sentient and non-sentient objects is patent to the world. Hence it follows that because of a disparity-in-nature from Brahman, this world cannot have Brahman as the constituent-cause.

Now, if some one were to say—"On the strength of the declaration in the Scripture to the effect that this world has a sentient being as its cause—I am prepared to conclude that the whole

world is itself sentient, inasmuch as the nature of the constituent-cause is known to continue in its effect ; and that the non-perception of the sentiency can be explained by postulating a peculiar modification of it. Just as, that is to say, in the case of the souls that are of admitted sentiency, we do fail to perceive their sentient character in their states of sleep, fainting, etc., even so there might be a failure to perceive the sentiency in the case of objects like the log-of-wood and the lump-of-clay ; and that on the ground of this very difference between them, viz., the perceptibility and the non-perceptibility (of their sentiency) and the absence and presence of colour and other qualities, we can explain without contradiction the relation of the principal and the auxiliary between the body and the organs on the one hand and the soul on the other, even though both equally participate in sentiency, the present case being quite explicable on the analogy of flesh, soup, rice, etc., which—although all equally earth-products—subserve each other's purpose by reason of the peculiar properties inherent in each,—the same circumstance also serving as an explanation of the well-known fact of the differentiation (of the world into sentient and non-sentient classes).”—One urging these considerations may somehow or other succeed in explaining away the disparity-in-nature based upon sentiency and non-sentiency ; but the disparity based upon purity and impurity he can in-no-wise remove.

Nor can he explain away the first disparity, says (the Sūtra) : “ Its being so follows from Scripture.” The sentient nature of all things in the world, even though nowhere an object of anybody's experience, is inferred merely on the strength of the Scriptural assertion about the world having a sentient first cause, because one has an absolute faith in the Scripture. But the inference is contradicted by Scripture itself, seeing that even from Scripture one learns of its being so. By ‘ its being so ’ he implies disparity from the constituent-cause. The Vedic text [Tait. Up., ii. 6] speaks of “ the intelligent and the non-intelligent, ” and so asserts that a portion of the world is non-sentient, and from this it follows that the world is different-in-nature from Brahman. 4.

[Page 9] But is it not a fact that in some places in the Scriptures we hear of the sentient character of the elements and sense-

organs, regarded usually as non-sentient? As for instance [Śat. Br., vi. i. 3. 2-4]—"The Earth spoke;" "the Waters spoke;" or [Chh., vi. 2. 3-4]—"That Light saw;" "those Waters saw;" and such other passages, declaring the sentiency of elements. Also concerning the sense-organs we have statements like [Bṛih., vi. 1. 7]—"Those Prāṇas (faculties) indeed, contending for self-supremacy, went to Brahman;" or like [Bṛih. i. 3. 2]—"They then said unto Speech: do thou chant for us"—where the sense-organs are referred to (as sentient). In reply he recites—

But that is a statement concerning the Superintendents, because of specification and correlation. 5.

The word 'but' dispels the doubt raised. We must not at all assume the sentient character of elements and sense-organs from Scriptural passages like—"The Earth spoke," and so forth, since this is a statement concerning the Superintendents. There is here a statement about sentient Divinities superintending elements like the earth, and organs like the speech, and performing activities proper to sentient beings, such as speaking, conversing and so forth, and not about mere elements and the sense-organs. Wherefore? Because of specification and correlation. For, there is a specified difference consisting of sentient-nature and non-sentient-nature between the experiencing-souls on the one hand and the elements and sense-organs on the other, as already mentioned; and that will not be explicable if everything were sentient. Further in the "Dispute amongst the Faculties," the text of the Kaushītakins, with a view to remove the doubt as to mere sense-organs being intended, and to comprehend the sentient Superintendents, makes a specification by using the epithet Divinities: Thus [Kaush. Up., ii. 14]—"These Divinities, forsooth, contending for self-supremacy....."; and further on [ibid., ii. 14]—"All these Divinities, indeed having recognised the pre-eminence of the Life-Breath....". There are also taught everywhere, in correlation (with the elements, organs, and other abodes), such sentient superintending Divinities in the Samhitās, Brāhmanas, Histories, Purāṇas, etc. A Scriptural text like [Ait. Āraṇ., ii. 4. 24]—"The Fire, becoming the speech, entered the mouth"—supports the existence of a Divinity guarding over the functions of the sense-organs. Further, in the concluding part of the

passage concerning the "Dispute of the Faculties" [Page 10] statements like [Chh., v. 1. 7]—"And then the Prāṇas went up to their father Prajāpati and said....."—where we are told of their approaching Prajāpati for ascertaining who was pre-eminent, and thereafter, on his advice, of their going out of the body one by one, and so arriving at the pre-eminence of the Life-breath by the method of concomitance and non-concomitance, and then [cp. Brih., vi. 1. 13]—of the offer of tributes unto him, —all these dealings, similar to our own, as taught (in the Scriptures) further confirm the statement concerning the Superintendents. We can also understand the 'correlation' as referring to the act of 'seeing' of the highest superintending Divinity (Brahman), as mentioned in the text [Chh., vi. 2. 3]—"That Light saw"—after the Divinity had entered into (become correlated with) the effects produced by it. 5.

Therefore there does exist a disparity-in-nature between the Brahman and the world; and by reason of this disparity the world cannot be an effect of the Brahman. To this objection he now furnishes a reply—

But we do see it. 6.

*The word 'but' turns back the (opponent's) objection. The statement that this world cannot have Brahman for its cause by reason of the disparity-in-nature: this is not an absolutely valid proposition. For, we do notice in the world the production, from admittedly sentient beings like men, of hair and nails etc., which are disparate-in-nature from them, as also from admittedly non-sentient things like cow-dung, that of scorpions etc. But (you might reply) it is merely the non-sentient bodies of men etc. that are the causes of the non-sentient hair, nails, and so forth, and so likewise the non-sentient bodies of scorpions, etc. that are the effects of non-sentient things like cow-dung. We answer Even so, that one of the non-sentient effects (body of the scorpion) should have an aptitude to be the abode of a sentient being, while another (hair, nails etc.) should not: this itself does constitute the disparity. And great indeed is the divergence in nature due to the process of evolution between entities like (the bodies of) men and (their products,) the hair, nails, etc., or between things

like cow-dung and (the bodies of) the scorpions and the like, as they so much differ in colour and the rest. For, were the cause and the effect to be absolutely similar, there would be an end to the very relation of cause and effect between them. If, however, it be urged that of entities like (the bodies of) men in regard to (their products,) the hair, nails, etc., or of things like cow-dung in regard to (the bodies of) the scorpions and the like, there is at least the characteristic of "earthness" which is persistent, we reply that if that were all, then of the Brahman in regard to (its products,) the ether and so forth, there is evidently the characteristic of "existence" which is so persistent. In fact, we want you to say whether, when on the ground of a disparity-in-nature you object to the world having Brahman as its constituent-cause, you mean by the disparity-in-nature the non-inherence of the entire mass of characteristics of the (cause) Brahman in the effect, the world; or the non-inherence (in the effect) of even a single characteristic (of the cause), whatever it be; or, finally, the non-inherence of (just one specific characteristic, viz.) the sentiency. In the first alternative there would result the contingency of an annihilation of the very relation of cause and effect throughout; for, in the absence of some specific difference between them, you cannot call one thing the cause and another its effect. The second alternative remains unproven. For, there does persist in ether and other (effects of Brahman) the characteristic of existence [Page 11] which belongs to Brahman, as we have already said. For the third alternative you cannot assign an illustrative example. For, unto the follower of the Brahma-philosophy, what possible example (acceptable to him) can you urge proving that a certain object destitute of sentiency is known not to have Brahman for its cause, seeing that he holds the view that all the mass of effects has Brahman alone as its constituent-cause? The conflict of this your view with the Scriptures is quite on the surface, as we have already proved that the Scriptures purport to teach Brahman as the efficient as well as the constituent cause of the world.

Next, as to the assertion that inasmuch as Brahman is an accomplished, existential entity, there is a possibility of its being open to other means-of-knowledge, that is entirely gratuitous. For, in the absence of colour and other qualities, Brahman cannot be

an object accessible to direct-perception. Also in the absence of (known) inferential marks it is outside the range of inference and the other means-of-knowledge. It is, on the contrary, cognisable only from the Scriptures, like, for instance, religious duty. To the same effect is the passage [Katha, I. ii. 2]—"It is not a knowledge to be obtained by reasoning : it can be best comprehended, My dearest, only when declared by another ;" as also another passage (Rigveda, x. 129. 6-7)—"Who indeed has known, and who can here declare.....from whence this creation has emanated?" These two Vedic stanzas indicate the inscrutable nature of the Cause of the World even for those that might have attained to perfection of power and vision. A Smṛiti also declares [Mahābhārata, vi. 5. 12]—"Those objects indeed that are beyond the pale of thinking—to them one should not apply logic ;" and another [Bhagavadgītā, ii. 25]—"He is declared to be non-manifest, unthinkable, and unmodifiable," as also others like [ibid., x. 2]—"Neither the host of gods nor the great sages know of my origin : I am indeed the source of the gods and of the great sages of every sort." And as to the view that the Scripture itself, prescribing ratiocination over and above the hearing, seems to assign a place of honour also to reasoning, not by such pretensions can there be gained a possible scope for sheer reasoning. For, it is only reasoning conformable to the Scripture that is here to be resorted to as being contributory to intuitive knowledge ; such reasoning, for instance, as—(i) because the true-nature of sleep and the true-nature of waking-life are both exclusive of each other, therefore the soul (who experiences both the states) is in reality unconnected with the attributes of any of them ; (ii) because in sound-sleep the soul rids himself of all worldly concerns and becomes of the nature of the Self who is pure existence, therefore the soul is in reality of the nature of that Self who is freed of all worldly ties and whose essence is pure existence ; or (iii) because the phenomenal-world springs from Brahman, therefore, according to the axiom that the cause and the effect are non-different from one another, the world has no existence apart from Brahman ; and so on. And in the Sūtra [II. i. 11.] beginning with " By reason of the non-stability of reasoning " he is going to exhibit [Page 12] the deceptive nature of mere ratiocination.—Then as to the person who argues on the strength of the Scriptural

assertion about a sentient cause to the world, that the whole world is itself sentient, even he can conceivably explain the Scriptural statement concerning the distinction between the sentient and the non-sentient, viz., [Tait. Up., ii. 6]—" The intelligent as also the non-intelligent"— by declaring (the common characteristic of sentiency) to be manifest in some objects and non-manifest in others. It is our opponent, on the other hand, who cannot explain the Scriptural assertion about the distinction. How? Because in the passage in question, viz., [Tait. Up., ii. 6]—" It transformed itself into the intelligent as also the non-intelligent" the Highest Cause is declared to transform itself and assume the form of the entire world. And just as one that is sentient cannot properly become non-sentient, because the two are disparate-in-nature, even so, one that is non-sentient cannot assume the form of the sentient. We, of course, have refuted the argument based on disparity-in-nature and hence have to assume, just in conformity with the Scripture, a sentient First Cause. 6.

If (you urge that the effect, viz., the world) would become non-existent, we say, No : for, that is a mere negative statement (without an actual object to be negated). 7.

If the sentient and pure Brahman, void of all qualities like sound, is desired to be the cause of an effect which is contrary-in-nature to it, as being non-sentient, impure, and possessed of qualities like sound, then in that case you will have to admit that the effect had no existence prior to its origination; and that would be unacceptable to you, who hold the view of the existence of the effect (in the cause) prior to production. To this contention we reply that it is no valid objection. For, it is a mere negative-statement : It is a mere denial (of the antecedent existence of the effect), and there is no real object to which the negation is to be referred. Neither also can your negative-statement come in the way of the recognition of the existence of the effect (in the cause) prior to the production. How so? Because just as, in the present time, this effect (the world) has an existence only in and through the Cause (Brahman), even so, we can understand it to have an existence also prior to creation. For, surely, even in the present time, this effect has no existence independent and irrespective of the existence of the Cause, as is clear from statements

like [Brih., ii. 4. 6]—" All would forsake him who recognises anything as existing elsewhere than in the Self. " And the same kind of existence, in and through the Cause, holds good in the case of the effect even prior to the creation. But (we are asked) do you not hold the Brahman, void of qualities like sound and so forth, as the cause of the world?— (We answer) most assuredly ; but the effect with its qualities of sound and the rest possesses no existence — as apart from its existence in and through the cause—now, any more than prior to creation ; so that it will not be possible for you to urge that the effect remains altogether non-existent prior to production. In fuller details we will expound this our position when we discuss the non-distinctness of the effect from the cause in Sūtra II. i. 14 below. 7.

Because during [the period of] re-absorption (or dissolution) there would result the contingency of its being like that : therefore, the theory is illogical. 8.

! Says the objector at this stage :—If the effect that has the characteristics of grossness, divisibility-into-parts, non-sentiency, finiteness, impurity and so forth, is to be assumed to have Brahman as its cause, then at the time of the Dissolution, when the effect would be restored to the causal state and re-absorbed (into the cause) and so [Page 13] would become undistinguishable from it, the effect would, by its own characteristics, contaminate the cause, so that during re-absorption there would arise the contingency of the cause Brahman also possessing, like the effect (world), impurity and other characteristics. Hence the Upanishadic view as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world does not stand to reason.—Again, once all the distinctions have merged undistinguishably together (into Brahman), at the time of the succeeding creation there cannot necessarily result a new creation with a (similar) distinction between the experiencing souls and the objects of experience, as there is nothing to restrain (the two classes) from being mixed with each other. For this reason also the view is unreasonable.—Once again, after the experiencing-souls have become, during the Dissolution, non-distinguishable from Brahman, if we were to assume a newer creation, although the occasion for it, viz., the Karman (of the souls), no longer exists—being merged into Brahman—then there is

sure to result the contingency of the liberated souls also becoming liable to be born in that creation : which also is another defect of logic (in the Brahman theory).—Should this world, finally, be imagined, even during the state of Dissolution, to remain just distinct from the Highest Brahman, then there can be no Dissolution strictly so-called, to say nothing for the objection that the effect can in-no-wise remain distinct from the cause. Therefore also the theory is illogical. 8.

To this we reply—

Not so : because there do exist parallel instances. 9.

There is not at all in our theory anything of illogicality. As to the defect pointed out, viz., that the effect, being re-absorbed into the cause at Dissolution, would by its own characteristics contaminate the cause, that is no defect. Why? Because there do exist parallel instances. Instances can indeed be pointed out in which an effect merging back into the cause does not by its own characteristics contaminate the cause. For example, earthen plates, etc., which are the products of clay, the constituent cause, although during the period of their separate existence (as plates etc.) they are divisible into classes such as very good (high), very bad (low), and middling, they do not yet contaminate with these their characteristics their constituent cause, the clay. Similarly different ornaments fashioned out of gold, when they, after their destruction, become re-absorbed into gold, do not by their own characteristics contaminate the gold. Likewise also, the four classes of beings which are produced out of the earth do not by their own characteristics contaminate the Earth when absorbed back into it. It is for your view of the case that no parallel instance can be cited. For, Dissolution itself would be impossible if the effect were to remain within the cause just by its own nature. It is to be noted here, however, that although there is non-distinctness in nature between the effect and the cause, it is the effect that is of the nature of the cause, and not the cause of the nature of the effect, as is clear from Scriptural statements about (word-)initiation (of creation) : and this he will state later under Sūtra II. i. 14.—Furthermore, your objection covers a far less field than there is warrant for, when you urge that the effect, at the time of re-absorption, would by its characteristics contaminate

the cause. The contingency holds equally well during the time that (the world actually) endures (as the world), as we (through-out) maintain non-separateness between the effect and the cause. For, there are Scriptural texts like [Brih., ii, 4. 6]—"All this that there is, is the Ātman," or [Chh., vii. 25. 2]—"The Ātman itself is all this," or [Muṇḍaka, II. ii. 11]—"Formerly all this was the immortal Brahman itself," or [Chh., iii. 14. 1.]—"All this verily is Brahman," [Page 14]—that declare the non-separateness in all the three times of the effect from the cause. The way out of the contingency that is available in these cases, viz., that the cause is not contaminated by the characteristics of the effect, because the effect itself as well as its characteristics are superimpositions of Nescience, that same also holds good in the condition of Dissolution.

There is also this other parallel instance : Just as a magician is not in all the three times affected by the magical-illusion which he himself spreads out, because (the illusion) is not a reality, even so is the Highest Self not affected by the world-illusion ; and again, just as the one (Soul) who is seeing a dream is not affected by the illusions of the dream-vision, because that illusion does not follow him over into either the waking or the deep-sleep conditions, even so the one enduring Soul who witnesses all the three conditions without himself undergoing any change, is in no way affected by all the three states that mutually exclude one another (none of them running over into the other). That the Highest Self should appear to have these three states is itself sheer illusion, comparable to the appearance of a rope in the form of a snake and the like. On this point there is a pronouncement by the Teachers who are the knowers of the traditional teaching of the Upanishads [Gauḍapāda-Kārikās, i. 16]—"When the Soul, thrown into sleep by the beginningless Illusion, wakes up from it ; it is only then that he realises the non-duality wherein there is neither birth, nor sleep, nor dreaming." So then, the defect urged on the ground of "the contingency that, during the state of re-absorption, the cause also, like the effect, would be affected by grossness and other qualities is no longer tenable. Next, the objection that, after the merging together of all distinctions whatsoever, there cannot be pointed out any principle to regulate the subsequent creation together

with its distinctive classifications: that is also nugatory, and just for the reason that parallel instances exist. For, just as, in the conditions of deep-sleep or Yogic-trance and the like, even though one might attain therein to one's innate nature of freedom-from-distinctions, still inasmuch as his Nescience stands unsublated, when he wakes out of it, there does exist for him the same old distinctive classifications: even so it could be in the present case. To this effect is the Scriptural statement [Chh., vi. 9. 2-3] —“All these creatures are absorbed into the (Brahman which is) Existence, and yet do not know that they are absorbed into It. Be they here a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a hog, or a worm, or a butterfly, or a gnat, or a fly: whatsoever they are that they re-become!” Just as, although the Highest Self is beyond all distinctions, yet, during the subsistence of the world, we do observe uninterrupted, all these dealings based upon distinctions, like unto the (affairs of the) dream-world (while it endures),—the dealings being grounded upon a false knowledge—even so, during the state of re-absorption also, we would infer the existence of (a latent tendency for) making distinctions, grounded likewise upon (unsublated) false knowledge. — By the same argument can be set at rest the contingency as to the liberated souls being born again, seeing that, in their case, all false knowledge has been sublated by right knowledge.—Lastly, as to the other alternative-contingency raised towards the end, viz., ‘should this world be imagined, even during the state of Dissolution, to remain just distinct from the Highest Brahman’ that is refuted by us inasmuch as we do not at all make the assumption. Hence our Upanishadic doctrine is quite logical. 9.

And because your own view is open to the same objection. 10.

[Page 15] And in the view of our opponent also the same common deficiencies would become manifest. We explain how. As to the contention that by reason of the disparity-in-nature the world cannot have Brahman for its constituent cause, that is equally applicable if it were to have the (Sāṅkhya) Pradhāna for its constituent cause, since in this view also the world which has qualities such as sound etc. is assumed to proceed from the Pradhāna which has not those sound and the other qualities. And for that very reason, i. e., because of the assumption of the pro-

duction of a disparate effect (from the Pradhāna), there would result the same contingency of the acceptance of the doctrine of the non-existence of the effect prior to its origination. So also, in the state of Dissolution, if the effect were to be assumed to remain non-distinct from the cause, the contingency of "this becoming like that" holds equally true. So likewise when all the effects, with all their specific individualities sublated, have become, in the condition of Dissolution, non-distinguishable (from their cause, the Pradhāna), the distinctions such as—this is the material-constituent attached to this Self, this the one attached to this other: all these which, prior to the Dissolution, were restricted to each person, they cannot possibly be, in a subsequent creation, regularly and necessarily assigned (to the same persons), as there is no adequate ground for the restriction. And if we assume that such a restriction could be made even in the absence of adequate ground, then the liberated souls can be liable to bondage once more, because even in their case there is the same absence of adequate ground (which by hypothesis is no bar). And if you were to make the supposition that it is only *some* of the distinctions that would become non-distinguishable, i. e., that would be completely absorbed into the Pradhāna, and not the others, then those that do not become (so absorbed) will have to be considered as not the effects of the Pradhāna. Thus all these deficiencies are common to both the sides and should not be urged against only one of them; and so (the sūtra) emphatically declares the deficiencies to be not deficiencies, inasmuch as they have to be necessarily admitted. 10.

And also because of the non-stability of reasoning. And should you claim to reason otherwise, even so there results the contingency of non-release. 11.

For this additional reason also one should not raise any objection on the basis of mere reasoning against a matter which can be known only from the Scriptures; since, that is to say, all reasonings are void of traditional authority and so lacking in stability, being just spun out of the sheerest guesses of men—there being no goad to keep such guesses under check. For, we find that reasonings put forth by certain learned persons with great ado are perceived to be fallacious by others more learned than

these, while those put forth by these again are proved to contain a fallacy by some others still, so that it is not possible to assign any stability to reasonings, because there is such a difference in the faculties of men. And if one were to follow the lead of a supposedly stable process-of-reasoning endorsed by a person of well-established eminence like Kapila or some other person, even so there results the absence of stability, inasmuch as we observe the existence of a mutual divergence of views amongst propounders-of-systems like Kapila, Kaṇāda and the rest, although they be admitted to possess a well-established pre-eminence. And if you were to say—we would reason in some other manner so as to avoid the fault of an absence of stability. For, surely, it is not possible to hold that there does not at all exist any stable (unshakeable) reasoning. To go no further, this very non-stability of reasonings is (sought to be) established by reasoning itself, inasmuch as, having observed the non-stability of a certain number of reasonings, you imagine the non-stability of other reasonings of the same class. If all reasonings were to be unstable [Page 16] there would result the contingency of an annihilation of all worldly dealings. For, we do see in ordinary life people proceeding to acquire or avert (respectively) the pleasure or the pain in the path-way that is yet to be traversed on the analogy of the path-way that has been or is being traversed. Moreover, whenever there ensues a divergence of views as to the real intention of a Scriptural text, it is reasoning, consisting in an exposition of the purport of a sentence, which enables us to refute the false (prima facie) interpretation and fix the correct one. Manu also holds the same view when he lays down [xii. 105]—“Direct perception, and inference, and the Śāstra consisting of various Scriptural texts: these three one should master thoroughly well if he is desirous of ascertaining (the nature of) purity in religious-practice;” and again [xii. 106]—“It is he who tries to harmonise the injunction about religious-practices laid down by Sages with a reasoning not going against the teaching of the Vedas and the Śāstras: he alone knows what is true religious-practice and none other.” In fact the so-called absence of stability is exactly a point of honour for reasoning; for, that serves as an incentive for throwing out defective reasoning and accepting one that is free from all defects. For, surely, because our forefathers were fools, that should constitute no ground at all

why we ourselves should act like fools. Therefore the instability of reasoning is no fault-in-argument. To this the reply is : Even so there arises the contingency of an absence of release. Although in a sporadic case or two reasoning appears to be well-grounded, still in the present instance, in any count, there does arise the non-release of reasoning from the fault of instability ; for, a knowledge of the actual Reality as it is, which is perfectly unfathomable and on which depends man's final emancipation, cannot be even distantly guessed except with the help of the Scriptures. For, as we have already said, this is an object not falling within the ken of direct-perception as there is an absence of colour and other qualities in it, and not within that of inference and other means-of-knowledge, owing to the absence of inferential marks etc. belonging to it. Further, all the disputants who believe in a final release do equally assume that the release is achieved by right knowledge ; and this right knowledge, because referring to an existing reality, must be uniform. We declare that to be the highest truth which always endures in one and the same form ; and the knowledge of this truth is known as the true knowledge in the world : e. g., the knowledge that fire is hot. This being so, it is absurd that persons should maintain a diversity of views regarding the nature of the true knowledge. Contrariwise, the divergence in views based upon reasoning—their mutual opposition (and inconsistency)—is admitted on all hands. For, what one logician puts forward, claiming that that alone is the true knowledge, that is upset by another ; and what this other one establishes, that is controverted by another still : this is already well-known all through the world. How can a knowledge arrived at by reasoning, and having no fixed and uniform content, ever become true knowledge ? Nor is it a fact that the propounder of the Pradhāna theory is acknowledged by all the logicians as being the most pre-eminent amongst those that know how to reason, so that it might have been possible to accept his view as being the one most true. And it is of course not possible to call together in one place and at one time all the logicians that have been, that are, and that will ever be born, so that the joint-view of them all, when referring to one and the same object and delivering itself in an identical manner, might be regarded as the true knowledge. The Veda, as contrasted with these, is eternal and is the source of the right knowledge, and it

[Page 17] can properly have a fixity of subject-matter and form-of-contents, so that it would be impossible for any logicians of the past, the present, and the future to gainsay the claim for correctness which the knowledge based upon Veda can rightfully have. Hence it follows that it is this very Upanishadic knowledge that is the true knowledge. And as the claim for being true cannot be established for any knowledge other than this, there would result (by following this other knowledge) a non-release from worldly-fetters. It thus stands established that, in conformity with the Scriptures and in conformity with reasonings consistent with the Scriptures, it is the sentient Brahman that is the efficient and the constituent cause of this world. 11. Here ends the Topic (3) called Disparity-in-Nature.

TOPIC 4: REPROBATE THEORIES

(*Sūtra* 12)

Hereby are also explained (away) theories, reprobated by men-of-position-and-competence. 12.

Because it offered the closest analogy unto the Upanishadic theory, because it was supported by very weighty reasonings, and because, in some of its sections, it was accepted by some competent followers of the Vedic view,—for these reasons it was that the objection against the Upanishadic teachings, put forth upon the basis of reasoning and claiming to find support from the theory that recognised the Pradhāna as the cause (of the world), has been thus far answered. Now, there continues to be brought forward, by some persons of feeble intellect and on the strength even of such theories as that of the Atoms, an objection based upon (mere) reasoning against the statements in the Upanishads. To meet that he makes an analogical-transference (of the present argumentation), following the (well-known) maxim of overthrowing the main assailant only (and ignoring the minor ones). What are accepted (parigrihyante) are called parigrahāḥ. Those that are not parigrahāḥ are styled a-parigrahāḥ. The a-parigrahāḥ of the men-of-competence-and-learning (Śishtāḥ) are designated (in the text of the sūtra) as the “Śishtāparigrahāḥ” or theories not accepted by the wise. By virtue

of the present argumentation in refutation of the theory that regards the Pradhāna as the cause, we have to consider as refuted, after a setting forth of their untenable nature, the theories such as those which recognise the atoms and the like as the cause (of the universe) theories which in none of their portions have been at all countenanced by persons of authority like Manu, Vyāsa, and others. The refuting argument being identical, there remains now no further ground at all for raising any objection. For, there holds good even in their case the fact of the impenetrability by (mere) logic of the highly mysterious (cause of the universe), of the instability of reasoning, of the resulting absence of release if one were to reason in any other mode, and the contradiction with the Scriptures: these and the like are the grounds of refutation. 12. Here ends the Topic (4) styled Reprobate Theories.

TOPIC 5 : OBJECTS TURNED SUBJECTS

(*Sūtra* 13)

It it be urged that by reason of the objects (of experience) becoming one with the experiencing subjects there would result an absence of discrimination, we reply, it might happen as in ordinary life. 13.

Once again, from another view-point, but on the strength of reasoning itself, the theory that regards the Brahman as the cause is being objected to. Although we grant that Scriptures might be the sole authority in their own proper province, yet where their subject-matter falls within the range of another means-of-knowledge, it is but fair that it should conform to this other means. This holds good in the case of several ritualistic and laudatory texts. Reasoning, likewise, should be unauthoritative in matters not falling strictly within its field, e. g., in regard to what constitutes and what does not constitute correct religious-practice. Well, what are you driving at? This being conceded, it is not right that the Scripture should run counter [Page 18] to something already well-established by other means-of-knowledge. But what makes you say that anything already well-established by other means-of-knowledge is contradicted by the Scriptures? The

reply follows. This distinction between the objects of experience and the experiencing subject is well-established in the world: the subject being the sentient soul within the body and the objects, the qualities like sound and the rest. Thus Devadatta is the experiencing subject, and cooked-rice the object of experience. Now this distinction would be rendered nugatory, if the subject were to be transformed into the object, or the object transformed into the subject. And such a mutual transformation in their case would ensue by reason of their being believed to be one with Brahman, the Highest Cause. And it is not right that this well-established distinction be rendered nugatory by the Scripture. For, we must postulate the existence of a distinction between the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience in the past and in the future, similar to what there actually exists to-day in the present. Hence, because of the resulting contingency of an annihilation of this well-established distinction between the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience, the final conclusion, making Brahman the cause (of the universe), is not tenable. If some one were to start such an objection one should answer him thus: It might happen as in the ordinary life. Even in our view the distinction in question can obtain without difficulty, since we observe analogies to it in the world. To explain: although foam and wave and ripple and bubble and the rest, as being just the modifications of the ocean, are not distinct from the ocean, whose essence is water, there can yet obtain a distinctness amongst themselves as also mutual relation between them such as conjunction etc. with one another. In this instance although the foam, ripple, and the rest, as modifications of the ocean, are not distinct-in-essence from the ocean which is constituted of water, yet there does not result any confusion of the one with the other. And even while such a commingling of them into one another does not take place, yet it is not that they possess an essence distinct from that of the ocean. Just so in the present case also there need not ensue the mixing up of the one with the other in the case of the experiencing-subjects and the objects-of-experience; nor likewise need they be regarded as having an essence distinct from the Highest Brahman.—It is to be noted here that although the experiencing-subject is not a modification of the Brahman, inasmuch as the Scriptural text [Tait. Up., ii. 6]—“Having created it, He thereupon entered into

the same"—speaks of the subsequent-entrance of the unmodified Creator himself into his creation, and his becoming himself the experiencing-subject, yet once He has entered into his creation there does exist a distinction caused by specific-limitations, just as there is one in the Ether caused by limitations such as the Ether-within-a-jar and the like. Consequently, it has been stated that there can exist, on the analogy of the ocean and the ripples, the distinction between the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience, although they are both of them identical-in-essence with Brahman, the Highest Cause. 13. Here ends the Topic (5) entitled Objects Turned Subjects.

TOPIC 6 : WORD-INITIATED WORLD

(*Sūtras* 14-20)

There is non-distinctness (of the world) from that (i. e., Brahman), because of the statements regarding (Word-)Initiation, and the like. 14.

Assuming this ordinary distinction in the shape of the experiencing-subject and the objects-of-experience we have formulated our refutation, saying that it might happen as in ordinary life. But this distinction does not exist from the point of view of the highest truth, inasmuch as we learn of the non-distinctness of the two : the effect and the cause. The effect is the multiform expanse of the world including the Ether and the rest ; [Page 19] the cause is the Highest Brahman ; and, from the point of view of the highest truth, we learn of the non-distinctness, i. e., non-existence as apart from it, of this effect from that cause. How ? Because of Scriptural statements such as (word-)initiation and the like. To begin with the statement concerning (word-)initiation, there, after promising the knowledge of *all* consequent upon the knowledge of *one*, by way of the needed illustrative example it is said [Chh., vi. 1. 4]—" Just as, My dear boy, by just one lump-of-clay everything fabricated out of clay can become comprehended, the modified-form being only a word-initiation,—a mere name,—as the clay alone it having any reality." The point intended is this : When one lump of clay is comprehended in its real nature as clay, all fabrications of clay such as jar, plate, or water-

pot, being in reality no more than the clay-in-essence, can become comprehended, inasmuch as the modified-forms are a fabrication of mere word, are a name only and are originated by word alone, as when it is said that here is a jar, a plate, a water-pot, and so on. The modified-form, as such has not at all any reality of essence: it is a mere name only, an unreality; the reality belonging to it only as it is clay. The above is an illustration used for the Brahman in the Scriptural text. The statement about word-initiation occurring here leads us to consider, by an application of the illustration to the matter-in-hand, the entire mass of created-objects as having no existence apart from the Brahman. And later, after declaring that Light, Water, and Food are the effects of Brahman, the same text proceeds to assert that the effects (of this triad) of Light, Water, and Food have no real existence as apart from Light, Water, and Food, with the words beginning with [Chh., vi. 4. 1]—"Fireness has vanished from the fire (as an independent reality), the modified-form being only an initiation by words, a mere name, the true reality being just the three colours (red, white, and black—belonging respectively to Light, Water, and Food)."—The sūtra speaks of 'statements regarding (Word-)initiation and the like,' and by 'the like' are to be adduced texts declaratory of the oneness of the Ātman, like [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—"All this has 'that one' as its essence; 'that one' is reality; 'that one' is the Self: and "That thou art"; or [Bṛih. ii., 4. 6]—"All this that there is, is this very Self"; or [Mundaka, II. ii. 11]—"Brahman alone is all this"; or [Chh., vii. 25. 2]—"The Ātman alone is all this"; or [Bṛih., iv. 4. 19]—"There is nothing at all of the manifold in the world." For, we cannot otherwise understand the possibility of the knowledge of one thing giving the knowledge of everything. Hence, just as the ether contained within a jar, within a water-pot, etc., is not distinct from the great mass of ether in its entirety, and just as the water in the mirage and the like is not distinct from the sandy-plane and so forth, seeing that the former have a form that anon appears and disappears, and so are not capable of being described in their real essence;—even so, we have to understand this entire mass of worldly-phenomenon consisting of experiencing-subjects and objects-of-experience, as having no real existence as apart from the Brahman.

An objection: Why not regard the Brahman as possessing

more than one nature in reality? Just as a tree has more than one branch, even so is the Brahman endowed with more than one power and activity. Accordingly, both the oneness and the manifoldness are true in reality, just as the tree has [Page 20] oneness when considered as tree, but manifoldness when considered as branches; or just as the ocean has oneness *qua* ocean, but manifoldness as foam, ripples, etc.; or just as, again, the clay as clay is one, but as jar, plate, etc., manifold. Out of this two-fold nature, the knowledge of that portion which refers to oneness would bring to pass the Scriptural declarations as to emancipation, etc., while by the portion referring to manifoldness would be accomplished the secular and the Scriptural requirements belonging to the Sphere of Works. And in this way also illustrations as to clay and the like would be harmonised.—To this we say—No. For, in the illustration [Chh., vi 4. 1]—“As clay alone there is reality,” the constituent-cause is alone emphatically declared to be the exclusive reality, the statement about Word-initiation assigning unreality to the entire mass of modified-forms. The same should hold true also of the theme for which the illustrations were adduced. For, there is a definite declaration [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—“All this has ‘this one’ as its essence; and that is the Real”—to the effect that the Highest Cause is alone real; while there is the teaching [ibid., vi. 8. 7]—“That is the Self: That thou art, O Śvetaketu”—that the Self-within-the-body is one with the Brahman. This oneness with Brahman of the Self-within-the-body is self-subsistent: it is not something the truth of which has to be established by extraneous efforts. So, when this oneness-in-essence with Brahman, declared in the Scriptures, comes to be realised, it serves to annihilate the ordinarily-understood distinct-individuality of the Self-within-the-body, just as the knowledge of the rope as rope drives away the (mistaken) knowledge of it as a snake and the like. And once the individuality of the Self-within-the-body is sublated, all the ordinary dealings based upon that become nugatory—dealings for establishing which one had to assume the existence of a second distinct aspect of the Brahman as manifold. This is borne out by passages such as [Br̥ih., iv. 5. 15]—“When, on the contrary, all this has become in his case just one with the Self, then what is there for him to see and what means to see it?”—which declare the absence of all phenomenal-dealings based upon

actions, means to actions, and fruits of actions, in the case of one who has realised the Brahman as the essence (of everything). Nor can it stand to reason to assert that this (perception of the) absence of all the phenomenal-dealings is merely contingent upon certain specific conditions; for, the statement [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—"That thou art"—does not declare the (Self's) oneness-in-essence with Brahman as bound up with any specific conditions. Further, the illustration of the thief [Chh., vi. 16] declares the bondage for one who states the untruth, and the release in the case of one who states the truth; and so vouches for the sole ultimate reality of oneness only—the manifoldness being an apparition raised up by false knowledge. For, if both were to be true, how can a creature, immersed in phenomenal-world as he is, be spoken of as a prevaricator? And the text [Brih., iv. 4. 19]—"From Death he comes by death, who sees manifoldness here"—declares as much by its deprecation of a belief in manifoldness. Nor can this view [Page 21] cogently explain how emancipation can be the result of knowledge; for, there is no scope (in this view) for any kind of false knowledge which gives rise to worldly-bondage and which is to be driven away by true knowledge. For, when both of them are true, how can it be said that the knowledge of oneness drives away the knowledge of manifoldness?

But an objector might say, if we assume absolute oneness, there being no manifoldness, the ordinary means-of-knowledge such as direct-perception would be rendered nugatory as having no scope for them, like perceptions as to the form of a human being when applied to objects like pillars (which are not human beings). So also the Scriptural prescriptions as to what should and what should not be done—depending as they do upon distinctions, would also be null and void in the absence of that (manifoldness). Likewise, too, the Scriptural teaching as to emancipation would, in the absence of that, come to nought, since it is contingent upon distinctions like that between the teacher and the taught. Besides, how can we reasonably believe in the truth of the doctrine of the oneness of the Self propounded by the Scriptural teaching about emancipation, when the Scripture itself is to be false?—To the above objection we reply that our theory is not open to the fault urged. For, prior to the realisation of the

Brahman as the only true Reality, all ordinary views-and-practices whatsoever can well be true, like the phenomena of the dream-life prior to awakening. As long as there has not taken place the realisation of the oneness of Self as the only Reality, so long nobody has, born within him, the notion as to the unreality of all the modified-forms that fall into the (three) categories of the means-of-knowledge, objects-of-knowledge, and fruit-of-knowledge. On the other hand, all creatures, under the influence of Nescience, and throwing overboard the oneness-in-essence with the Brahman which is theirs by right, conceive a notion with reference to the (various) phenomenal-forms, regarding them as of their own essence or as belonging to them, and designating them (respectively) as the 'I' or the 'mine'. Therefore, prior to the awakening of the consciousness of the Brahman as the only true Reality, all secular and Scriptural requirements can find a satisfactory warrant. Just as for the ordinary man, gone asleep and visualising in dreams objects high and low, there does exist, prior to the awakening, a knowledge which he thinks to be direct perception, and which he (for the time) even firmly believes in—there being, be it noted, no notion at the time of the fallaciousness of that 'direct-perception'—even so in the present case. — But, it might be asked, how can we possibly explain the knowledge—which is true—of the Brahman as the only Reality, when it is to result from an Upanishadic statement which falls within the sphere of the untrue? For, surely, one bitten by a rope-mistaken-as-snake never dies; nor is it possible, with the help of the water-in-the-mirage, to achieve purposes like drinking, bathing, and the like. But that is no objection; for, we do meet with effects, such as death, resulting from even suspicion of poison and the like; and in a man during the state of dream we do see the effects (quivering etc.) of snake-bite, bath, and the like. Should it be urged that even this effect is unreal, this is our reply: Although in a man during the state of dream the effects due to snake-bite, bath, and the like be false, yet there is the fruit of them in the form of the man's consciousness of what had happened, which is true, seeing that it does not disappear even in the wakeful condition. For, assuredly, no man whatsoever, when awakened from dreaming, although realising as false the effects due to snake-bite, water-baths, and the like which he saw in the dream, ever regards his experience of them

as untrue.—Incidentally, from the fact of the persistence of this consciousness of dream-experience in the man who has seen dreams we have to understand a refutation of the theory which regards the body itself as the Self.—We have a Scriptural passage to the same effect [Chh., v. 2. 9]—“When, while some activity intended for a definite end is proceeding, one sees a woman in his dreams, in that dream-vision of his he should understand a prosperity for him”—[Page 22] which avows for the acquisition of a prosperity which is real from a dream-vision which is unreal. In the same manner Ait. Āraṇ. [III. ii. 4. 7]—after declaring that, when certain omens capable of being experienced during waking-life have presented themselves, “one should consider that he will not live much longer,” goes on to say (ibid., III. ii. 4. 15)—“Now the dreams: One sees (in the dream) a black person with black teeth; and that person kills him”—that even these varied dream-visions which are unreal presage death which is real. And that is indeed well-established, in ordinary life, with persons who are skilled in (drawing inference from) invariable concomitance and non-concomitance, viz., that such-and-such a dream-vision conduces to weal and such-and-such an one to woe. So too we observe the knowledge of the true ‘A’ and other (sounds) as resulting from the knowledge of the untrue symbolic lines (standing for them).—Finally, here is this ultimate (decisive) argument to prove the oneness of the Ātman: viz., there is nothing further beyond it of which an expectancy exists. While in an ordinary statement such as, ‘one should make an offering,’ there arises the expectancy as to ‘unto whom,’ ‘with what,’ and ‘in what mode,’ no such expectancy is known to arise in connection with the declaration [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—‘That thou art,’ or [Bṛih., i. 4. 10]—‘I am Brahman,’ inasmuch as it intends to convey the knowledge of the absolute oneness of the true essence of everything. It is only when some other object exists as a remainder that there might arise the expectancy; but there does not exist any other object remaining apart from and beyond the Ātman, which can give rise to the expectancy. Nor is it possible to urge that such a knowledge never does arise; for, there are Vedic texts like [Chh., vi. 16. 3]—“And then indeed he did realise,” and there are also prescriptions for securing that knowledge such as hearing (the Vedic texts, Bṛih., iv. 6) and repeating them after the teacher [Bṛih., iv. 4. 22]. And it is not possible to urge

that this knowledge is fruitless or erroneous ; for, we see the fruit of it, viz., the cessation of Nescience ; and there arises thereafter no other knowledge to negative the (earlier) knowledge (as happens in the case of an erroneous knowledge). Of course, until this absolute oneness of the Ātman is realised, all secular and Scriptural affairs which are due to a compound of truth with falsehood, remain, as we have already stated, quite undisturbed. Hence, when the absolute oneness of the Ātman is brought home by this ultimate (decisive) means-of-knowledge, all the earlier activities based upon distinction are annihilated, and there then remains no more any scope for imagining the Brahman to possess manifoldness.

Another objection : we gather, from the assigning of illustrative examples such as the lump-of-clay, that the Scriptural texts intend to set forth the Brahman as one capable of being modified : for, objects like the lump-of-clay are known in ordinary life to be capable of assuming modifications. We answer, No. For, texts like [Brih., iv. 4. 25]—“ He, indeed, is this great unborn Ātman, the ageless, deathless, immortal and fearless Brahman” ; [Page 23] or [Brih., iii. 9. 26]—“ He is that Ātman, the Not-this, Not-that” ; or [Brih., iii. 8. 8]—“ It is neither gross nor subtle”,—and others deny unto the Brahman every kind of modification and declare it to be immutable. And it surely is not possible to understand one and the same Brahman as both capable and also incapable of assuming modifications. Why may it not be possible, like standing and moving (in the case of one and the same man) ? No : because we have declared the Brahman to be immutable. Unto the immutable Brahman, of course, there cannot be assigned manifoldness of nature like standing and moving. We have already said that the Brahman is immutable and eternal inasmuch as all kinds of modifications are denied of it. Nor can we imagine that, just as the realisation of the oneness of the Ātman with the Brahman is the means to salvation, even so the realisation of it as capable of assuming the modifications in the form of the world might have been intended as another independent means for some other assignable fruit ; for there is no valid proof for the supposition. The Scripture declares the fruit to follow just from the realisation of the Ātman as being one with the immutable Brahman ; for instance, the text {Brih., iv. 2. 4} which

beginning with—"He is that Ātman, the Not-this, Not-that," and concludes [Brih., iv. 2. 4]—"Now indeed, O Janaka, thou hast attained the Fearless One." From this it follows that in a context where the prevailing theme is the Brahman, when it has been proved that the winning of the fruit is to result just from the realisation of the Brahman as destitute of all specific attributes whatsoever, any statements therein that are met with and that have no special fruit declared in their connection—e. g., the statement as to Brahman being modified in the form of the world—are to be understood merely as subordinate means contributory to the Brahma-realisation, in accordance with the maxim—"In a context where some fruit is declared in connection with the main-theme, any statements made without specification of a special fruit connected therewith have to be regarded as subordinate (to the main-theme)"—and not as though they are capable of yielding an independent fruit of their own. For, it is absurd to declare that from a realisation of the Brahman as susceptible of modifications there might result the fruit, viz., the Ātman's susceptibility to modifications, since the nature of emancipation has to be eternal and immutable (which it cannot be if the Ātman who is to get the emancipation were to be by nature mutable). — But, for one who holds by the theory of the oneness of the Ātman with the immutable Brahman, because for him there is absolute oneness, there would result the non-existence of a controller of the world and the objects-controlled, and so a contradiction with his own solemn-declaration as to the Lord being the cause (of the Universe). To this we say, No: For the (Lord's) omniscience turns upon the mere unfolding of the embryonic Names and Forms which go to make up the Nescience. It was on the basis of texts like [Tait. Up., i. 1]—"From that Ātman sprang forth the Ether"—that we had made the solemn-assertion [Brah. Sūtra, I. i. 2]—"From which (arise) the origination etc. of this (universe)"—intended to declare that it is from the omniscient, omnipotent Lord, whose nature is eternal, pure, unfettered, consciousness, that there result the world's origination, subsistence, and dissolution, and not from the non-sentient Pradhāna or from some other principle. That solemn-assertion of course stands: nor do we assert here anything which runs counter to it. How can you say that, when you declare in the same breath the absolute oneness of the Ātman without anything as

a second to it? Listen how we declare nothing self-contradictory : In the Scriptural texts, and in the Smritis (based upon them), we are told that the omniscient Lord has—as if forming a part of his nature but not really explicable either as having that nature or as not having that nature—the Name and the Form, the fabrications of Nescience and the germinal-principles of the phenomenal-world,—which are designated [Page 24] as the Illusion or as the Power or as the Nature of the omniscient Lord. The omniscient Lord is distinct from these two, as is clear from the passage [Chh., viii. 14. 1]—“It is indeed the Ether which achieves the Name and the Form : that which is beyond these two is the Brahman,” as also from texts like [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—“Let me unfold the Name and the Form”; or [Tait. Āraṇ., iii. 12. 7]—“The Wise One, having congregated all forms, assigns the names and keeps on calling out the same;” or [Śvet., vi. 16]—“He who makes the one seed manifold.” Thus the Lord becomes the Lord only when conforming himself to the limitations of Name and Form made out by Nescience, like unto the ether as conforming to the limitations of the jar, the water-pot, and the like. And He it is who, from the point of view of ordinary life, rules over the sentient-selves styled the individual-souls, who are as if a portion of Himself—analogueous to the ether as limited by the jar—and who conform to the bodies (kārya) and the organs which are all the creations of Name and Form,—all of them the fabrications of Nescience. Thus, then, the Lord’s character as Lord—His omniscience and omnipotence—is merely contingent upon His being characterised by these limitations that consist of Nescience; while from the point of view of the ultimate truth there cannot reasonably remain any scope herein for the ordinary conceptions of controlling, being controlled, omniscience and the like, when the Ātman has once attained through knowledge his real nature in which all limitations are at an end. This has been declared by texts like [Chh., vii. 24. 1]—“Wherein he neither sees anything beyond it, nor hears anything besides it, nor knows anything other than itself : that is the Plenum;” and [Bṛih., iv. 5. 15]—“When in his case everything has become his very Self, what can he perceive, and with what can he perceive?” Thus in the state of highest Reality all the Upanishads vouch for the annihilation of all phenomenal-dealings. To the like effect also the Bhagavadgītā [v. 14-15]—“The Lord

creates, of these people, neither their function-as-an-actor, nor their activities, nor the joining of their actions with (corresponding) fruit: it is Nature that does it all (automatically). Nor does the Lord receive either the sin or the merit of anyone: the knowledge is obscured by Nescience, and as a consequence of it the creatures all go deviously"—wherein is set forth, the utter absence, in the state of highest Reality, of ordinary conceptions such as that of the controller and the objects-controlled, and so forth. From the point of view of ordinary perception, on the other hand, there are statements even in the Scriptures referring to the Lord, the Controller, etc. Thus [Bṛih., iv. 4. 22]—"He is the Lord of all, the Over-lord of all beings, the Guardian of the creatures, the embankment that steadies all these worlds so as to prevent their falling into utter confusion;" [Page 25] and likewise too the Bhagavadgītā [xviii. 61]—"The Lord is stationed, O Arjuna, in the heart-region of all creatures, causing by His Power-of-Illusion all the beings to turn round and round, as though mounted upon a wheel." The author of these Sūtras on his part declares the 'non-distinctness from It' from the point of view of highest Reality; while from the ordinary, phenomenal view-point he declares that 'it might happen as in the ordinary life,' making the Brahman equivalent to the great ocean (of the illustration), and so following the mode-of-explanation by the modification-theory—without as much as explicitly controverting the phenomenal creation—particularly as it might be of some utility in meditations on the Qualified (Brahman). 14.

And because there is a perception (of the effect) only upon the existence (of the cause). 15.

For this reason also there is non-distinctness of the effect from the cause; because, namely, it is only consequent upon the existence of the cause that the effect is perceived, and not upon its non-existence. For example, it is only when the clay is there that a jar is observed or when the threads are there, that the cloth is observed. Such an invariable perception of one thing is never observed as being necessarily contingent upon the existence of quite another thing. A horse, for instance, being distinct from a cow, is not invariably found only where a cow exists; nor, to

take another instance, is a jar invariably found only where the pot-maker exists, since they are two distinct things although between them exists the relation of an effect and its efficient (but not the constituent) cause. But, one might object, we do observe the invariable presence of one thing consequent upon the existence of another (and a distinct) thing, as for instance, the perception of the smoke (only) upon the existence of the fire. No, we reply. For, even though the fire be extinguished, we do observe smoke, as contained in a cow-boy's pipe, for example. Our objector might possibly characterise the smoke as being in a particular condition (for instance, continuous and copious and uprising) urging that this kind of smoke does not exist where the fire is non-existent; but even so there is nothing defective in our argument. For, we are going to say that the ground of the non-distinctness between the effect and its cause is the fact that our idea of the former is (invariably) coloured (and interpenetrated) by the form of the latter. Such a relation does not exist between the fire and the smoke.

As another alternative we might read the Sūtra as—"And because of the existence of the direct-perception (of the non-distinctness of the cause and the effect)." It is not merely on the basis of the Scriptures that there is non-distinctness between the effect and the cause: there is such non-distinctness also on the strength of a direct perception of it. For there does exist a direct perception as regards the non-distinctness between the effect and the cause. Thus, in an aggregate of the threads which make up the cloth, as apart from and beyond the threads, there is not at all observed such (a new and distinct) thing as a piece-of-cloth, the effect: what we do actually observe are mere threads extended lengthwise and breadthwise; and likewise (there are merely) the fibres in the threads (constituted out of them) and the smaller segments in the fibres. From such a direct perceptive cognition we can take back the chain of inference to the three colours: red, white, and black [out of which, according to Chh. vi. 4, everything is made], and then (as their still more ultimate basis) the mere wind and the mere ether; and, finally, the Brahman as the sole Absolute without a second—where, as we have said, all means-of-knowledge reach their most ultimate stay-and-support. 15.

And because of the (antecedent) existence of the subsequent (effect in the form of the cause). 16.

For this reason also, there is non-distinctness of the effect from the cause: because, prior to its origination, the Veda declares the existence of the effect, which belongs to a subsequent time, in the cause, and in the form of the cause. [Page 26] Thus [Chh., vi. 2. 1]—" All this, My boy, was undoubtedly existing in the beginning;" or [Ait. Ār., II. iv. 1. 1]—" The Ātman verily was alone all this in the beginning"—wherein there is declared a co-ordination between the effect referred to by the word ' this ' and the Cause. If a thing does not exist within another, and as being of one essence with the other, it does not arise out of that; e.g., oil from sand-grains. Consequently, since, prior to origination, it was non-distinct, so the effect, ever subsequent to production, has to be inferred to be non-distinct from the cause. Moreover, inasmuch as Brahman, the Cause, does not at all deviate from existence in all the three times, so likewise the effect, the world, does not also deviate from existence in all the three times; and since existence as such is one only, therefore also there is non-distinctness of the effect from the cause. 16.

If you say ' Nay ' by reason of the designation (of the Cause) as ' non-existence ', the reply is—No: because, as appears from the remainder of the statement, it is (a designation) by opposite specification (merely). 17.

One might urge: But in places the Scriptural texts do also designate the effect as non-existence prior to the origination: Thus [Chh., iii. 19. 1]—" All this was in the beginning just non-existence," or [Tait. Up., ii. 7. 1]—" Non-existence, indeed, was all this at first." From this designation of the effect as non-existence there cannot be said to be an existence of the effect prior to origination. To this we answer, No. For, this designation of the effect as non-existence is not intended to declare the utter non-existence of it prior to origination, but, as contrasted with the specification of the effect as in an evolved state of its names and forms, there is another specification of it as in an unevolved state of its names and forms; and it is by this other specification that there is here a designation of the effect—existing as it certainly

is prior to its origination, and non-distinct as it also is from the form of its cause. How do you know this? From the remainder of the statement. A statement which is of doubtful import in the earlier part is determined in meaning by its latter part. Here, for instance, in the text [Chh., iii. 19. 1]—" All this was in the beginning just non-existence"—the very same (effect) which at the outset is referred to by the word 'non-existence,' that same is again pointed to by the word 'that' and is specified as 'existence' in [Chh., iii. 19. 1]—" That was existence." [If 'that' had stood for mere non-existence,] as non-existence can have no relation with the prior or the posterior time, the word 'was' should not properly have been used of it. So also in [Tait. Up., ii. 7. 1]—" Non-existence indeed was all this at first," in the part of the statement to follow we have a specific mention to the effect [ibid., ii. 7. 1]—" That of itself transformed its own self," [Page 27] which means that it was not before absolutely non-existent. We conclude therefore that this designation of the effect prior to its origination, is merely of the nature of an opposite specification. In ordinary life anything with a fully-evolved name and form is known as a fit object for being called existence; hence, prior to its evolution with names and forms, it can be taken in a secondary sense, and declared to be as though 'non-existence.' 17.

And from reasoning, as well as another Scriptural passage. 18.

From reasoning also we can infer the existence of the effect prior to its origination and its non-distinctness from the cause; as also from another Scriptural-passage. We will first describe the reasoning. We observe in ordinary life milk, clay, gold, and so forth—and none but these—resorted to by people who are desirous of (producing respectively) curds, jars, ornaments, etc. Persons wanting curds do not resort to clay, nor those wanting jars, to milk. This cannot be reasonably explained if the effect were taken to be non-existent. For (should it be so), prior to the origination, everything being everywhere alike non-existent, why should curds be produced out of milk alone and not out of clay, and why should a jar be produced out of clay alone and not out of milk? If (to obviate the objection) it be supposed that, although (the effect be everywhere) equally non-existing prior to its ori-

6 [Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Trans.]

gination, yet it is in milk alone that there exists a certain subtle (predisposing) form of the curds, and not in clay; and in clay alone that there exists a certain subtle (predisposing) form of the jar, and not in milk: then, inasmuch as the antecedent condition is characterised by this subtle (predisposing) form, there results a throwing overboard of the theory of the (antecedent) non-existence of the effect (in the cause), and the establishing of the theory of the (antecedent) existence of the effect (in the cause). If, as another alternative, one were to posit in the cause a certain potency for invariably producing certain specific effect only, this potency cannot serve as a determining principle of the effect if it were to be either distinct (from effect) or altogether of the nature of non-existence; for, its non-existence or distinctness would not be specifically restricted to (particular effects and not others). Hence, the potency has to be of one essence with the cause, and the effect has to be of one essence with the potency. — Moreover, it is necessary that between the cause and the effect, as between the substance and its qualities, we should assume an identity of-essence, as there is no distinctness between them such as there is between a horse and a buffalo. And even with the hypothesis of the Intimate-Relation (*samavāya*) if there has to be assumed a relation (of some sort) between the Intimate-Relation itself on the one hand, and the intimately-related objects on the other, between this (new-relation) again and the things which it keeps in relation, a yet newer relation of some kind has to be assumed, and so on *ad infinitum*, which would lead to the contingency of non-finality. If, on the other hand, there is no assumption of such a relation, there would be the contingency of the breaking asunder (of the relation). Should you here urge that the Intimate Relation, being itself of the nature of a relation, would be related to the objects without the necessity of any intervening relation then (the quality called) Contact, being no less of the nature of a relation, ought to be related (with the objects in contact) without requiring an (intervening) Intimate Relation (as you assume). The assumption of an Intimate Relation is also purposeless because (pairs) such as the substance and its qualities are actually perceived as being identical-in-essence.—How, moreover, would the effect which is an aggregate of parts subsist—if it is to do so—upon its cause, viz., its constituent parts? Would it subsist upon (i) all the parts taken toge-

ther, or would it subsist upon (ii) each one of them singly (and by turn)? If it were to subsist (i, a) upon all the parts (collectively), then there would arise the contingency of the non-perception of the whole-as-such, because there cannot possibly be (in one act of perception) a perceptive-contact between the entire whole and the sense-of-perception. Thus, for illustration, (the quality of) plurality, residing as it does upon the total number of things that go to make it up, cannot be perceived by perceiving the constituent things singly. If it were to subsist (i, b) upon all the parts, but *seriatim* [one segment of the whole coming into contact with its corresponding constituent-part], then [although the difficulty of non-perception disappears, yet] there will have to be imagined to the whole (a series of) constituent parts other than those out of which it was actually produced so as to make it possible for the former series of parts to exist upon the latter series in succession. For, it is by a series of constituent-parts-distinct from those of scabbard that the sword fits into its scabbard. Such a supposition would further lead to a *regressus in infinitum*, because there will have to be imagined each time, [Page 28] a new series of constituent-parts to the whole by means of which it could reside upon the series of its constituent parts first imagined (and thereafter a second new series, and so on). On the other hand (case ii), if it were to reside (wholly and completely) upon any single one of its constituents, then while the whole is performing its function in one part, it cannot perform its function in another part. For, if Devadatta be present in Srughna, he cannot on that very day be present at Pāṭaliputra also. If there be a presence simultaneously in more than one place, there will have to be more than one personality; as for instance, of Devadatta and Yajñadatta respectively residents of Srughnā and Pāṭaliputra. Were you to urge that, like the genus "cow-ness" (which, although one, resides upon each single species, the cow, wholly and completely) the constituted-whole might reside wholly and completely upon each one of its constituent parts, and so no defect obtains in our view, we reply, no; because we never have that sort of perception. For, were the constituted-whole to reside like cow-ness wholly and completely on each constituent part then, just as we perceive the "cow-ness" in each cow by direct-perception, so ought we to be able to see the whole in each part by direct-per-

ception; but such a perception never takes place as by necessity. Moreover, if the whole were to reside upon any single part fully and completely, then inasmuch as a thing gets its status by performing its function, and inasmuch as the whole (which is to perform the function) is only one, even by the horn (which by hypothesis is equal to the whole animal) it ought to perform, say, the function of the udder, or by the chest, the function of the back. But we never notice anything of the kind.

Further, if the effect were to be non-existent before its origination, then the (process of) origination would have neither a (grammatical) subject nor any substantiality. For, origination is certainly an action, and as such necessarily requires, like the action of going and so forth, a (grammatical) subject. That we should have an action and that it should be without a (grammatical) subject is a contradiction. When we speak of a jar originating, if the origination is not to have the jar as its (grammatical) subject, we will have in that case to imagine some other (grammatical) subject for it, (say, the potsherds). And similarly when we speak of potsherds etc. originating, we will have to imagine something-else as being the (grammatical) subject of that action. If that were true, when one says 'the jar originates' he will have to be taken to say that it is the pot-maker and other causes that are originating. In ordinary life, however, when there is a statement made about the origination of a jar one never understands that even the pot-maker and so forth are being originated: rather, these are understood to have been already originated. — If, further, one were to argue that the origination of, and the acquiring-of-a-concrete-individuality by, an effect is simply the effect's coming into [samavāya] relation with its cause, and with the (genus-)existence (respectively) you have to explain how one that has not yet obtained a substantiality can have any relation at all. A relation is possible only between two existing entities, and not between an existing and a non-existing entity, or between two non-existing entities. — Moreover, (when you speak of the non-existence of an effect prior to its origination,) since 'non-existence' is void of all characterisations, its delimitation as 'prior to origination' is inadmissible. In ordinary life it is existing entities like houses and fields that are seen to possess such delimitations, and not a non-existence.

For, surely, an attempt at delimitation like—“The barren-woman’s son was the king before the coronation of Pūrṇavarman”—cannot convey any specification as to when the barren-woman’s son, who is void of all reality, became or is or will become king. If ever, forsooth, the barren-woman’s son were to come into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies, then only would it stand to reason that the non-existing effect might step into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies. We, however, hold the view that since the barren-woman’s son and the non-existing effect are both of them equally non-existing entities, therefore, just as the barren-woman’s son could not step into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies, even so would the non-existing effect not come into existence subsequent to the operation of the causal agencies. It might be objected: if that were so, the operation of the causal agencies would be reduced to purposelessness. For, just as nobody ever busies himself (when producing a jar) to induce (the clay, pot-maker and other) causes to (assume an existential form) because these are already existing entities, even so, [Page 29] if the effect were to exist prior to origination, and were to be of one essence with its cause, then nobody would exert himself to endow the effect with the form-of-existence. But people do thus exert themselves. Hence, with a view to make the operation of causal agencies purposive, we would be inclined to regard the effect as non-existing prior to its origination.—The objection is not valid, we reply, since the operation of causal agencies will have motive enough in that thereby the cause is to be made to assume the form of an effect. That this ‘form of the effect’ again is also of one essence with the cause, inasmuch as what does not already exist in the cause as of one essence with it, cannot, as we have said, be originated. Besides, owing to a mere difference in the (external) form being observed, there cannot be assumed to be an otherness in the thing’s real essence. For, surely, Devadatta (seated) with his hands and legs drawn together does not pass over into another entity in essence when one observes him in (another) position with his hands and legs stretched out; for, there is the recognition of his being the very same individual. In a like manner our parents etc., even though we observe them day after day in different varying postures, do not become different in essence, inasmuch as there is the recognition

that he is my father, brother, son, etc. (as the case may be). And if one were to object that this may be right in those cases where the ultimate limit of a difference in birth has not been crossed (and the individuals do not utterly disappear from us), but not so in the other cases: we say, Nay. For even in (the ordinary case of a cause-effect relation, viz.) milk and so forth assuming the form of curds, we see the transformation taking place before our very eyes. And even where, as in the case of the seeds of a Banian tree and the like (where the transformation into sprouts etc. takes place while they are) concealed from our sight, when the seeds spring up into our view after the accretion to them of other parts similar to their own, and so assuming the form of a sprout and the like, then we are to call it their birth; and when these same parts waste away and we (ultimately) cease to see them, then we are to call it their death,—if it is the intervention of a birth and a death thus understood that is to make what was non-existence to become existence and what was existence to become non-existence, then we will have to recognise the child in the foetus and that lying on its back (after birth) as two distinct ones. Similarly too we will have to assume a distinction (of individuality) even in the conditions of childhood, youth and old age which would entail the contingency of giving the go to the ordinary dealings with the parents and the like.—Hereby the (Buddhist) doctrine of Momentariness is also to be understood as refuted.—He, on the other hand, who considers the effect as non-existent prior to its origination: in his theory the operation of causal agencies will have no material on which to operate: for, as the non-existent (effect) cannot be the material, it would be like the employment of various weapons such as sword etc., for the purpose of hacking the ether to pieces. If you contend that the operation of causal agencies can have (the clay) the inherent cause as the material to work upon, we say, No: for, it would involve an unwarranted license in logic if the causal agencies operating upon one thing (the inherent cause) were to bring into existence another (and quite a distinct) thing. And if it be held that the effect is merely a subtle-form of the inner-essence of the inherent cause, we demur, because that would bring you round to the doctrine of the (antecedent) existence of the effect (in the cause). Hence it follows that it is the very (causal) substances, milk and so forth, that come to be designated as effects when they stand

forth under the form of (the effects like) curds and the like. Consequently even after a hundred years one will not be able to reach the conclusion that the effect is distinct from the cause. Accordingly, it is (Brahman), the First Cause that, right down to its most ultimate effects, assumes, like an actor, the forms of the various effects, and so comes to be the basis of all the phenomenal dealings. Thus from reasoning we arrive at the doctrine of the existence of the effect prior to its origination, and its non-distinctness from the cause.

We arrive at the very same conclusion even from another Scriptural-text. Since in the preceding Sūtra there was cited a Scriptural-text which designated the cause as 'non-existence,' it is a text different from that which is meant by 'another' Scriptural-text, and which designates it as 'existence,'—namely one like [Chh., vi. 2. 1] : "Existence alone, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning, one and without-a-second." [Page 30] And the passage [in Chh., vi. 2. 1]—"And now some declare that it was nothing but 'non-existence' in the beginning"—introduces the view as regards (the effect being) 'non-existence,' and, calling this view into question by the words (following)—"How could existence be produced out of non-existence?"—reaches the final conclusion that—"Nothing but existence, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning." Here, inasmuch as, in the condition prior to origination, the effect which is denoted by the word 'this' is placed by the Scriptural-text in co-ordination with the cause which is denoted by the word 'existence,' there follow the (two) conclusions as to the (antecedent) existence (of the effect) and its non-distinctness (from the cause). If the effect were non-existent prior to origination and were to come into the relation of 'sama-vāya' while it is being subsequently produced, then it would be distinct from the cause. Under this supposition the solemn-declaration [Chh. vi. 1. 3]—"By which what has not been heard becomes something already heard...."—would be rendered nugatory. The solemn-declaration on the other hand is ratified (only) by believing in the (antecedent) existence (of the effect) and (its) non-distinctness (from the cause). 18.

And like unto a piece-of-cloth. 19.

And just as a piece-of-cloth, when rolled up, is not clearly

perceived as to whether it be a piece-of-cloth or some other substance: but the same when spread out is, by that spreading out, clearly perceived (as when one says—) the object that was rolled up is the piece-of-cloth itself. And just as, while it was rolled up, one did have the perception of it as a piece-of-cloth, but did not know it as possessing a specific length and breadth; and just as the same piece-of-cloth, while it is being spread out, is perceived as possessing a specific length and breadth, but it is not felt that it is a piece-of-cloth distinct from the one having the rolled-up form: in exactly the same manner an effect such as a piece-of-cloth is non-manifest while it subsists in the form of its causes like the threads, etc., and is rendered manifest for perception by the operation of the causal agencies like the shuttle, the loom, and the weaver. Thus the Sūtra means that the maxim of the rolled-up and the spread-out piece-of-cloth establishes the non-distinctness of the effect from the cause. 19.

And like unto the life-breaths etc. 20.

And just as we observe in the world the different life-breaths, such as the Prāṇa, Apāna, etc., abiding just in the form of their root-cause, when they are curbed in the (Yogic) process of breath-control, and so performing only the function of continuing the life, but not the other (wonted) functions such as withdrawing, expanding, and so forth; and just as, these same varieties of life-breath, when again released, perform likewise their other (wonted) functions—withdrawing, expanding, etc.—over and above that of the continuance of the life; and just as the different varieties of life-breath are not distinct from the Breath (or Prāṇa) which has these sub-varieties, seeing that all alike have the moving-air as their essence: even so, analogously, is the effect non-distinct from the cause. [Page 31] Hence, inasmuch as the entire world is an effect of Brahman and non-distinct from it, the solemn Vedic declaration, namely [Chh., vi. 1. 3]—“By which what has not been heard becomes something already heard, what has not been thought becomes something already thought, what has not been known becomes something already known.....”—is fully ratified. 20. Here ends the Topic (6) styled Word-Initiated World.

forth under the form of (the effects like) curds and the like. Consequently even after a hundred years one will not be able to reach the conclusion that the effect is distinct from the cause. Accordingly, it is (Brahman), the First Cause that, right down to its most ultimate effects, assumes, like an actor, the forms of the various effects, and so comes to be the basis of all the phenomenal dealings. Thus from reasoning we arrive at the doctrine of the existence of the effect prior to its origination, and its non-distinctness from the cause.

We arrive at the very same conclusion even from another Scriptural-text. Since in the preceding Sūtra there was cited a Scriptural-text which designated the cause as 'non-existence,' it is a text different from that which is meant by 'another' Scriptural-text, and which designates it as 'existence,'—namely one like [Chh., vi. 2. 1] : "Existence alone, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning, one and without-a-second." [Page 30] And the passage [in Chh., vi. 2. 1]—"And now some declare that it was nothing but 'non-existence' in the beginning"—introduces the view as regards (the effect being) 'non-existence,' and, calling this view into question by the words (following)—"How could existence be produced out of non-existence?"—reaches the final conclusion that—"Nothing but existence, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning." Here, inasmuch as, in the condition prior to origination, the effect which is denoted by the word 'this' is placed by the Scriptural-text in co-ordination with the cause which is denoted by the word 'existence,' there follow the (two) conclusions as to the (antecedent) existence (of the effect) and its non-distinctness (from the cause). If the effect were non-existent prior to origination and were to come into the relation of 'sama-vāya' while it is being subsequently produced, then it would be distinct from the cause. Under this supposition the solemn-declaration [Chh. vi. 1. 3]—"By which what has not been heard becomes something already heard...."—would be rendered nugatory. The solemn-declaration on the other hand is ratified (only) by believing in the (antecedent) existence (of the effect) and (its) non-distinctness (from the cause). 18.

And like unto a piece-of-cloth. 19.

And just as a piece-of-cloth, when rolled up, is not clearly

perceived as to whether it be a piece-of-cloth or some other substance: but the same when spread out is, by that spreading out, clearly, perceived (as when one says—) the object that was rolled up is the piece-of-cloth itself. And just as, while it was rolled up, one did have the perception of it as a piece-of cloth, but did not know it as possessing a specific length and breadth; and just as the same piece-of-cloth, while it is being spread out, is perceived as possessing a specific length and breadth, but it is not felt that it is a piece-of-cloth distinct from the one having the rolled-up form: in exactly the same manner an effect such as a piece-of-cloth is non-manifest while it subsists in the form of its causes like the threads, etc., and is rendered manifest for perception by the operation of the causal agencies like the shuttle, the loom, and the weaver. Thus the Sūtra means that the maxim of the rolled-up and the spread-out piece-of-cloth establishes the non-distinctness of the effect from the cause. 19.

And like unto the life-breaths etc. 20.

And just as we observe in the world the different life-breaths, such as the Prāṇa, Apāna, etc., abiding just in the form of their root-cause, when they are curbed in the (Yogic) process of breath-control, and so performing only the function of continuing the life, but not the other (wonted) functions such as withdrawing, expanding, and so forth; and just as, these same varieties of life-breath, when again released, perform likewise their other (wonted) functions—withdrawing, expanding, etc.—over and above that of the continuance of the life; and just as the different varieties of life-breath are not distinct from the Breath (or Prāṇa) which has these sub-varieties, seeing that all alike have the moving-air as their essence: even so, analogously, is the effect non-distinct from the cause. [Page 31] Hence, inasmuch as the entire world is an effect of Brahman and non-distinct from it, the solemn Vedic declaration, namely [Chh., vi. 1. 3]—“ By which what has not been heard becomes something already heard, what has not been thought becomes something already thought, what has not been known becomes something already known..... ” —is fully ratified. 20. Here ends the Topic (6) styled Word-Initiated World.

TOPIC 7 : CREATOR HIGHER THAN THE SOUL

(*Sūtras* 21-23)

In consequence of the designation of the other One as this, there arises the contingency of his not-doing what is beneficial, and so forth, 21.

It is from another aspect of it that the doctrine of a sentient first cause is now being attacked. If indeed one were to postulate a sentient being to initiate the creative process, there would arise the contingency of defects such as not doing what is beneficial, and the like. Why? Because of the designation of the other One as this. For, the Scripture designates the other One, viz., the embodied soul, as being of the essence of Brahman, since there is an awakening of the consciousness in the following form [Chh., vi. 8. 7]—“That is the Self: That thou art, O Svetaketu!” Or (interpreting another way) the Scripture designates the other One, viz., the Brahman as being the true Self of the embodied-soul, inasmuch as in the passage [Tait, Up., ii. 6]—“Having created it, into the very same He entered”—it is the Creator Brahman in the unmodified-form that is set forth as having subsequently entered all the effects, and so become the true Self of the embodied-soul. And in the text [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—“Let me thereafter enter (the creation) with this soul—this Self—and unfold the names and the forms”—the Highest Divinity designates the soul as the Self and hence points out that the embodied soul is not other than the Brahman. Therefore, the creative-function appertaining to Brahman is (eventually) that of the embodied-soul itself. As a consequence, being as he is, a free, independent creator, he should do just what is exclusively beneficial to him and what would cause him comfort, and not what is harmful to him, such as this net-work of manifold miseries, to wit: birth, death, oldage, disease and what not. For, no one who retains his freedom would fashion a house of incarceration for himself and therein enter. Nor would he, being by nature extremely pure, conceive a relation of ownership with the altogether impure body. And even though inadvertently fashioned, he would at his will abandon whatever might cause him pain, and take up what might cause pleasure. And (above all) he would

remember : it was by me that this wondrous globe of the universe was fashioned. Every one, in fact, after doing a thing, clearly remembers that he has done it. Further, just as the magician does, without any effort and whenever he wills it, wind up the magical-illusion spread out by himself, even so ought the embodied-soul too (be able to) withdraw this creation. But, of a fact, this embodied-soul is not able to withdraw even his own body (and limbs) without making an effort. Thus then, as we do not notice the doing of any beneficial actions etc., it follows that the creative process emanating from a sentient cause cannot stand to reason. 21.

But It is more-and-beyond, as there is an intimation of distinction. 22.

[Page 32] The word 'but' turns back the objection. That Brahman, omniscient and omnipotent, and eternal, pure, sentient and free by nature, and which is over and above and distinct from the embodied-soul : it is That which we declare to be the Creator of the world. To It the contingencies, such as not doing the beneficial etc., do not apply. For, to It there does not exist anything beneficial to be achieved or anything harmful to be averted, as it is by nature eternal and free. There does not exist in Its case anywhere any hindrance to knowledge or to power, because of Its omniscience and omnipotence. The embodied-soul on the other hand is not of this nature, and to it do apply the defects such as not doing the beneficial etc. But this soul we never declare to be the creator of the world. Whence do you get this ? On account of an intimation of distinction. Declarations like [Brih., ii. 4. 5]—"The Self, forsooth, My dear, is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected upon, to be meditated upon ;" or [Chh., viii. 7. 1]—"He is to be sought after, to be cognised ;" or [Chh., vi. 8. 1]—"It is then, My dear boy, that one becomes of-one-essence with Existence ;" or [Brih., iv. 3. 35]—"The embodied-soul, surmounted by the Omniscient Self....."—and many more of a like nature, which assert a distinction of the agent and the action and so forth, designate the Brahman as being more-and-beyond the individual soul.

But it might be urged that there is also an assertion of non-

distinction, such as [Chh., vi. 8. 6]—"That thou art"—and the like. How could contradictories like distinction and non-distinction be both true? But that is no objection. For, in more than one place it has been established that there is a possibility of both on the analogy of the (elemental) ether and ether-in-the-jar. Further, when there has been awakened the consciousness of the non-distinction by declarations such as [Chh., vi. 8. 6]—"That thou art"—and the like—which point out that non-distinction, then there results a falling away of the individual soul's relation to the phenomenal world, and also of the idea of the Brahman as being its creator, inasmuch as that right knowledge wipes out all kinds of dealings-in-phenomena, which are (just) a pageant set afoot by false knowledge. From that point of view, where is the creation, and whence can there be defects such as not doing the beneficial etc.? This transmigratory-world which gives rise to these notions of not doing what is beneficial etc. is an erroneous-perception based upon the failure to discriminate between (the Brahman and) the limiting-adjuncts, consisting of this whole assemblage of bodies and organs, which are the fabrications of names and forms that are themselves figured forth by Nescience: it has, as we have stated time and again, no existence from the point of view of the Highest Truth—even like the feeling of the 'I' as being the subject of birth, death, cutting, piercing, and the like (which really belong to the body only). As long, then, as the notions of distinction (and dealings based upon these) remain un-sublated, so long the intimation of distinction contained in texts of the nature of [Chh., viii. 7. 1]—"He is to be sought after, He is to be known"—testifies to the Brahman being over-and-above (the individual soul), and so dispels the contingency as to our theory being open to defects like not doing what is beneficial, etc. 22.

And, because of the analogy of stones and the like, there is no cogency in that. 23.

[Page 33] Just as in the world, in the case of stones, which all partake of the common characteristic of 'earth-ness,' there are some stones, very precious, like diamonds, lapis lazuli, etc., others of medium excellence like crystals, and others of low value, only fit to be thrown at dogs and crows, so that we notice

a manifold variety amongst them; and just as of seeds which are grounded in the same soil we notice a very large variety in their leaves, flowers, fruits, smell, sap, etc., as in a sandal or a *kimpāka*; and just as one and the same food-juice produces diversified effects like blood, etc. and like hair, down, and the rest: even so it stands to reason that one and the same Brahman should give rise to the differentiation between the individual selves and the Highest Self, and to the manifoldness of the creation. Hence, there is no cogency in that, that is to say, there is no cogency in the defect imagined by our opponent. The word 'and' (in the sūtra) suggests a cumulation of arguments like the authoritative-ness of the Scripture, the nature of the modified forms as merely due to word-initiation, and the other analogous instance of the diversity of things visible in the dreams. 23. Here ends the Topic (7) entitled Creator Higher than the Soul.

TOPIC 8 : CREATOR'S CAUSAL PARAPHERNALIA "

(Sūtras 24-25)

If one says No, because the accumulation [of causal paraphernalia] is observed, we demur : for, it is like the milk. 24.

The statement made that the sentient Brahman, one without a second, is the cause of the world, cannot be maintained. Why? Because the accumulation [of causal paraphernalia] is observed. For, in ordinary life, we observe pot-makers, [weavers], etc., the authors of jars or pieces-of-cloth or the like, producing their respective handicrafts after having furnished themselves with materials and instruments like clay, staff, wheel, threads and such-like accumulation of manifold causal paraphernalia. The Brahman, however, you intend to set forth as being devoid of any assistance. If It is not going to gather together other means-of-work, how can you maintain Its character as a Creator? Consequently, Brahman is not the cause of the world. To this we reply that it is no [valid] objection; for, as in the case of the milk, this can be explained as a consequence of its peculiar innate-nature. Just as in the world we find milk or water of its own accord getting modified into curds or ice without needing for it any extraneous means, just so it might be in this case too. — But it

might be urged, even the milk and the like do require extraneous means, like heat etc. [while they are becoming transformed into curds, etc.: how can you then say—'for, it is like the milk'? This is no objection. That kind of modification and that degree of modification which milk of its own accord undergoes, that same kind and degree of modification towards the form of the curds is merely accelerated by the use of heat etc. If indeed milk were not to possess of its own accord an innate proclivity for becoming curds, even the heat etc. would not by force succeed in transforming it into curds. For, surely, the wind or the ether cannot be perforce compelled to assume the form of curds by heat and the like. The presence of causal auxiliaries merely contributes to the perfection of the effect. But Brahman is already possessed of a perfection of powers : not by anything extraneous is its perfection to be brought about. There is a Scriptural text to that effect [Śvet., v. 2]—[Page 34] "There exists neither the body nor the organs to Him, and we do not see any one who is His equal or His superior; we hear of His highest and diversified power, as also, of knowledge and strength and activity, which are His by nature." Therefore we can understand, even of the one solitary Brahman, in consequence of its possessing a miraculous power, this diversified modification, as in the case of the milk. 24.

And also like [the analogous cases of] the gods etc. of ordinary experience. 25.

This may be so. In the case of non-sentient objects like the milk etc. there can well result the modification in the form of curds, without the necessity of any extraneous means, because that is an observed fact. But pot-makers etc., who are sentient beings, are observed to proceed to produce their respective handicrafts not without a full equipment of means and instruments. How then can the Brahman, sentient as it is, start the activity without any assistance? — We reply, like the [analogous cases of] gods, etc. Just as in the world we notice gods, manes, sages and such other personalities of great prowess,—sentient too as they all are,—yet, irrespective of any extraneous means and by reason of being endowed with peculiar potency, creating, alone and by the act of mere meditation, many a body and a palace and a car and the like

of diversified make-and-pose—as can be asserted on the authority of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmanas, the Hīstories, and the Purāṇas; and just as the spider spins out webs out of itself, or the female crane conceives without semen, or the lotus-plant moves from one lake to another (adjoining) lake without requiring any extraneous means of travel: even so the sentient Brahman too can create the world out of itself and without standing in need of any extraneous means.—If against this one were to urge that analogies of the gods etc., which are adduced for the Brahman, are not quite on a par with the case sought to be explained by analogy. For, the gods etc., do have their non-sentient body which can serve as the material for fashioning miraculous objects like other bodies etc. and not their sentient souls; while in the case of the spider it is its saliva produced by eating smaller insects which, when hardened, becomes the thread of the web: and as to the female crane, she conceives upon hearing the noise of a thundering-cloud; and as concerning the lotus-plant, finally, from one lake it approaches another lake by its own non-sentient body, which is propelled by an (in-dwelling) sentience, as does the creeper the tree; and it is not a case that, being itself non-sentient, it is able to perform the movement towards another lake. Therefore, all these analogous instances do not fit in with the Brahman. To this our reply should be: that is no defect. For, what was wanted to be conveyed was just the difference of these cases with the (other) parallel instances of the pot-makers and the like. While, then, the pot-makers etc. and the gods etc. are both equally sentient, the former, before beginning an action, stand in need of extraneous means, but not the latter; in an analogous manner the sentient Brahman for its parts could also similarly [Page 35] dispense with *all* extraneous means—this was all that was intended to be conveyed by the adduced analogies of the gods and the like. The point is that it is not an invariable rule that exactly the same potence that has been observed in the case of the one should precisely tally with that of all others.

25. Here ends the Topic (8) entitled Creator's Causal Paraphernalia.

TOPIC 9 : IMPARTITE'S PART-MODIFICATION

(*Sūtras* 26-29)

The conclusion then stands established that the cause of the world is the sentient Brahman, one without a second, which, on the analogy of the milk and the like, or the gods and other instances, assumes a modification of itself, without standing in need of any other extraneous means. By way of a further probing of the ascertained conclusion of the Śāstra, he is now bringing up another objection—once more—

Either a wholesale transformation, or a disturbance in the Scriptural-texts about the impartiteness. 26.

There would arise the contingency of "whole-sale transformation" that is to say, modification in-the-form-of-the-effect of the whole Brahman, because there can be no parts to it. If Brahman had been, like the earth and similar objects, constituted of parts, then it would have been possible for one of these parts to get modified, while the other part could have remained unmodified. But we learn of the Brahman as being impartite from Scriptures like [Svet., vi. 19]—"Without digital-parts, without activity, tranquil, stainless, spotless," or [Mundaka, ii. 1. 2]—"The Puruṣha verily is divine, devoid of definite dimensions, unborn, and possessed of both the without and the within," or [Bṛih., ii. 4. 12]—"This Great-Being is endless and unfathomable and solidly constituted out of knowledge alone," or [Bṛih., iii. 9. 26]—"He is that Ātman (describable as) 'not-this,' 'not-that,'" or [Bṛih., iii. 8. 8]—"Neither gross nor subtle,"—and others which deny all specifications in its case whatsoever. So then, as there is not any possibility of a modification in one part, the contingency of a whole-sale modification having arisen, there would result an outright destruction (of the Brahman), which would also involve the futility of the instructions to seek and obtain a sight of the Brahman, seeing that the effect is to be seen by us all without any effort whatsoever, and there is no possibility of the Brahman remaining over and above the effect; hence too the Scriptural statement about Brahman being unborn would be vitiated. And if, with a view to the removing of this defect, you

were to assume parts to the Brahman, still the texts just adduced teaching the impartite nature of the Brahman, would become disturbed. Furthermore, if we assume parts to it, there arises the contingency of its non-eternality. In every way then this theory cannot possibly be sustained : Thus the objection. 26.

But on account of the Scripture : the Scripture being the (only) basis of it. 27.

By the word 'but' he dispels the objection. There certainly exists no flaw in our theory. To begin with, there is not the contingency of a whole-sale transformation. Why? From Scripture. Just as the Scripture declares to us the creation of the world from Brahman, [Page 36] even so there is a declaration as to the existence of the Brahman independently of its modifications, inasmuch as there is an assertion of the Cause and its modifications as being distinct from one another : namely [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—"And the Divinity reflected : 'having by means of this soul, this Self, subsequently entered these three divine entities, let me unfold the names and the forms,'" or [Chh., iii. 12. 6]—"Thus much is his greatness : greater than that is the Purusha. All the beings form a quarter of Him, His immortal three-quarters are in the heaven;" and the like. Also there are passages which speak of the heart as His abode, and passages which speak of the (individual soul's) merging back into Existence. If the entire Brahman had been used up in the process of transformation into its effect, then the specification referring to the condition of deep-sleep, namely, [Chh., vi. 8. 1]—"Then, My dear boy, he becomes merged back into Existence"—would become inapplicable inasmuch as the individual soul remains always merged into the essence of the modified Brahman (as being itself a modification of the Brahman), while (beyond the Modified Brahman) there exists no unmodified-Brahman (into which it can become merged during deep-sleep). Also there are texts placing the Brahman beyond the pales of our perceptive-organs, whereas the modifications of the Brahman (which by hypothesis exhaust the Brahman) are always within the range of the perceptive-organs. Hence there does exist an unmodified-Brahman.—Nor does this involve a disturbance of the Scriptural passages regarding impartiteness, because we assume likewise its impartiteness on the strength of

the Scriptural declarations themselves. For, Brahman has the Scriptures as the only basis and the word-testimony as the only means-of-proof, and it is not open to sense-perception. We have therefore to believe in it just as the Scripture teaches it. And the Scripture propounds both these in the case of the Brahman: its part-transformation and its impartiteness. Why, in the case of charm-beads, spells, herbs and the like, as we know them in the world, we see their manifold potences depending upon differences in place, time and other circumstances, and giving rise to many self-contradictory effects. Now, if even these cannot be determined by mere logic, in the absence of special instruction as to what specific thing has what particular potences helped by an assignable set of auxiliaries, what particular spheres of action, leading to what particular consequences: how much the more reason there is not to expound, except with the concurrence of the Scripture, the characteristics of Brahman, the real nature of which is beyond the ken of even thought! Thus, likewise, declare those well-versed in the Purāṇas [M̐bh., vi. 5. 12]—"Those objects indeed that are beyond thought: them one should not bring under the yoke of logic. That which is beyond the normal-phenomena—such is the definition of the Unthinkable." Hence it can arise only from Scripture: this understanding of the true-nature-as-it-is of things that are beyond the pale of sense-perception.

But, it might be urged, even the Scripture cannot make us acquiesce in a self-contradictory statement, such as, that the Brahman is impartite, that it assumes a modification, and that the entire whole is not modified. If Brahman be at all impartite, either it ought not to be ever modified, or the entire whole ought to be modified. And to assume that in some of its aspects it gets modified, while in the others it remains [Page 37] unmodified, virtually makes it possessed of parts owing to this assumed difference in aspects. For, it is only in matters pertaining to an action that even a self-contradictory teaching like [under Jaim. Sūtra, x. 8. 6]—"He takes the Shodāśin-cup in the Atirātra rite: He does not take the Shodāśin in the Atirātra rite,"—can have the perceived contradiction therein composed by resorting to an option in practice; because an action, after all, rests upon an individual's will. But in the present case even recourse to option cannot possibly remove the contradiction, because the nature of

reality does not depend upon any man's will. Hence the view contains an ineradicable difficulty. We reply that it is not so; because we can assume the differences in the aspects (of the Brahman) as merely the fabrications of Nescience. For, surely, owing to a difference in aspects fabricated by Nescience, the thing-as-it-is cannot be rendered liable to partition. Because to a person suffering from eye-disease the moon appears as if double, the moon in reality cannot of course be double. It is through a difference in aspects consisting of names and forms which are the fabrications of Nescience—aspects, one of them developed and the other undeveloped, and both of them not susceptible of a discrimination as to whether they are or are not other than That (Brahman)—that the Brahman comes to be the basis of all phenomenal dealings involving liability to modification; whereas in its ultimate real nature It transcends all the phenomenal dealings and abides as ever unmodified (and unmodifiable), seeing that the distinction of names and forms is a fiction of the Nescience and is merely word-initiated, so that (in reality) it does not militate against the impartiteness of Brahman. Nor need we suppose that the Scriptural statement about modification primarily intends to teach the modification itself, because no fruit is made known as resulting from such a comprehension. It is, on the other hand, intended to teach the real-essence of Brahman as devoid of all phenomenality, because a fruit is declared as resulting from that comprehension. Thus a Scriptural passage [Bṛih., iv. 2. 4]—introducing the theme with—"This is that 'Not-this,' 'Not-that' Ātman"—goes on to say: "Now hast thou verily reached the Fearless, O Janaka!" Accordingly, in our theory there exists no possibility of any flaw. 27.

And besides we do have similar and manifold creations in the self also. 28.

Further, one need not here contentiously ask, how one and the same Brahman can have a multiform creation without violating its real nature, since, even in a self who is one and who is seeing a dream, a multiform creation without violating his real nature is declared to arise in the text commencing with [Bṛih., iv. 3. 10]—"There there are no (real) cars, nor yoke-animals, nor paths; and yet he creates the cars, the yoke-animals, and the paths." And in

ordinary experience too we come across manifold creations of elephants, horses, and the like amongst the gods and amongst the magicians, etc., without thereby vitiating their real (unitary) nature. Similarly, even in the unitary Brahman—and without destroying its real nature—there can exist a multiform creation. 28.

And because the same objections can be urged against your own view. 29.

[Page 38] In our opponent's own theory also the same flaw exists. The view endorsed by the follower of the Pradhāna-theory is that the impartite, infinite Pradhāna, void of sound and other qualities, is the cause of the effect, which is divisible into parts, of limited dimensions, and possessed of sound and other qualities. Even in that view there arises the contingency of a wholesale modification of the Pradhāna which is impartite, or a vitiation of the assumption of its impartiteness. But it would be pointed out that they do not at all assume the Pradhāna to be impartite. There are the three eternal qualities of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. The Pradhāna is merely a state of equipoise of these (three qualities), and so with these very parts it is capable of division into parts. But the present defect cannot possibly be remedied by this kind of liability to partition, since Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are each of them equally impartite. And if one of these in turn, with the other two as auxiliaries, is to be the constituent cause of a similar world of phenomena, then (by parity of reasoning) there does arise the contingency of the same objection being urged against your own view. But inasmuch as reasoning is always unstable [Brahmasūtra, II. i. 11,] if you are inclined to (flout our reasoning and) believe in the Pradhāna's being in fact capable of partition, then there presents itself the contingency of its being impermanent, etc. And if your idea were that it is the potences as inferred from the diversity of effects that are the (so-called) parts, those can be made equally available in defence of the propounder of the Brahman-theory.— In a like manner in the case of the follower of the theory of Atoms, when he assumes the conjunction of one atom with another, if, as being without parts, the atom is to come into contact with another atom in its entirety, then, as there could be no further increase in the

size, the result (of the conjunction) would be a mere atom (and not a binary). And if the atom were to come into contact at some of its parts, then that would militate against the ascription of impartiteness to the atom, so that in this theory also there arises the same contingency (as in ours); and that ought not to be therefore pressed against just one of the opposing theories only. As for the propounder of the Brahman-theory, he *has* refuted the objection directed against his own view. 29. Here ends the Topic(9) entitled Impartite's Part-Modification.

TOPIC 10: FULLY-EQUIPPED DIVINITY

(*Sūtras* 30-31)

We have said that even from the unitary Brahman there can properly arise this manifold assemblage of modification in consequence of the Brahman being endowed with manifold potences. But, it might be asked, how do we know that the Highest Brahman is joined to such manifold potences? The reply follows—

[The Divinity is] endowed with everything, because it is thus declared. 30.

We have to assume that the Highest Divinity is equipped with all powers. Why? Because it is thus declared. For, the Scripture declares the joining of the Highest Divinity with all powers: for instance [Chh., iii. 14. 4]—"Possessed of all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes; encompassing all this, the unspeaking, the unconcerned;" or [Chh., viii. 7. 1]—"He of truthful desires and truthful purposes;" or [Mundaka, I. i. 9]—"He who knows all and realises everything;" [Page 39] or [Bṛih., iii. 8. 9]—"It is at the behest of this, the Immutable One, O Gārgī, that the sun and the moon stand sustained;" and others of like import. 30.

If you say Nay, by reason of the absence of organs (of perception and action), the explanation has been already given. 31.

This might be. But the Scripture declares the Highest Divinity as being devoid of all organs, as for instance [Bṛih., iii. 8. 8]—"Without the eye and, without the ear, and without speech and

without mind;” and the like. How can such a Divinity, albeit endowed with all powers, be able to proceed to activity? For, even the gods and others although sentient and endowed with all powers, we learn, are able to proceed to various activities only because they are equipped with a spiritual body and spiritual organs. Moreover, when there has been a denial of all characterisation to the Divinity in the text [Bṛih., iii. 9. 26]—“Not-this, not-that,” how can the Divinity be coupled with all potences?—What was to be said in answer to the above has been already stated before. This Brahman is altogether unfathomable, and penetrable only to the Scripture, but impervious to reasoning. Besides, we cannot lay down the rule that what potency was seen in the case of one, in the same manner it should exist in the case of another also. That the Brahman, in whose case all specifications have been denied, can yet be joined to omnipotence has been already explained by us by setting forth the distinction of aspects as imagined by Nescience. The Scriptural text likewise [Śvet., iii. 19]—“Without hands and feet, and yet swift and able to grasp: He the eyeless sees, He the earless hears”—declares, in the case of the Brahman—albeit destitute of all organs—the possession of all kinds of potences. 31. Here ends the Topic (10) entitled Fully-Equipped Divinity,

TOPIC 11: FINAL END OF CREATION

(*Sūtras* 32-33)

The theory of a sentient First Cause is, from another point of view, again called into question—

No: because of purposiveness (of all activities). 32.

That the sentient Highest Soul should have created this globe of the Universe does not stand to reason. Why? Because of the purposiveness of (all) activities. For, in this world, we never observe any sentient person—where he proceeds to act after previous deliberation—commencing any activity, however slight be the effort involved in it, if it does not subserve some purpose of his own: much less an activity involving such a very heavy exertion. And there is the Scriptural text [Bṛih., ii. 4. 5] confirming this consensus of commonsense—[Page 40] “Not indeed, My dear,

does all this become dear unto one in the interest of all this, but rather does all this become dear in the interest of one's own Self." And there is involved a very heavy exertion in this activity, viz. that of creating this globe of the Universe with all its array of details high and low. If now all this (mighty) activity of the sentient Highest Soul is to be assumed to minister to his own (specific) ends, then the absolutely self-sufficient nature of the Highest Self, as endorsed by the Scriptures, would be vitiated. If, on the other hand, there be no purposiveness (in the activity), there would result an absence of the activity itself. And in case you were to say that, just as we at times observe even a sentient person, in a frenzied state, performing, by reason of his intellectual apparatus being out of gear, activities that aim at no benefit to himself, even so might the Highest Self be taken to have gone about the action, then, in that case, the omniscience of the Highest Self, as attested by the Scriptures, would be overthrown. Hence, that a sentient being should have been the author of the creation is a theory that does not hold together. 32.

But, as in ordinary life, it might be mere sport. 33.

The word 'but' negatives the objection. Just as in the world, in the case of one who has all his desires fully satisfied—say of a king or of a royal minister—we do observe, in the way of playings and recreations, various activities of the nature of mere sport and not in anywise aimed at any other extraneous purpose; and just as (movements like) up-breathings and out-breathings etc. take place by very nature and without aiming at any extraneous purpose: even so in the case of the Lord also there can take place, by His very nature, an activity of the nature of mere sport and without aiming at any other purpose. For, of course, there cannot be imagined to exist in the case of the Lord any other purpose, whether we view at it logically or in the light of the Scriptures. Nor can you gainsay what is only the (intrinsic) nature of any one. And although the creation of this entire globe of the Universe might appear to us as a very heavy exertion, yet to the Highest Lord it is but sheer sport; for, He has immeasurable powers. And although indeed, in ordinary life, even in the sports there can be attributed some slight purpose, still, in the present case, not even such a purpose can possibly be posited, because of

the Scriptural declaration of His self-sufficiency. Nor can there result a cessation of the activity, or a frenzied activity, because the Scriptures avow both the creation and the omniscience. Nor finally, should this fact be forgotten that the Scriptural account of creation—as it comes within the sphere of the phenomenal-dealings in names and forms, which are but the figurations of Nescience—is not to be understood from the point of view of the highest truth, but is to be taken as having been aimed at setting forth the Brahman as the real essence of everything. 33. Here ends the Topic (11) entitled Final End of Creation.

TOPIC 12 : INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY

(*Sūtras* 34-36)

Once again is brought up an objection against the Lord being the cause of the origination etc. of the world, with the object of strengthening the view solemnly averred, following herein the maxim of infixing a peg [by shaking it and the soil at its root]—

There is no inequality, nor cruelty, because of (the Lord's) showing due-consideration : so, in fact, it declares. 34.

{Page 41} The Lord cannot reasonably be the cause of the world. Why? Because there arises the contingency of His inequality and cruelty. For, He makes some—e.g., the gods etc.,—experience greatest happiness ; others—e. g., the beasts and the like—He makes suffer the greatest miseries ; while others still—e. g., men etc.—He allows to experience (both these) in moderation. That the Lord should have created the world with such an unequal dispensation argues in His case the presence, as in that of an ordinary mortal, of love and hatred ; and so there arises the contingency of a flat contradiction of the Lord's nature of passionlessness as determined by Revealed-texts and compilations-of-authority. Then again, there arises the contingency of an ascription to Him—because He brings about visitations of sorrows and encompasses the destruction (at Dissolution) of the entire creation—of compassionlessness and of extreme cruelty, for which even the most wicked conceive a loathing. Therefore, owing to this contingency of inequality and cruelty, the Lord

cannot be the cause. To this contingency we make the reply that the Lord does not stand open to the charges of inequality and cruelty. Why? Because of a showing of [due] consideration. If indeed the Lord were to create this creation, with its (patent) inequalities, entirely irrespective of any consideration, then there could arise these two faults: to wit, inequality and cruelty. But He does not function as the Creator irrespective of any considerations. The Lord creates this world together with its inequalities after showing all [due] consideration. What is it to which he shows all [due] consideration? We answer: it is to the merit and the demerit. Consequently, that the creation shows inequalities in consideration of the merit and demerit of the creatures about to be created argues no fault in the Lord. The Lord should rather be viewed upon like the rain. For, just as the rain constitutes the common cause for the production of crops (like) rice, barley, etc., but as regards the differences in rice, barley, etc., it is the peculiar potences inherent in the various seeds of these that constitute the special causes: even so the Lord is the *common cause* for the production of the gods, men, and the rest of the creation, while as regards the inequalities between the gods, men, etc. it is the actions appertaining to the various souls that serve as the *special causes* for the same. Thus, in consequence of His showing [due] consideration, the Lord is not to be arraigned for the faults of inequality and cruelty. — But how do you know that it is out of such [due] consideration, that the Lord, creates this world with its differentiation of the high, the low, and the middling? — For so, in fact, the Scripture declares [Kaush. Br., iii. 8] — “It is indeed He alone who makes that man do a good action whom he desires to lift up to these higher worlds; and it is He likewise who makes another man do a bad action whom he desires to drag downwards;” or again, [Bṛih., iii. 2. 13] — “Good does one become by good action, bad, by bad action.” Smṛiti too shows that the Lord metes out rewards and punishments only in consideration of the specific actions of beings, as in (the Bhagavadgītā iv. 11) — “Whatsoever people in whatsoever manner be-take themselves to me, them in that very manner I accord treatment;” — and others of the same kind. 34.

If you say, ‘there is no Karman, because of non-differentiation,’ we reply: No, on account of beginninglessness. 35.

[Page 42] In consequence of the pronounced-declaration of non-differentiation prior to creation, as in the text [Chh., vi. 2. 1] —“ Existence alone, My dear boy, was all this in the beginning: one and without a second,” there does not exist any Karman out of consideration for which there might ensue inequalities in the creation. For, Karman comes into existence only at a time subsequent to the creation, as being dependent upon differentiation into the body and the like; and if the differentiation into the body and the like were to be dependent upon the Karman, there would arise the logical defect of a mutual interdependence (or of reasoning-in-a-circle). Consequently, if the Lord were to proceed, subsequent to such a differentiation, to create (in [due] consideration of the merit and demerit), He might do so. But prior to the differentiation, there being the absence of any Karman which could be the cause of the diversity (in the world), we are compelled to posit the *first* creation as being free from all inequalities. To this objection we demur, because of the beginninglessness of this transmigratory-creation. It might have been a defect, if this transmigratory-creation ever had had a starting-point. But the world, being without a beginning, and, between the Karman and the inequality in the creation there being established an unending chain of the relation of cause and effect—as in the case of the seed and the sprout—there is no contradiction present in the Lord’s creative activity. 35.

But how do you know that this transmigratory-world is without a beginning? So he recites the following—

It stands to reason, and is also attested. 36.

The beginninglessness of the transmigratory-world stands to reason. For, if it were to have a definite starting-point, coming into existence all of a sudden, (and without adequate causes) as it must then do, there would arise the contingency of even the liberated souls (in whose case all ground for rebirth has been destroyed) being again born into the world, as well as the contingency of one’s being made liable for what he might not have himself done, inasmuch as no assignable cause can then exist for the inequalities of happiness and unhappiness (in the world). And it

has been said that the Lord cannot be the cause of this inequality. Nor can Nescience alone and by itself be the cause of this inequality, because it is of a uniform nature only (and as such incapable of causing any inequality). For, Nescience can be the cause of inequality only as circumscribed by the Karman induced by latent-impressions due to afflictions like passion, etc. But we cannot have a body unless there is Karman, and there cannot be Karman unless there be a body: so that there arises the fault of mutual interdependence. If, on the other hand, we assume a beginninglessness, there can be offered an explanation in conformity with the maxim of the seed and the sprout, and so there would be no defect of any kind.—Further, we have it attested also—this beginninglessness of the transmigratory-world—in the Scriptures and the Smṛitis. In the Scriptural-text, to begin with, there is an indication of the world's beginninglessness inasmuch as, at the very starting-point of the creation, the words [Chh., vi. 3. 2]—“By means of this Soul, this Self”—designate the embodied-self by the term *jīva* or individual-soul, which implies a sustenance of life (by the individual-soul in some existence prior to the creation that is to be). If there had been any definite beginning to the series-of-transmigrations, how could there have been, at the very threshold of the creation, a designation by the word *jīva*,—which implies as its basis a sustenance of life,—if the self had never (in any earlier creation) sustained life at all? Nor can you say that it is an (anticipatory) designation: because he is going to sustain life in the time to come; for, more powerful than the relation that is to come is the relation that has already been, because that stands forth as an accomplished fact. [Page 43] The words of the Samhitā also [Rigveda, x. 190. 3]—“The Creator fashioned the Sun and the Moon as before,”—testify to the existence of an antecedent fashioning (of the Sun, the Moon, and the whole creation). In the Smṛitis too we come across the beginninglessness of transmigratory-world, as in [Bhagavadgītā, xv. 3]—“There is not to be perceived here any form of it: neither the end, nor the beginning, nor the support.” And in the Purāṇa it has been established that there is no measuring of the world-creations that have been in times gone by or that are to follow in the time to come. 36. Here ends the Topic (12) entitled Inequality and Cruelty.

TOPIC 13 : EVERYTHING IN ORDER

(*Sūtra* 37)

In the Vedic theory as hitherto demonstrated,— viz., that the sentient Brahman is the constituent as well as the efficient cause of the world—the defects alleged by our opponents, such as Disparity-in-Nature, and the like, have been now set at rest by the Great Teacher. Now, being about to commence a section principally devoted to a refutation of other people's theories, he brings to a conclusion the section principally devoted to (showing) the acceptability of his own theory—

And because all the qualities properly fit in. 37.

Since, with the acceptance of this Brahman as the cause of the world, all the characteristics that are demanded of a cause are seen, in the manner hitherto shown, to harmoniously subsist therein—namely, the Brahman's being Omniscient, Omnipotent, Master of the great Illusion, and so forth—therefore, no more can this Upanishadic theory be called into question. 37. Here ends the Topic (13) entitled Everything in Order.

• *Here ends—in the Work of the holy and blessed Feet of the Revered Śaṅkara, the Pupil of the holy Feet of the Revered Govinda, the blessed Ascetic-preceptor with the Title of “ Paramahāṅsa,”—in this Comment expounding the Real Nature of the Embodied-Self—the First Quarter of the Second Chapter.*

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN SENATE CHAMBERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 10, 1917

THE SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HAS THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR
LETTER OF THE 7TH INSTANT, RELATIVE TO THE
MATTER OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION RELATIVE TO THE
ELECTION OF SENATORS BY THE PEOPLE.

YOUR LETTER IS BEING REFERRED TO THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. THE COMMISSIONERS
WILL BE PLEASURED TO FURNISH YOU WITH
A COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS
AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

VERY TRULY YOURS,
J. W. WALKER,
SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

RECORDED
INDEXED

अथ

ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्ये

द्वितीयाध्यायस्य

प्रथमः पादः

१ स्मृत्यधिकरणम् ।

प्रथमेऽध्याये सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरो जगत् उत्पात्तिकारणं मृत्युवर्णादिय इव घटरुचकादीनाम्, उत्पन्नस्य जगतो नियन्तृत्वेन स्थितिकारणं ३ मायावीव मायार्थाः, प्रसारितस्य च जगतः पुनः स्वात्मन्येवोपसंहार-कारणमवनिरिव चतुर्विधस्य भूतग्रामस्य, स एव च सर्वेषां न आ-त्मेत्येतद्वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयप्रतिपादनेन प्रतिपादितम् । प्रधानादिकारण- ६ वादाश्चाशब्दत्वेन निराकृताः । इदानीं स्वपक्षे स्मृतिन्यायविरोधपरि-हारः, प्रधानादिवादानां च न्यायाभासोपबृंहितत्वं, प्रतिवेदान्तं च सृ-ष्ट्यादिप्रक्रियाया अविगीतत्वमित्यस्यार्थजातस्य प्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयोऽ- ९ ध्याय आरभ्यते । तत्र प्रथमं तावत् स्मृतिविरोधमुपन्यस्य परिहरति—

स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न, अन्य-

स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् ॥ १ ॥

यदुक्तं ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणमिति तदयुक्तम् । कुतः । स्मृत्यनवका-शदोषप्रसङ्गात् । स्मृतिश्च तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिप्रणीता शिष्टपरिगृहीता, १२ अन्याश्च तदनुसारिण्यः स्मृतय एवं सत्यनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन् । तासु ह्यचेतनं प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रं जगतः कारणमुपनिबध्यते । मन्वादिस्मृतयस्ता-वच्चोदनालक्षणेनाग्निहोत्रादिना धर्मजातेनापेक्षितमर्थं समर्पयन्त्यः साव- १५ काशा भवन्ति । अस्य वर्णस्यास्मिन् कालेऽनेन विधानेनोपनयनम्, ईदृशश्चाचारः, इत्थं वेदाध्ययनम्, इत्थं समावर्तनम्, इत्थं सहधर्म-चारिणीसंयोग इति । तथा पुरुषार्थाश्च वर्णाश्रमधर्मान् नानाविधानाद- १८ धति । नैवं कपिलादिस्मृतीनामनुष्ठेये विषयेऽवकाशोऽस्ति । मोक्षसाधन- १ [ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्]

- मेव हि सम्यग्दर्शनमधिकृत्य ताः प्रणीताः । यदि तत्राप्यनवकाशाः
 स्युरानर्थक्यमेवासां प्रसज्येत । तस्मात् तदविरोधेन वेदान्ता व्याख्या-
 २१ तव्याः ॥ कथं पुनरीक्षत्यादिभ्यो हेतुभ्यो ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारण-
 मित्यवधारितः श्रुत्यर्थः स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेन पुनराक्षिप्यते । भवे-
 दयमनाक्षेपः स्वतन्त्रप्रज्ञानाम् । परतन्त्रप्रज्ञास्तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वात-
 २४ न्त्येण श्रुत्यर्थमवधारयितुमशक्नुवन्तः प्रख्यातप्रणेतृकासु स्मृतिष्ववलम्बेरन्,
 तद्वलेन च श्रुत्यर्थं प्रतिपित्सेरन् । अस्मत्कृते च व्याख्याने न विश्वस्यु-
 र्बहुमानात् स्मृतीनां प्रणेतृषु । कपिलप्रभृतीनां चार्षं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतं
 २७ स्मर्यते । श्रुतिश्च भवति [श्वेताश्वतर, ५.२]—

ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे

ज्ञानैर्विभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् ।

- ३० इति । तस्मान्नैषां मतमयथार्थं शक्यं संभावयितुम् । तर्कावष्टम्भेन चैतेऽर्थं
 प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति । तस्मादपि स्मृतिबलेन वेदान्ता व्याख्येया इति पुनराक्षेपः ॥
 तस्य समाधिः । न, अन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गादिति । यदि
 ३३ स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेनेश्वरकारणवाद आक्षिप्येत, एवमप्यग्न्या ईश्वर-
 कारणवादिन्यः स्मृतयोऽनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन् । ता उदाहरिष्यामः—

यत्तत् सूक्ष्ममविज्ञेयम्,

- ३६ इति परं ब्रह्म प्रकृत्य [महा० भा०, १२.३४२.३०],

स ह्यन्तरात्मा भूतानां क्षेत्रज्ञश्चेति कथ्यते ।

इति चोक्त्वा [महा० भा०, १२.३४२.३१],

- ३९ तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम ।

इत्याह [महा० भा०, १२.३४२.३२] । तथान्यत्रापि—

अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन् निर्गुणे संप्रलीयते ।

- ४२ इत्याह [महा० भा०, १२.३४७.३१] ।

अतश्च संक्षेपमिमं शृणुध्वं नारायणः सर्वमिदं पुराणः ।

स सर्गकाले च करोति सर्वं संहारकाले च तदत्ति भूयः ॥

- ४५ इति पुराणे [महा० भा०, १२.३०७.११५] । भगवद्गीतासु च [७.६]—

अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ।

इति । परमात्मानमेव प्रकृत्यापस्तम्बः पठति [ध०सू०, १.८.२३.२]—

४८

तस्मात् कायाः प्रभवन्ति सर्वे

स मूलं शाश्वतिकः स नित्यः ।

इति । एवमनेकशः स्मृतिष्वपीश्वरः कारणत्वेनोपादानत्वेन च प्रकाशयते ॥

५१

स्मृतिबलेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठमानस्य स्मृतिबलेनैवोत्तरं वक्ष्यामीत्यतोऽयमन्य-
स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषोपन्यासः । दर्शितं तु श्रुतीनामीश्वरकारणवादं प्रति तात्प-
र्यम् । विप्रतिपत्तौ च स्मृतीनामवश्यकर्तव्येऽन्यतरपरिग्रहेऽन्यतरपरित्यागे

५४

च श्रुत्यनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः प्रमाणमनपेक्ष्या इतराः । तदुक्तं प्रमाणलक्षणे
[जै० सू०, १.३.३]—

विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् ।

५७

इति । नचातीन्द्रियानर्थाञ्श्रुतिमन्तरेण कश्चिदुपलभत इति शक्यं संभा-
वयितुम् । निमित्ताभावात् । शक्यं कपिलादीनां सिद्धानामप्रतिहतज्ञान-
त्वादिति चेत् । न । सिद्धेरपि सापेक्षत्वात् । धर्मानुष्ठानापेक्षा हि

६०

सिद्धिः । स च धर्मश्चोदनालक्षणः । ततश्च पूर्वसिद्धायाश्चोदनाया अर्थो
न पश्चिमसिद्धपुरुषवचनवशेनातिशङ्कितुं शक्यते । सिद्धव्यपाश्रयकल्प-
नायामपि बहुत्वात् सिद्धानां प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां

६३

न श्रुतिव्यपाश्रयादन्यन्निर्णयकारणमस्ति । परतन्त्रप्रज्ञस्यापि नाकस्मात्
स्मृतिविशेषविषयः पक्षपातो युक्तः, कस्यचित् क्वचित् पक्षपाते सति
पुरुषमतिवैश्वरूप्येण तत्त्वाव्यवस्थानप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् तस्यापि स्मृति-

६६

विप्रतिपत्त्युपन्यासेन श्रुत्यनुसाराननुसारविषयविवेचनेन च सन्मार्गे
प्रज्ञा संग्रहणीया ॥

या तु श्रुतिः कपिलस्य ज्ञानातिशयं प्रदर्शयन्ती प्रदर्शिता न तथा

६९

श्रुतिविरुद्धमपि कापिलं मतं श्रद्धातुं शक्यं कपिलमिति श्रुतिसामान्य-
मात्रत्वात्, अन्यस्य च कर्पिलस्य सगरपुत्राणां प्रतप्तुर्वासुदेवनाम्नः
स्मरणात्, अन्यार्थदर्शनस्य च प्राप्तिरहितस्यासाधकत्वात् । भवति

७२

चान्या मगोर्माहात्म्यं प्रख्यापयन्ती श्रुतिः [तै० सं०, २.२.१०.२]—

यद्वै किं च मनुरवदत् तद्भेषजम् ।

इति । मनुना च [१२.९१]—

७५

सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मानि ।

संपश्यन्नात्मयाजी वै स्वाराज्यमधिगच्छति ॥

इति सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनं प्रशंसता कापिलं मतं निन्दत इति गम्यते ।

७८ कपिलो हि न सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनमनुमन्यते, आत्मभेदाभ्युपगमात् । महा-
भारतेऽपि च—

बहवः पुरुषा ब्रह्मन्नुताहो एक एव तु ।

८१ इति विचार्य [१२.३६०.१],

बहवः पुरुषा राजन् सांख्ययोगविचारिणाम् ।

इति परमक्षमुपन्यस्य [महा०भा०, १२.३६०.२], तद्व्युदासेन—

८४ बहूनां पुरुषाणां हि यथैका योनिरुच्यते ।

तथा तं पुरुषं विश्वमाख्यास्यामि गुणाधिकम् ॥

इत्युपक्रम्य [महा०भा०, १२.३६०.३],

८७ ममान्तरात्मा तव च ये चान्ये देहसंस्थिताः ।

सर्वेषां साक्षिभूतोऽसौ न ग्राह्यः केनचित् क्वचित् ॥

८८ विश्वमूर्धा विश्वभुजो विश्वपादाक्षिनासिकः ।

९० एकश्चरति भूतेषु स्वैरचारी यथासुखम् ॥

इति सर्वात्मतैव निर्धारिता [महा०भा०, १२.३६१.४, ५] । श्रुतिश्च

सर्वात्मतायां भवति [ई०, ७]—

९३ यस्मिन् सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मैवाभूद्विजानतः ।

तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥

इत्येवंविधा ॥ अतश्च सिद्धमात्मभेदकल्पनयापि कपिलस्य तन्त्रं वेद-

९६ विरुद्धं वेदानुसारिमनुवचनविरुद्धं च, न केवलं स्वतन्त्रप्रकृतिकल्पनयै-

वेति । वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थं प्रामाण्यं खेरिव रूपविषये, पुरुषव-

चसां तु मूलान्तरापेक्षं वक्तृस्मृतिव्यवहितं चेति विप्रकर्षः । तस्माद्वेद-

९९ विरुद्धे विषये स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो न दोषः ॥ १ ॥

कुतश्च स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो न दोषः—

इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः ॥ २ ॥

प्रधानादितराणि यानि प्रधानपरिणामत्वेन स्मृतौ कल्पितानि महदा-

३ दीनि, न तानि वेदे लोके चोपलभ्यन्ते । भूतेन्द्रियाणि तावल्लोकवेद-

प्रसिद्धत्वाच्छक्यन्ते स्मर्तुम् । अलोकवेदप्रसिद्धत्वात् तु महदादीनां,

षष्ठस्येवेन्द्रियार्थस्य, न स्मृतिरवकल्पते । यदपि क्वचित् तत्परमिव श्रवण-
 ६ मवभासते तदप्यतत्परं व्याख्यातम्—आनुमानिकमप्येकेषाम् [ब्र० सू०,
 १.४.१] इत्यत्र । कार्यस्मृतेरप्रामाण्यात् कारणस्मृतेरप्यप्रामाण्यं युक्त-
 मित्यभिप्रायः । तस्मादपि न स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो दोषः । तर्कावष्टम्भं
 ९ तु—न विलक्षणत्वात् [ब्र० सू०, २.१.४] इत्यारभ्योन्मथिष्यति ॥ २ ॥
 इति स्मृत्याधिकरणम् ॥ १ ॥

२ योगप्रत्युक्त्याधिकरणम् ।

एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ३ ॥

एतेन सांख्यस्मृतिप्रत्याख्यानेन योगस्मृतिरपि प्रत्याख्याता द्रष्टव्ये-
 त्यतिदिशति । तत्रापि श्रुतिविरोधेन प्रधानं स्वन्तत्रमेव कारणं, महदा-
 ३ दीनि च कार्याण्यलोकवेदप्रसिद्धानि कल्पन्ते ॥ नन्वेवं सति समान-
 न्यायत्वात् पूर्वैर्णैवैतद्गतं किमर्थं पुनरतिदिश्यते । अस्ति ह्यत्राम्यधिकाशङ्का ।
 सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायो हि योगो वेदे विहितः—

६ श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

इति [बृ०, २.४.५] ।

त्रिरुन्नतं स्थाप्य समं शरीरम् ।

७ इत्यादिना [श्वे०, २.८] चासनादिकल्पनापुरःसरं बहुप्रपञ्चं योगवि-
 धानं श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि दृश्यते । लिङ्गानि च वैदिकानि योगविषयाणि
 सहस्रश उपलभ्यन्ते—

१२ तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम् ।

इति [का०, २.३.११],

विद्यामेतां योगविधिं च कृत्स्नम् ।

१५ इति [का०, २.३.१८] चैवमादीनि । योगशास्त्रेऽपि—

अथ तत्त्वदर्शनोपायो योगः ।

इति सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायत्वेनैव योगोऽङ्गीक्रियते । अतः संप्रतिपन्नाथैक-
 १८ देशत्वादष्टकादिस्मृतिवद्योगस्मृतिरप्यनपवदनीया भविष्यतीतीयमप्यधिका-
 शङ्कातिदेशेन निवर्त्यते । अथैकदेशसंप्रतिपत्तावप्यथैकदेशविप्रतिपत्तेः
 पूर्वोक्ताया दर्शनात् ॥

- २१ सतीष्वप्यध्यात्मविषयासु बह्वीषु स्मृतिषु सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योरेव निरा-
करणे यत्नः कृतः । सांख्ययोगौ हि परमपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्यातौ,
शिष्टैश्च परिगृहीतौ, लिङ्गेन च श्रौतेनोपबृंहितौ [श्वे०, ६.१३]—
- २४ तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नं
ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः ।
इति । निराकरणं तु न सांख्यज्ञानेन वेदनिरपेक्षेण योगमार्गेण वा निः-
- २७ श्रेयसमधिगम्यत इति । श्रुतिर्हि वैदिकादात्मैकत्वविज्ञानादन्यन्निश्रेयस-
साधनं वारयति [श्वे०, ३.८]—
तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति
- ३० नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ।
इति । द्वैतिनो हि ते सांख्या योगाश्च नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः । यत्तु दर्शन-
मुक्तम् [श्वे०, ६.१३]—
- ३३ तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नम् ।
इति, वैदिकमेव तत्र ज्ञानं ध्यानं च सांख्ययोगशब्दाभ्यामभिलष्यते,
प्रत्यासत्तेः, इत्यवगन्तव्यम् । येन त्वंशेन न विरुध्येते तेनेष्टमेव सांख्य-
- ३६ योगस्मृत्योः सावकाशत्वम् । तद्यथा—
असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः ।
इति [बृ०, ४.३.१६] एवमादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव पुरुषस्य विशुद्धत्वं निर्गुण-
- ३९ पुरुषनिरूपणेन सांख्यैरभ्युपगम्यते । तथा च योगैरपि [जाबा०, ५]—
अथ परिव्राड् विवर्णवासा मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहः ।
इत्येवमादि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव निवृत्तिनिष्ठत्वं प्रब्रज्याद्युपदेशेनानुगम्यते ॥
- ४२ एतेन सर्वाणि तर्कस्मरणानि प्रतिवक्तव्यानि । तान्यपि तर्कोपपत्तिभ्यां
तत्त्वज्ञानायोपकुर्वन्तीति चेदुपकुर्वन्तु नाम । तत्त्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य
एव भवति [तै० ब्रा०, ३.१२.९.७]—
- ४५ नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्,
तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि,
इति [बृ०, ३.९.२६] एवमादिश्रुतिभ्यः ॥ ३ ॥ इति योगप्रत्युक्त्य-
- ४८ धिकरणम् ॥ २ ॥

३ विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम् ।

न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ॥ ४ ॥

- ब्रह्मास्य जगतो निमित्तकारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्य पक्षस्याक्षेपः स्मृतिनिमित्तः परिहृतः, तर्कनिमित्त इदानीमाक्षेपः परिहियते । कुतः पुनरस्मिन्नवधारित आगमार्थे तर्कनिमित्तस्याक्षेपस्यावकाशः । तनु धर्म इव ब्रह्मण्यप्यनपेक्ष आगमो भवितुमर्हति ॥ भवेदयमवष्टम्भो यदि प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्य आगममात्रप्रमेयोऽयमर्थः स्यात्, अनुष्ठेयरूप इव धर्मः । परिनिष्पन्नरूपं तु ब्रह्मावगम्यते । परिनिष्पन्ने च वस्तुनि प्रमाणान्तराणामस्त्ववकाशो, यथा पृथिव्यादिषु । यथा च श्रुतीनां परस्परविरोधे सत्येकवशेनेतरा नीयन्ते, एवं प्रमाणान्तरविरोधेऽपि तद्वशेनैव श्रुतिर्नीयेत । दृष्टसाम्येन चादृष्टमर्थं समर्थयन्ती युक्तिरनुभवस्य संनिकृष्यते, विप्रकृष्यते तु श्रुतिरैतिह्यमात्रेण स्वार्थाभिधानात् । अनुभवावसानं च ब्रह्मविज्ञानमविद्याया निवर्तकं मोक्षसाधनं च दृष्टफलतयेष्यते । श्रुतिरपि [बृ०, १२ २.४.५]—

श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः ।

- इति श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधती तर्कमप्यत्रादत्तव्यं दर्शयति । अतस्तर्कनिमित्तः पुनराक्षेपः क्रियते—न, विलक्षणत्वादस्य, इति ॥ यदुक्तम्, चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिरिति, तन्नोपपद्यते । कस्मात् । विलक्षणत्वादस्य विकारस्य प्रकृत्याः । इदं हि ब्रह्मकार्यत्वेनाभिप्रेयमाणं जगद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणमचेतनमशुद्धं च दृश्यते, ब्रह्म च जगद्विलक्षणं चेतनं शुद्धं च श्रूयते । नच विलक्षणत्वे प्रकृतिविकारभावो दृष्टः । नहि रुचकादयो विकारा मृत्प्रकृतिका भवन्ति, शरावादयो वा सुवर्णप्रकृतिकाः । मृदैव तु मृदन्विता विकाराः क्रियन्ते, सुवर्णेन च सुवर्णान्विताः । तथेदमपि जगदचेतनं सुखदुःखमोहान्वितं सत् अचेतनस्यैव सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य कारणस्य कार्यं भवितुमर्हतीति न विलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणः । ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वं चास्य जगतोऽशुद्धचेतनत्वदर्शनादवगन्तव्यम् । अशुद्धं हि जगत् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया, प्रीतिपरितापविषादादिहेतुत्वात्, स्वर्गनरकाद्युच्चावचप्रपञ्चत्वाच्च । अचेतनं चेदं जगत्, चेतनं प्रति कार्यकरणभावेनोपकरणभावोपगमात् । नहि साम्ये सत्युपकार्यो-

- पकारकभावो भवति । नहि प्रदीपौ परस्परस्योपकुरुतः ॥ ननु चेतनमपि कार्यकरणं स्वामिभृत्यन्यायेन भोक्तुरूपकारिष्यति । न । स्वामिभृत्ययो-
- ३० र्ण्यचेतनांशस्यैव चेतनं प्रत्युपकारकत्वात् । यो ह्येकस्य चेतनस्य परि-
ग्रहो बुद्ध्यादिरचेतनभागः स एवान्यस्य चेतनस्योपकरोति, न तु स्वयमेव
चेतनश्चेतनान्तरस्योपकरोत्यपकरोति वा । निरतिशया ह्यकर्तारश्चेतना
- ३३ इति सांख्या मन्यन्ते । तस्मादचेतनं कार्यकरणम् । नच काष्ठलोष्टादीनां
चेतनत्वे किञ्चित् प्रमाणमस्ति । प्रसिद्धश्चायं चेतनाचेतनविभागो लोके ।
तस्माद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगत् तत्प्रकृतिकम् ॥
- ३६ योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत—श्रुत्या जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्वलेनैव
समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमयिष्यामि, प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारेऽन्वयदर्शनात् ।
अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद्भविष्यति । यथा स्पष्टचैतन्या-
- ३९ नामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते, एवं काष्ठलो-
ष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते । एतस्मादेव च विभाविताविभा-
वितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभावाभ्यां च कार्यकरणानामात्मनां च
- ४२ चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते । यथा च
पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेऽपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात् पर-
स्योपकारित्वं भवति, एवमिहापि भविष्यति । प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत
- ४५ एव न विरोत्स्यते—इति । तेनापि कथञ्चिच्चेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं
विलक्षणत्वं परिहियेत । शुद्धयशुद्धित्वलक्षणं तु विलक्षणत्वं नैव
परिहियते ॥
- ४८ नृचेतरदपि विलक्षणत्वं परिहर्तुं शक्यत इत्याह—तथात्वं च शब्दा-
दिति । अनवगम्यमानमेव हीदं लोके समस्तस्य वस्तुनश्चेतनत्वं चेतन-
प्रकृतिकत्वश्रवणाच्छब्दशरणतया केवलयोत्प्रेक्ष्यते । तच्च शब्देनैव
- ५१ विरुध्यते, यतः शब्दादपि तथात्वमवगम्यते । तथात्वमिति प्रकृतिविल-
क्षणत्वं कथयति । शब्द एव [तै० उ०, २.६]—
- विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च,
- ५४ इति कस्यचिद्विभागस्याचेतनतां श्रावयंश्चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणो विलक्षणमचेतनं
जगच्छ्रावयति ॥ ४ ॥

ननु चेतनत्वमपि क्वचिदचेतनत्वामिमितानां भूतेन्द्रियाणां श्रूयते,
यथा—

३ मृदब्रवीत् । आपोऽब्रुवन् ।

इति [श० प० ब्रा०, ६.१.३.२, ४] ।

तत्तेज ऐक्षत । ता आप ऐक्षन्त ।

६ इति [छा०, ६.२.३, ४] चैवमाद्या भूतविषया चेतनत्वश्रुतिः । इन्द्रि-
यविषयापि—

ते हेमे प्राणा अहंश्रेयसे विवदमाना ब्रह्म जग्मुः ।

९ इति [बृ०, ६.१.७] ।

ते ह वाचमूचुस्त्वं न उद्रायेति ।

इति [बृ०, १.३.२] एवमाद्येन्द्रियविषयेति ॥ अत उत्तरं पठति—

अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ॥ ५ ॥

१२ तुशब्द आशङ्कामपनुदति । न खलु मृदब्रवीदित्येवंजातीयकया श्रुत्या

भूतेन्द्रियाणां चेतनत्वमाशङ्कनीयम्, यतोऽभिमानिव्यपदेश एषः । मृदा-

द्यभिमानिन्यो वागाद्यभिमानिन्यश्च चेतना देवता वदनसंवदनादिषु

१५ चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते, न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रम् । कस्मात् ।

विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् । विशेषो हि भोक्तृणां भूतेन्द्रियाणां च चेतनाचेतन-

प्रविभागलक्षणः प्रागभिहितः । सर्वचेतनतार्या चासौ नोपपद्येत । अपिच

१८ कौषीतकिनः प्राणसंवादे करणमात्राशङ्काविनिवृत्तयेऽधिष्ठातृचेतनपरि-
प्रहाय देवताशब्देन विशिषन्ति—

एता ह वै देवता अहंश्रेयसे विवदमानाः ।

२१ इति [कौ०, २.१४],

ता वा एताः सर्वा देवताः प्राणे निःश्रेयसं विदित्वा ।

इति [कौ०, २.१४] च । अनुगताश्च सर्वत्राभिमानिन्यश्चेतना देवता

२४ मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणादिभ्योऽवगम्यन्ते ।

अग्निर्वाग्भूत्वा मुखं प्राविशत् ।

इति [ऐ० आ०, २.४.२४] एवमादिका च श्रुतिः करणेष्वनुग्राहिकां

२७ देवतामनुगतां दर्शयति । प्राणसंवादवाक्यशेषे च—

२ [ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्]

ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः ।

इति [छा०, ५.१.७] श्रेष्ठत्वनिर्धारणाय प्रजापतिगमनं, तद्वचनाच्चैकै-
३० कोक्तमणेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्राणश्रेष्ठ्यप्रतिपत्तिः,
तस्मै बलिहरणम् ।

इति [बृ०, ६.१.१३] चैवंजातीयकोऽस्मदादिष्विव व्यवहारोऽनुग-
३३ म्यमानोऽभिमानिव्यपदेशं द्रढयति ।
तत्तेज ऐक्षत ।

इति [छा०, ६.२.३] अपि परस्या एव देवताया अधिष्ठात्र्याः स्ववि-
३६ कारेष्वनुगताया इयमीक्षा व्यपदिश्यत इति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

तस्माद्विलक्षणमेवेदं ब्रह्मणो जगत् । विलक्षणत्वाच्च न ब्रह्मप्रकृति-
कमित्याक्षिप्ते प्रतिविधत्ते—

दृश्यते तु ॥ ६ ॥

- ३ तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति । यदुक्तं विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमिति,
नायमेकान्तः । दृश्यते हि लोके चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्यः पुरुषादिभ्यो
विलक्षणानां केशनखादीनामुत्पत्तिः, अचेतनत्वेन च प्रसिद्धेभ्यो
६ गोमयादिभ्यो वृश्चिकादीनाम् । नन्वचेतनान्येव पुरुषादिशरीराण्यचे-
तनानां केशनखादीनां कारणानि, अचेतनान्येव च वृश्चिकादिशरी-
राण्यचेतनानां गोमयादीनां कार्याणीति । उच्यते । एवमपि किञ्चि-
९ दचेतनं चेतनस्यायतनभावमुपगच्छति, किञ्चिन्नेत्यस्त्येव वैलक्षण्यम् ।
महांश्चायं पारिणामिकः स्वभावविप्रकर्षः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादीनां च
स्वरूपादिभेदात्, तथा गोमयादीनां वृश्चिकादीनां च । अत्यन्तसारूप्ये
१२ च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रलीयेत । अथोच्येत, अस्ति कश्चित् पार्थि-
वत्वादिस्वभावः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादिष्वनुवर्तमानो गोमयादीनां वृश्चि-
कादिष्विति, ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनु-
१५ वर्तमानो दृश्यते । विलक्षणत्वेन च कारणेन ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वं जगतो
दूषयता किमशेषस्य ब्रह्मस्वभावस्याननुवर्तनं विलक्षणत्वमभिप्रेयते, उत
यस्यकस्यचित्, अथ चैतन्यस्येति वक्तव्यम् । प्रथमे विकल्पे समस्त-
१८ प्रकृतिविकारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । नह्यसत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकार इति भवति ।
द्वितीये चासिद्धत्वम् । दृश्यते हि सत्तालक्षणो ब्रह्मस्वभाव आका-

शादिष्वनुवर्तमान इत्युक्तम् । तृतीये तु दृष्टान्ताभावः । किं हि यच्चै-
 २१ तन्येनानन्वितं तद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकं दृष्टमिति ब्रह्मवादिनं प्रत्युदाह्रियेत, सम-
 स्तस्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । आगमविरोधस्तु प्रसिद्ध
 एव । चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यागमतात्पर्यस्य प्रसाधित-
 २४ त्वात् ॥

यत्तूक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद्ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुरिति, तदपि
 मनोरथमात्रम् । रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः । लिङ्गाद्य-
 २७ भावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम् । आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थो धर्मवत् ।
 तथा च श्रुतिः—

नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ ।

३० इति [का०, १.२.९],

को अद्वा वेद क इह प्रवोचत् ।

इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आबभूव ।

३३ इति [ऋ०सं०, १०.१२९.६, ७] च, एते ऋचौ सिद्धानामपीश्वराणां
 दुर्बोधतां जगत्कारणस्य दर्शयतः । स्मृतिरपि भवति—

अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् ।

३६ इति [महा० भा०, ६.५.१२],

अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्योऽयमुच्यते ।

इति [भ० गी०, २.२५] च,

३९ न मे विदुः सुरगणाः प्रभवं न महर्षयः ।

अहमादिर्हि देवानां महर्षिणां च सर्वशः ॥

इति [भ० गी०, १०.२] चैवंजातीयका । यदपि श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण
 ४२ मननं विदधच्छब्द एव तर्कमप्यादर्थव्यं दर्शयतीत्युक्तम्, नानेन मिषेण
 शुष्कतर्कस्यात्रात्मलाभः संभवति । श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभ-
 वाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते । स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोरुभयोरितरेतरव्यभिचारादात्मनोऽन-
 ४५ न्वागतत्वं, संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना संपत्तेर्निष्प्रपञ्चसदा-
 त्मत्वं, प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यत्वन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेक
 इत्येवंजातीयकः । तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात् [ब्र० सू०, २.१.११] इति च

४८ केवलस्य तर्कस्य विप्रलम्भकत्वं दर्शयिष्यति ॥ योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबलेनैव समस्तस्य जगतश्चेतनतामुप्रेक्षते तस्यापि—

विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च ।

५१ इति [तै०उ०, २.६] चेतनाचेतनविभागश्रवणं विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम् । परस्यैव त्विदमपि विभागश्रवणं न युज्यते । कथम् । परमकारणस्य ह्यत्र समस्तजगदात्मना समवस्थानं

५४ श्राव्यते—

विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं चाभवत् ।

इति [तै०उ०, २.६] । तत्र यथा चेतनस्याचेतनभावो नोपपद्यते विलक्षणत्वात्, एवमचेतनस्यापि चेतनभावो नोपपद्यते । प्रत्युक्तत्वात् तु वि-
५७ लक्षणत्वस्य यथाश्रुत्येव चेतनं कारणं ग्रहीतव्यं भवति ॥ ६ ॥

असदिति चेन्न, प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥

यदि चेतनं शुद्धं शब्दादिहीनं च ब्रह्म तद्विपरीतस्याचेतनस्याशुद्धस्य शब्दादिमतश्च कार्यस्य कारणमिष्येत, असत् तर्हि कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति

३ प्रसज्येत । अनिष्टं चैतत् सत्कार्यवादिनस्तवेति चेत् । नैष दोषः । प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् । प्रतिषेधमात्रं हीदं, नास्य प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति । नह्ययं प्रतिषेधः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रतिषेद्धं शक्नोति । कथम् ।
६ यथैव हीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मना सत्, एवं प्रागुत्पत्तेरपीति गम्यते । नहीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मानमन्तरेण स्वतन्त्रमेवास्ति—

सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद ।

९ इत्यादि [बृ०, २.४.६] श्रवणात् । कारणात्मना तु सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेरविशिष्टम् ॥ ननु शब्दादिहीनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणम् । बाढम् । नतु शब्दादिमतं कार्यं कारणात्मना हीनं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिदानीं वास्ति । तेन
१२ न शक्यते वक्तुं प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत् कार्यमिति । विस्तीरेण चैतत् कार्यकारणानन्यत्ववादे [ब्र०सू०, २.१.१४] वक्ष्यामः ॥ ७ ॥

अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ॥ ८ ॥

अत्राह—यदि स्थौल्यसावयवत्वाचेतनत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वाशुद्ध्यादिधर्मकं कार्यं ब्रह्मकारणमभ्युपगम्येत, तदपीतौ प्रलये प्रतिसंसृज्यमानं कार्यं-

३. कारणविभागप्रापद्यमानं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदित्यपीतौ कार-
णस्यापि ब्रह्मणः कार्यस्येवाशुद्ध्यादिरूपप्रसङ्गात् सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगत्कार-
णमित्यसमञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनम् । अपिच समस्तस्य विभागस्या-
६ विभागप्राप्ते. पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियमकारणाभावाद्भोक्तृभोग्यादिविभागेनोत्पत्तिर्न
प्राप्नोतीत्यसमञ्जसम् । अपिच भोक्तृणां परेण ब्रह्मणाऽविभागं गतानां
कर्मादिनिमित्तप्रलयेऽपि पुनरुत्पत्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां मुक्तानामपि पुन-
९ रुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् । अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण
ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेत, एवमप्यपीतिश्च न संभवति, कारणव्यतिरिक्तं च कार्यं
न संभवतीत्यसमञ्जसमेवेति ॥ ८ ॥

अत्रोच्यते—

न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ॥ ९ ॥

नैवास्मदीये दर्शने किञ्चिदसमञ्जस्यमस्ति । यत् तावदभिहितं कारण-
३ मपिगच्छत् कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदिति, तददूषणम् ।
कस्मात् । दृष्टान्तभावात् । सन्ति हि दृष्टान्ता यथा कारणमपिगच्छत्
कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण न दूषयति । तद्यथा शरावादयो मृत्प्रकृ-
६ तिका विकारा विभागावस्थायामुच्चावचमध्यमप्रभेदाः सन्तः पुनः प्रकृति-
मपिगच्छन्तो न तामात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति । रुचकादयश्च सुवर्ण-
विकारा अपीतौ न सुवर्णमात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति । पृथिवीविकारश्च-
९ तुर्विधो भूतग्रामो न पृथिवीमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजति । त्वत्पक्षस्य
तु न कश्चिद् दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति । अपीतिरेव हि न संभवेद्यदि कारणे कार्यं
स्वधर्मेणैवावतिष्ठेत । अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं
१२ नतु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्, आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः, इति वक्ष्यामः [ब्र०
सू०, २.१.१४] ॥ अत्यल्पं चेदमुच्यते कार्यमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण
कारणं संसृजेदिति । स्थितावपि समानोऽयं प्रसङ्गः, कार्यकारणयोरन-
१५ न्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा [बृ०, २.४.६],

आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् [छा०, ७.२५.२],

१८ ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात् [मु०, २.२.११],

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म [छा०, ३.१४.१],

इत्येवमाद्याभिर्हि श्रुतिभिरविशेषेण त्रिष्वपि कालेषु कार्यस्य कारणान-
 २१ न्यत्वं श्राव्यते । तत्र यः परिहारः, कार्यस्य तद्धर्माणां चाविद्याध्यारो-
 पितत्वान्न तैः कारणं संस्पृश्यत इति, अपीतावपि स समानः ॥

अस्ति चायमपरो दृष्टान्तो—यथा स्वयंप्रसारितया मायया मायावी
 २४ त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते, अवस्तुत्वात्, एवं परमात्मापि संसार-
 मायया न संस्पृश्यत इति । यथाच स्वंप्रदृग्गेकः स्वप्रदर्शनमायया न
 संस्पृश्यते प्रबोधसंप्रसादयोरनन्वागतत्वात्, एवमवस्थात्रयसाक्ष्येकोऽव्यभि-
 २७ चार्यवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यत इति । मायामात्रं ह्येतत्
 परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मनावभासनम्, रज्ज्वा इव सर्पादिभावेनेति ।
 अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्विराचार्यैः [गौड० कारि०, १.१६]—

३० अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥

इति । तत्र यदुक्तमपीतौ कारणस्थापि कार्यस्येव स्थौल्यादिदोषप्रसङ्ग
 ३३ इति एतदयुक्तम् । यत् पुनरेतदुक्तं समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुन-
 र्विभागेनोत्पत्तौ नियमकारणं नोपपद्यत इति, अयमप्यदोषः । दृष्टान्त-
 भावादेव । यथाहि सुषुप्तिसमाध्यादावपि सत्यां स्वाभाविवयामविभागप्राप्तौ
 ३६ मिथ्याज्ञानस्यानपोदितत्वात् पूर्ववत् पुनः प्रबोधे विभागो भवति, एवमि-
 हापि भविष्यति । श्रुतिश्चात्र भवति—

इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामह इति ।
 ३९ त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतङ्गो
 वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तदाभवन्ति ।

इति [छा०, ६.९.२, ३] । यथा ह्यविभागेऽपि परमात्मनि, मिथ्या-
 ४२ ज्ञानप्रतिबद्धो विभागव्यवहारः स्वप्नवदव्याहतः स्थितौ दृश्यते, एवम-
 पीतावपि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धैव विभागशक्तिरनुमास्यते । एतेन मुक्तानां
 पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः, सम्यग्ज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानस्यापोदितत्वात् । यः
 ४५ पुनरयमन्तेऽपरो विकल्प उत्प्रेक्षितः, अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव
 परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेतेति, सोऽप्यनभ्युपगमादेव प्रतिषिद्धः । तस्मात्
 समञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनम् ॥ ९ ॥

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ १० ॥

स्वपक्षे चैते प्रतिवादिनः साधारणा दोषाः प्रादुःष्युः । कथमित्यु-
च्यते । यत् तावदभिहितं विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमिति, प्रधा-
३ नप्रकृतिकतायामपि समानमेतत्, शब्दादिहीनात् प्रधानाच्छब्दादिमतो
जगत उत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् । अत एव च विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात्
समानः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यवादप्रसङ्गः । तथापीतौ कार्यस्य कारणाविभा-
६ गाभ्युपगमात् तद्वत्प्रसङ्गोऽपि समानः । तथा मृदितसर्वविशेषेषु विकारे-
ष्वपीतावविभागात्मतां गतेष्विदमस्य पुरुषस्थोपादानमिदमस्येति प्राक्प्र-
लयात् प्रतिपुरुषं ये नियता भेदा न ते तथैव पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियन्तुं शक्य-
९ न्ते, कारणाभावात् । विनैव कारणेन नियमेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कारणाभाव-
साम्यान्मुक्तानामपि पुनर्बन्धप्रसङ्गः । अथ केचिद्भेदा अपीतावविभाग-
मापद्यन्ते केचिन्नैति चेत्, ये नापद्यन्ते तेषां प्रधानकार्यत्वं न प्राप्नोति ।
१२ इत्येवमेते दोषाः साधारणत्वान्नान्यतरस्मिन् पक्षे चोदयितव्या भवन्ती-
त्यदोषतामेवैषां दृढयति, अवश्याश्रयितव्यत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवम-
प्यविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः ॥ ११ ॥

इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यं यस्मान्निरागमाः
पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति, उत्प्रेक्षाया निर-
३ ङ्कुशत्वात् । तथाहि कैश्चिदभियुक्तैर्यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्ततरैर-
न्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते, तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षिताः सन्तस्तस्तोऽन्यैराभास्यन्ते, इति
न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुं, पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात् । अथ
६ कस्यचित् प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यस्य कपिलस्यान्यस्य वा संमतस्तर्कः प्रतिष्ठित
इत्याश्रीयेत, एवमप्यप्रतिष्ठितत्वमेव, प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यानुमतानामपि तीर्थ-
काराणां कपिलकणभुक्प्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ अथोच्येत
९ अन्यथा वयमनुमास्यामहे यथा नाप्रतिष्ठादोषो भविष्यति । न हि प्रति-
ष्ठितस्तर्क एव नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । एतदपि हि तर्काणामप्रति-
ष्ठितत्वं तर्केणैव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते, केषांचित् तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वदर्शनेनान्ये-
१२ षामपि तज्जातीयकानां तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वकल्पनात् । सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां

१५ च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । अतीतवर्तमानाध्वसाम्येन ह्यनागतेऽप्य-
ध्वनि सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहाराय प्रवर्तमानो लोको दृश्यते । श्रुत्यर्थविप्र-
तिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्ति-
निरूपणरूपेण क्रियते । मनुरपि चैवं मन्यते—

१८ प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् ।
त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ॥

इति [१२.१०५],

२१ आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।
यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥

२४ इति [१२.१०६] च ब्रुवन् । अयमेव तर्कस्यालंकारो यदप्रतिष्ठि-
तत्वं नाम । एवंहि सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यो
भवति । नहि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चि-
दस्ति प्रमाणम् । तस्मान्न तर्काप्रतिष्ठानं दोष इति चेत्, एवमप्यविमोक्ष-
प्रसङ्गः । यद्यपि क्वचिद्विषये तर्कस्य प्रतिष्ठितत्वमुपलक्ष्यते, तथापि
२७ प्रकृते तावद्विषये प्रसज्यत एवाप्रतिष्ठितत्वदोषादनिर्मोक्षस्तर्कस्य । नहीद-
मतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनमागममन्तरेणोत्प्रेक्षितुमापि शक्यम् ।
रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षगोचरः, लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीना-
३० मिति चावोचाम । अपिच सम्यग्ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति सर्वेषां मोक्षवादि-
नामभ्युपगमः । तच्च सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपम्, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् । एकरूपेण
ह्यवस्थितो योऽर्थः स परमार्थः । लोके तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानमित्यु-
३३ च्यते, यथाग्निरुष्ण इति । तत्रैवं सति, सम्यग्ज्ञाने पुरुषाणां विप्रति-
पत्तिरनुपपन्ना । तर्कज्ञानानां त्वन्योन्यविरोधात् प्रसिद्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः ।
यद्धि केनचित् तार्किकेणेदमेव सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिपादितं तदपरेण
३६ व्युत्थाप्यते, तेनापि प्रतिष्ठापितं ततोऽपरेण व्युत्थाप्यते, इति प्रसिद्धं
लोके । कथमेकरूपानवस्थितविषयं तर्कप्रभवं सम्यग्ज्ञानं भवेत् । नच
प्रधानवादी तर्कविदामुत्तम इति सर्वैस्तार्किकैः परिगृहीतो येन तदीयं
३९ मतं सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्येमहि । नच शक्यन्तेऽतीतानागतवर्तमाना-
स्तार्किका एकस्मिन् देशे काले च समाहर्तुं, येन तन्मतिरेकरूपैकार्य-
विषया सम्यग्मतिरिति स्यात् । वेदस्य तु नित्यत्वे विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे

- ४२ च सति व्यवस्थितार्थविषयत्वोपपत्तेस्तज्जनितस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यक्त्वमती-
तानागतवर्तमानैः सर्वैरपि तार्किकैरपहोतुमशक्यम् । अतः सिद्धर्मस्यैवौ-
पनिषदस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वम् । अतोऽन्यत्र सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वानुपपत्तेः
४५ संसाराविमोक्ष एव प्रसज्येत । अत आगमवशेनागमानुसारितर्कवशेन
च चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेति स्थितम् ॥ ११ ॥ इति
विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम् ॥ ३ ॥

४ शिष्टापरिग्रहाधिकरणम् ।

एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः ॥ १२ ॥

- वैदिकस्य दर्शनस्य प्रत्यासन्नत्वाद्गुरुतरतर्कबलोपेतत्वाद्देदानुसारिभिश्च
कैश्चिच्छिष्टैः केनचिदंशेन परिगृहीतत्वात् प्रधानकारणवादं तावद्व्यपा-
३ श्रित्य यस्तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेपो वेदान्तवाक्येषूद्भावितः स परिहृतः । इदानी-
मण्वादिवादव्यपाश्रयेणापि कैश्चिन्मन्दमतिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्येषु पुनस्तर्कनि-
मित्त आक्षेप आशङ्क्यते, इत्यतः प्रधानमल्लनिर्बर्हणन्यायेनातिदिशति ।
६ परिगृह्यन्त इति परिग्रहाः, न परिग्रहा अपरिग्रहाः, शिष्टानामपरिग्रहाः
शिष्टापरिग्रहाः । एतेन प्रकृतेन प्रधानकारणवादनिराकरणकारणेन शिष्टै-
र्मनुव्यासप्रभृतिभिः केनचिदप्यंशेनापरिगृहीता येऽण्वादिकारणवादास्ते-
९ ऽपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता निराकृता द्रष्टव्याः । तुल्यत्वान्निराकरण-
कारणस्य नात्र पुनराशङ्कितव्यं किञ्चिदस्ति । तुल्यमत्रापि परमगम्भीरस्य
तर्कानवगाह्यत्वम्, तर्कस्याप्रतिष्ठितत्वम्, अन्यथानुमानेऽप्यविमोक्षः,
१२ आगमविरोधश्चेत्येवंजातीयकं निराकरणकारणम् ॥ १२ ॥ इति शिष्टा-
परिग्रहाधिकरणम् ॥ ४ ॥

५ भोक्त्रापत्त्याधिकरणम् ।

भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत् ॥ १३ ॥

- अन्यथा पुनर्ब्रह्मकारणवादस्तर्कबलेनैवाक्षिप्यते । यद्यपि श्रुतिः प्रमाणं
स्वविषये भवति, तथापि प्रमाणान्तरेण विषयापहारेऽन्यपरा भवितुमर्हति,
३ यथा मन्त्रार्थवादौ । तर्कोऽपि स्वविषयादन्यत्राप्रतिष्ठितः स्यात्, यथा
धर्माधर्मयोः । किमतः । यद्येवम्, अत इदमयुक्तं यत् प्रमाणान्तरप्रसि-
३ [ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्]

- द्वार्थबाधनं श्रुतेः । कथं पुनः प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धोऽर्थः श्रुत्या बाध्यत
 ६ इति । अत्रोच्यते । प्रसिद्धो ह्ययं भोक्तृभोग्यविभागो लोके, भोक्ता चेतनः
 शरीरो, भोग्याः शब्दादयो विषया इति । यथा भोक्ता देवदत्तो, भोज्य
 ओदन इति । तस्य च विभागस्याभावः प्रसज्येत यदि भोक्ता भोग्य-
 ९ भावमापद्येत, भोग्यं वा भोक्तृभावमापद्येत । तयोश्चैतरेतरभावापत्तिः
 परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वात् प्रसज्येत । न चास्य प्रसिद्धस्य विभागस्य
 बाधनं युक्तम् । यथा त्वद्यत्वे भोक्तृभोग्ययोर्विभागो दृष्टस्तथातीतानागत-
 १२ योरपि कल्पयितव्यः । तस्मात् प्रसिद्धस्यास्य भोक्तृभोग्यविभागस्याभाव-
 प्रसङ्गाद्युक्तमिदं ब्रह्मकारणतावधारणमिति चेत् कश्चिच्चोदयेत्, तं प्रति-
 ब्रूयात्—स्याल्लोकवदिति । उपपद्यत एवायमस्मत्पक्षेऽपि विभागः, एवं
 १५ लोके दृष्टत्वात् । तथाहि समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां
 फेनवीचीतरङ्गबुद्बुदादीनामितरेतरविभाग इतरेतरसंश्लेषादिलक्षणश्च व्यव-
 हार उपलभ्यते । नच समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां फेन-
 १८ तरङ्गादीनामितरेतरभावापत्तिर्भवति । नच तेषामितरेतरभावानापत्तावपि
 समुद्रात्मनोऽन्यत्वं भवति । एवमिहापि नच भोक्तृभोग्ययोरितरेतरभावा-
 पत्तिः, नच परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्वं भविष्यति ॥ यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो
 २१ विकारः,

तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् ।

- इति [तै० उ०, २ . ६] स्रष्टुरेकत्विकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्व-
 २४ श्रवणात्, तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाश-
 स्येव घटाद्युपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यते
 भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरङ्गादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम् ॥ १३ ॥ इति
 २७ भोक्त्रापत्यधिकरणम् ॥ ५ ॥

६ आरम्भणाधिकरणम् ।

तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ॥ १४ ॥

- अभ्युपगम्य चेमं व्यावहारिकं भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणं विभागं स्याल्लोकव-
 दिनि परिहारोऽभिहितः । नत्वयं विभागः परमार्थतोऽस्ति, यस्मात् तयोः
 ३ कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वमवगम्यते । कार्यमाकाशादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत्,

- कारणं परं ब्रह्म, तस्मात् कारणात् परमार्थतोऽनन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेणाभावः कार्यस्यावगम्यते । कुतः । आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः । आरम्भणशब्दस्तावत्—
- ६ एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाय, दृष्टान्तापेक्षायामुच्यते—
यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचरम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।
- ९ इति [छा०, ६.१.१] । एतदुक्तं भवति । एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन परमार्थतो मृदात्मना विज्ञातेन सर्वं मृन्मयं घटशरावोदञ्चनादिकं मृदात्मकत्वाविशेषाद्विज्ञातं भवेत्, यतो वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं, वाचैव
- १२ केवलमस्तीत्यारभ्यते विकारो घटः शराव उदञ्चनं चेति । नतु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति । नामधेयमात्रं ह्येतदनृतम्, मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति । एष ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्त आम्नातः । तत्र श्रुताद्वाचारम्भण-
- १५ शब्दाद्वाष्टान्तिकेऽपि ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्यजातस्याभाव इति गम्यते । पुनश्च तेजोब्रह्मणां ब्रह्मकार्यतामुक्त्वा तेजोब्रह्मकार्याणां तेजोब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभावं ब्रवीति [छा०, ६.४.१]—
- १८ अपागादग्नेरग्नित्वं, वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं, त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम् ।
इत्यादिना । आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्य इत्यादिशब्दात् [छा०, ६.८.७]—
- २१ ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं, तत् सत्यं, स आत्मा, तत् त्वमसि,
इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा [बृ०, २.४.६],
ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम् [मु०, २.२.११],
- २४ आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् [छा०, ७.२.५.२],
नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन [बृ०, ४.४.१९],
इत्येवमाद्यप्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपादनपरं वचनजातमुदाहर्तव्यम् । नचान्यथैक-
- २७ विज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं संपद्यते । तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वम्, यथाच मृगवृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्योऽनन्यत्वम्, दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात् स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्, एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्च-
- ३० जातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥
नन्वेकात्मकं ब्रह्म, यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाख एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म । अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव, यथा वृक्ष

- ३३ इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति नानात्वम्, यथाच समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनतरङ्गा-
द्यात्मना नानात्वम्, यथाच मृदात्मनैकत्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वम् ।
तत्रैकत्वांशेन ज्ञानान्मोक्षव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति, नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डा-
३६ श्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति । एवंच मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनु-
रूपा भविष्यन्तीति ॥ नैवं स्यात्—

मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् [छा०, ६.१०.१],

- ३९ इति प्रकृतिमात्रस्य दृष्टान्ते सत्यत्वावधारणात्, वाचारम्भणशब्देन वि-
कारजातस्यानृतत्वाभिधानात्, दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि—

एतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं, तत् सत्यम् [छा०, ६.८.७],

- ४२ इति च परमकारणस्यैकस्य सत्यत्वावधारणात्,—

स आत्मा, तत् त्वमसि, श्वेतकेतो [छा०, ६.८.७],

इति च शारीरस्य ब्रह्मभावोपदेशात् । स्वयंप्रसिद्धं ह्येतच्छारीरस्य ब्रह्मा-

- ४५ त्वत्वमुपदिश्यते, न यत्नान्तरप्रसाध्यम् । अतश्चेदं शास्त्रीयं ब्रह्मात्मत्व-
मवगम्यमानं स्वाभाविकस्य शारीरात्मत्वस्य बाधकं संपद्यते, रज्ज्वादि-
बुद्ध्य इव सर्पादिवुद्धीनाम् । बाधिते च शारीरात्मत्वे तदाश्रयः समस्तः

- ४८ स्वाभाविको व्यवहारो बाधितो भवति, यत्प्रसिद्धये नानात्वांशोऽपरो
ब्रह्मणः कल्प्येत । दर्शयति च—

यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् ।

- ५१ इत्यादिना [बृ०, ४.५.१५] ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शिनं प्रति समस्तस्य क्रिया-
कारकफललक्षणस्य व्यवहारस्याभावम् । न चायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्था-
विशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयत इति युक्तं वक्तुम्,—

- ५४ तत् त्वमसि [छा०, ६.८.७]

इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्यानवस्थाविशेषनिबन्धनत्वात् । तस्करदृष्टान्तेन चानृ-
तामिसंधस्य बन्धनं सत्यामिसंधस्य च मोक्षं दर्शयन्नेकत्वमेवैकं पारमा-

- ५७ र्थिकं दर्शयति [छा०, ६.१६] मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितं च नानात्वम् । उभ-
यसत्यतायां हि कथं व्यवहारगोचरोऽपि जन्तुरनृतामिसंध इत्युच्येत ।

मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।

- ६० इति [बृ०, ४.४.१९] च भेददृष्टिमपवदन्नेवैतद्दर्शयति । न चास्मिन्

दर्शने ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इत्युपपद्यते, सम्यग्ज्ञानापनोद्यस्य कस्यचिन्मिथ्याज्ञानस्य
संसारकारणत्वेनानभ्युपगमात् । उभयसत्यतायां हि कथमेकत्वज्ञानेन
६३ नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यत इत्युच्येत ॥

नन्वेकत्वैकान्ताभ्युपगमे नानात्वाभावात् प्रत्यक्षादीनि लौकिकानि
प्रमाणानि व्याहन्येरन् निर्विषयत्वात्, स्थाण्वादिष्विव पुरुषादिज्ञानानि ।
६६ तथा विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रमपि भेदापेक्षत्वात् तदभावे व्याहन्येत । मोक्ष-
शास्त्रस्यापि शिष्यशासित्रादिभेदापेक्षत्वात् तदभावे व्याघातः स्यात्,
कथं चानृतेन मोक्षशास्त्रेण प्रतिपादितस्यात्मैकत्वस्य सत्यत्वमुपपद्येतेति ॥
६९ अत्रोच्यते—नैष दोषः, सर्वव्यवहारणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्य-
त्वोपपत्तेः, स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक् प्रबोधात् । यावद्धि न सत्यात्मैकत्व-
प्रतिपत्तिस्तावत् प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु विकारेष्वनृतत्वबुद्धिर्न कस्य-
७२ चेदुत्पद्यते । विकारानेव त्वहं ममेत्यविद्ययात्मात्मीयेन भावेन सर्वो जन्तुः
प्रतिपद्यते स्वाभाविकीं ब्रह्मात्मतां हित्वा । तस्मात् प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताप्रतिबो-
धादुपपन्नः सर्वो लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः । यथा सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य
७५ जनस्य स्वप्ने उच्चावचान् भावान् पश्यतो निश्चितमेव प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं
विज्ञानं भवति प्राक् प्रबोधात्, नच प्रत्यक्षाभासाभिप्रायस्तत्काले भवति,
तद्वत् ॥ कथं त्वसत्येन वेदान्तवाक्येन सत्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिरु-
७८ पपद्येत । नहि रज्जुसर्पेण दष्टो म्रियते, नापि मृगतृष्णिकाम्भसा पाना-
वगाहनादिप्रयोजनं क्रियत इति । नैष दोषः । शङ्काविषादिनिमित्तमर-
णादिकार्योपलब्धेः । स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य च सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्य-
८१ दर्शनात् । तत् कार्यमप्यनृतमेवेति चेद्भूयात्, तत्र ब्रूमः—यद्यपि
स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यमनृतम्, तथापि तदवगतिः
सत्यमेव फलं, प्रतिबुद्धस्याप्यबाध्यमानत्वात् । नहि स्वप्नादुत्थितः स्वप्न-
८४ दृष्टं सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यं मिथ्येति मन्यमानस्तदवगतिमपि मिथ्येति
मन्यते कश्चित् । एतेन स्वप्नदृशोऽवगत्यबाधनेन देहमात्रात्मवादो दूषितो
वेदितव्यः । तथाच श्रुतिः—

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यदा कर्मसु काम्येषु स्त्रियं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति ।

समृद्धिं तत्र जानीयात् तस्मिन् स्वप्ननिदर्शने ॥

इति [छा०, ५.२.९] असत्येन स्वप्नदर्शनेन सत्यायाः समृद्धेः प्रति-
९० पत्तिं दर्शयति । तथा प्रत्यक्षदर्शनेषु केषुचिदरिष्टेषु जातेषु—

न चिरमिव जीविष्यतीति विद्यात् ।

इत्युक्त्वा [ऐ० आ०, ३.२.४.७],—

९३ अथ स्वप्नाः । पुरुषं कृष्णं कृष्णदन्तं पश्यति, स एनं हन्ति ।
इत्यादिना [ऐ० आ०, ३.२.४.१५] 'तेनतेनासत्येनैव स्वप्नदर्शनेन
सत्यं मरणं सूच्यत इति दर्शयति । प्रसिद्धं चेदं लोकेऽन्वयव्यतिरेक-

९६ कुशलानामीदृशेन स्वप्नदर्शनेन साध्यागमः सूच्यत ईदृशेनासाध्यागम इति ।
तथाकारादिसत्याक्षरप्रतिपत्तिर्दृष्टा रेखानृताक्षरप्रतिपत्तेः ॥ अपि चान्य-
मिदं प्रमाणमात्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकं—नातः परं किञ्चिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति ।

९९ यथाहि लोके यजेतेत्युक्ते किं केन कथमित्याकाङ्क्ष्यते, नैवं—

तत् त्वमसि [छा०, ६.८.७],

अहं ब्रह्मास्मि [बृ०, १.४.१०],

१०२ इत्युक्ते किञ्चिदन्यदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति, सर्वात्मैकत्वविषयत्वावगतेः । सति
ह्यन्यस्मिन्नवशिष्यमाणेऽर्थ आकाङ्क्षा स्यात्, नत्वात्मैकत्वव्यतिरेकेणाव-
शिष्यमाणोऽन्योऽर्थोऽस्ति य आकाङ्क्ष्येत । न चेयमवगतिर्नोत्पद्यत इति

१०५ शक्यं वक्तुम्—

तद्वास्य विजज्ञौ [छा०, ६.१६.३],

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः, अवगतिसाधनानां च श्रवणादीनां वेदानुवचनादीनां
१०८ च विधानात् । नचेयमवगतिरनर्थिका भ्रान्तिर्वेति शक्यं वक्तुम्,
अविधानिवृत्तिफलदर्शनात्, बाधकज्ञानान्तराभावाच्च । प्राक् चात्मैक-
त्वावगतेरव्याहतः सर्वः सत्यानृतव्यवहारो लौकिको वैदिकश्चेत्यवोचाम ।

१११ तस्मादन्त्येन प्रमाणेन प्रतिपादित आत्मैकत्वे समस्तस्य प्राचीनस्य
भेदव्यवहारस्य बाधितत्वान्नानेकात्मकब्रह्मकल्पनावकाशोऽस्ति ॥

ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतमिति
११४ गम्यते, परिणामिनो हि मृदादयोऽर्था लोके समधिस्ता इति ।
नेत्युच्यते—

स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म

११७ [बृ०, ४.४.२५],

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा [बृ०, ३.९.२६],
अस्थूलमनणु [बृ०, ३.८.८],

- १२० इत्याद्याभ्यः सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधश्रुतिभ्यो ब्रह्मणः कूटस्थत्वावगमात् ।
नह्येकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मत्व तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम् ।
स्थितिगतित्वत् स्यादिति चेत् । न । कूटस्थस्येति विशेषणात् । नहि
१२३ कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मणः स्थितिगतित्वदनेकधर्माश्रयत्वं संभवति । कूटस्थं च
नित्यं ब्रह्म सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधादित्यवोचाम । नच यथा ब्रह्मण आत्मै-
कत्वंदर्शनं मोक्षसाधनमेवं जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव
१२६ कस्मैचित् फलायाभिप्रेयते । प्रमाणाभावात् । कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मत्ववि-
ज्ञानादेव हि फलं दर्शयति शास्त्रम्—

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा ।

- १२९ इत्युपक्रम्य [बृ०, ४.२.४],
अभयं वै जनक प्राप्सोऽसि ।

- इति [बृ०, ४.२.४] एवंजातीयकम् । तत्रैतत् सिद्धं भवति, ब्रह्म-
१३२ प्रकरणे सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितब्रह्मदर्शनादेव फलसिद्धौ सत्यां, यत् तत्रा-
फलं श्रूयते, ब्रह्मणो जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि, तद्ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव
विनियुज्यते, फलवत्संनिधावफलं तदङ्गमितिवत्, नतु स्वतन्त्रं फलाय
१३५ कल्प्यत इति । नहि परिणामवत्त्वविज्ञानात् परिणामवत्त्वमात्मनः फलं
स्यादिति वक्तुं युक्तम्, कूटस्थनित्यत्वान्मोक्षस्य ॥ कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मवादिन
एकत्वैकान्त्यादीशित्रीशितव्याभाव ईश्वरकारणप्रतिज्ञाविरोध इति चेत् ।
१३८ न । अविद्यात्मकनामरूपबीजव्याकुरणापेक्षत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वस्य ।

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः [तै० उ०, १.१]

- इत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वरूपात् सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेरीश्वरा-
१४१ जगज्जनिस्थितिप्रलयाः, नाचेतनात् प्रधानादन्यस्माद्वेत्येषोऽर्थः प्रति-
ज्ञातः—जन्माद्यस्य यतः [ब्र०सू०, १.१.२] इति । सा प्रतिज्ञा तदव-
स्थैव, न तद्विरुद्धोऽर्थः पुनरिहोच्यते । कथं नोच्यतेऽत्यन्तमात्मन एक-
१४४ त्वमद्वितीयत्वं च ब्रुवता । शृणु यथा नोच्यते । सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्यात्मभूते
इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये संसारप्रपञ्च-

बीजभूते सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य माया, शक्तिः, प्रकृतिरिति च श्रुतिस्मृत्योर-
१४७ मिलप्येते । ताभ्यामन्यः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः—

आकाशो वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता । ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म ।
इति [छा०, ८.१४.१] श्रुतेः ।

१५० नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि [छा०, ६.३.२],

सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्र्य धीरो

नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन् यदास्ते । [तै० आ०, ३.१२.७],

१५३ एकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति [श्वे०, ६.२.],

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च । एवमविद्याकृतनामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधीश्वरो भवति,
व्योमेव घटकरकाद्युपाध्यनुरोधि । स च स्वात्मभूतानेव घटाकाश-

१५६ स्थानीयानविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसंघातानुरोधिनी जी-
वाख्यान् विज्ञानात्मनः प्रतीष्टे व्यवहारविषये । तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपा-

१५९ विद्ययापास्तसर्वोपाधिस्वरूप आत्मनीशित्रीशितव्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार
उपपद्यते । तथा चोक्तम्—

यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा ।

१६२ इति [छा०, ७.२४.१] ।

यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् ।

इत्यादिना [बृ०, ४.५.१५] च । एवं परमार्थावस्थायां सर्वव्यव-
१६५ हाराभावं वदन्ति वेदान्ताः सर्वे । तथेश्वरगीतास्वपि [५.१४, १५]—

न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः ।

न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते ॥

१६८ नादत्ते कस्यचित् पापं न चैव सुकृतं विभुः ।

अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ॥

इति परमार्थावस्थायामीशित्रीशितव्यादिव्यवहाराभावः प्रदर्श्यते । व्य-
१७१ वहारावस्थायां तूक्तः श्रुतावपीश्वरादिव्यवहारः—

एष सर्वेश्वर एष भूताधिपतिरेष भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां
लोकानामसंभेदाय ।

१७४ इति [बृ०, ४.४.२२] । तथाचेश्चरगीतास्वपि [१८.६१]—
ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

भ्रामयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥

१७७ इति । सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण तदनन्यत्वमित्याह । व्यवहाराभिप्रायेण तु स्याल्लोकवदिति महासमुद्रस्थानीयतां ब्रह्मणः कथयति, अप्रत्याख्यायैव कार्यप्रपञ्चं परिणामप्रक्रियां चाश्रयति, सगुणेषूपासने-

१८० पूषयोक्ष्यत इति ॥ १४ ॥

भावे चोपलब्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

इतश्च कारणादनन्यत्वं कार्यस्य, यत्कारणं भाव एव कारणस्य कार्यमुपलभ्यते, नाभावे । तद्यथा सत्यां मृदि घट उपलभ्यते, सत्सु च तन्तुषु पटः । नच नियमेनान्यभावेऽन्यस्योपलब्धिर्दृष्टा । नह्यश्चो गौरन्यः सन् गौर्भाव एवोपलभ्यते । नच कुलालभाव एव घट उपलभ्यते, सत्यपि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेऽन्यत्वात् ॥ नन्वन्यस्य भावेऽन्यस्योपलब्धिर्नियता दृश्यते, यथाग्निभावे धूमस्येति । नेत्युच्यते । उद्घापितेऽप्यग्नौ गोपालघुटिकादिधारितस्य धूमस्य दृश्यमानत्वात् । अथ धूमं कयाचिदवस्थया विशिष्यात्, ईदृशो धूमो नासत्यग्नौ भवतीति, नैवमपि कश्चिद्वोषः । तद्भावानुरक्तां हि बुद्धिं कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे हेतुं वयं वदामः । न चासावग्निधूमयोर्विद्यते ॥

भावाच्चोपलब्धेरिति वा सूत्रम् । न केवलं शब्दादेव कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिभावाच्च तयोरनन्यत्वमित्यर्थः । भवति हि प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिः कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे । तद्यथा, तन्तुसंस्थाने पटे तन्तुव्यतिरेकेण पटो नाम कार्यं नैवोपलभ्यते, केवलास्तु तन्तव आतानवितानवन्तः प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यन्ते, तथा तन्तुष्वंशवोऽंशुषु तदवयवाः । अनया प्रत्यक्षोपलब्ध्या लोहितशुक्लकृष्णानि त्रीणि रूपाणि, ततो वायुमात्रम्, आकाशमात्रं चेत्यनुमेयम् । ततः परं ब्रह्मैकमेवाद्वितीयं, तत्र सर्वप्रमाणाणां निष्ठामवोचाम ॥ १५ ॥

सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य ॥ १६ ॥

इतश्च कारणात् कार्यस्यानन्यत्वं, यत्कारणं प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणात्मनैव कारणे सत्त्वमवरकालीनस्य कार्यस्य श्रूयते—

४ [ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्]

- ३ सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् [छा०, ६.२.१],
 आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् [ऐ०आ०, २.४.१.१],
 इत्यादाविदंशब्दगृहीतस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यात् ।
 ६ यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते, न तत् तत उत्पद्यते, यथा सिकताभ्य-
 स्तैलम् । तस्मात् प्रागुत्पत्तेरनन्यत्वादुत्पन्नमप्यनन्यदेव कारणात् कार्य-
 मित्यवगम्यते । यथाच कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति,
 ९ एवं कार्यमपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति । एकं च पुनः
 सत्त्वम्, अतोऽप्यनन्यत्वं कारणात् कार्यस्य ॥ १६ ॥

असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न, धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १७ ॥

ननु क्वचिदसत्त्वमपि प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः—
 असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् ।

- ३ इति [छा०, ३.१९.१],
 असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति [तै०उ०, २.७.१] च । तस्मादसद्व्यपदेशान्न प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य
 ६ सत्त्वमिति चेत् । नेति ब्रूमः । नह्ययमत्यन्तासत्त्वाभिप्रायेण प्रागुत्पत्तेः
 कार्यस्यासद्व्यपदेशः, किंतर्हि व्याकृतनामरूपत्वाद्धर्मादव्याकृतनामरूपत्वं
 धर्मान्तरं, तेन धर्मान्तरेणायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत एव कार्यस्य
 ९ कारणरूपेणानन्यस्य । कथमेतदवगम्यते । वाक्यशेषात् । यदुपक्रमे
 संदिग्धार्थं वाक्यं, तच्छेषान्निश्चीयते । इह च तावत्—

असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् ।

- १२ इति [छा०, ३.१९.१] असच्छब्देनोपक्रमे निर्दिष्टं यत् तदेव पुनः
 स्तच्छब्देन परामृश्य सदिति विशिनष्टि—

तत् सदासीत् ।

- १५ इति [छा०, ३.१९.१] । असतश्च पूर्वापरकालासंबन्धादासीच्छब्दानु-
 पपत्तेश्च ।

असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ।

- १८ इति [तै० उ०, २.७.१] अत्रापि—

तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत ।

इति [तै० उ०, २.७.१] वाक्यशेषे विशेषणान्नास्यन्तासत्त्वम् ।
 २१ तस्माद्धर्मान्तरेणैवायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य । नामरूपव्याकृतं
 हि वस्तु सच्छब्दाहं लोके प्रसिद्धम् । अतः प्राङ्नामरूपव्याकरणादस-
 दिवासीदित्युपचर्यते ॥ १७ ॥

युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ॥ १८ ॥

युक्तेश्च प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमनन्यत्वं च कारणादवगम्यते, शब्दान्-
 न्तराच्च । युक्तिस्तावद्वर्ण्यते । दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि क्षीर-
 ३ मृत्तिकासुवर्णादीन्युपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते । नहि दध्यर्थिभिर्मृत्ति-
 कोपादीयते, न घटार्थिभिः क्षीरम् । तदसत्कार्यवादे नोपपद्येत । अविशिष्टे
 हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः सर्वस्य सर्वत्रासत्त्वे कस्मात् क्षीरादेव दध्युत्पद्यते न मृत्तिकाया,
 ६ मृत्तिकाया एव च घट उत्पद्यते न क्षीरात् । अथाविशिष्टेऽपि प्रागसत्त्वे
 क्षीर एव दध्नः कश्चिदतिशयो न मृत्तिकायां, मृत्तिकायामेव च घटस्य
 कश्चिदतिशयो न क्षीर इत्युच्येत, तर्ह्यतिशयवत्त्वात् प्रागवस्थाया अस-
 ९ त्कार्यवादहानिः सत्कार्यवादसिद्धिश्च । शक्तिश्च कारणस्य कार्यनियमार्था
 कल्प्यमाना नान्यासती वा कार्यं नियच्छेत्, असत्त्वाविशेषादन्यत्वाविशे-
 षाच्च । तस्मात् कारणात्मात्मभूता शक्तिः शक्तेश्चात्मभूतं कार्यम् ॥ अपिच
 १२ कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यगुणादीनां च अत्रमहिषत्रद्वेदबुद्धयभावात् तादात्म्यमभ्युप-
 गन्तव्यम् । समवायकल्पनायामपि समवायस्य समवायिभिः संबन्धेऽभ्युप-
 गम्यमाने तस्य तस्यान्योऽन्यः संबन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः ।
 १५ अनभ्युपगम्यमाने च विच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । अथ समवायः स्वयं संबन्ध-
 रूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैवापरं संबन्धं संबध्यते, संयोगोऽपि तर्हि स्वयं संबन्ध-
 रूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैव समवायं संबध्येत । तादात्म्यप्रतीतिश्च द्रव्यगुणादीनां
 १८ समवायकल्पनानर्थक्यम् ॥ कथंच कार्यमयविद्रव्यं कारणेष्ववयवद्रव्येषु
 वर्तमानं वर्तते—किं समस्तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तते, उत प्रत्यवयवम् । यदि तावत्
 समस्तेषु वर्तते, ततोऽवयव्यनुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत, समस्तावयवसंनिकर्ष-
 २१ स्याशक्यत्वात् । नहि बहुत्वं समस्तेष्वश्रयेषु वर्तमानं व्यस्ताश्रयग्रहणेन
 गृह्यते । अथावयवशः समस्तेषु वर्तते, तदाप्यारम्भकावयवव्यतिरेकेणा-
 वयविनोऽवयवाः कल्प्येरन् यैरारम्भकेष्ववयवशोऽवयवी वर्तते । कोशा-
 २४ वयवव्यतिरिक्तैर्ह्यवयवैरसिः कोशं व्याप्नोति । अनवस्था चैवं प्रसज्येत

- तेषु तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तयितुमन्येषामन्येषामवयवानां कल्पनीयत्वात् । अथ प्रत्यवयवं वर्तेत, तदैकत्र व्यापारेऽन्यत्राव्यापारः स्यात् । नहि देवदत्तः
- २७ सुधे संनिधीयमानस्तदहरेव पाटलिपुत्रेऽपि संनिधीयेत । युगपदनेकत्र वृत्तावनेकत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोरिव सुधपाटलिपुत्रनिवासिनोः । गोत्वादिवत् प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तेर्न दोष इति चेत् । न । तथा
- ३० प्रतीत्यभावात् । यदि गोत्वादिवत् प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तोऽवयवी स्यात्, यथा गोत्वं प्रतिव्यक्ति प्रत्यक्षं गृह्यत एवमवयव्यपि प्रत्यवयवं प्रत्यक्षं गृह्येत । नचैवं नियतं गृह्यते । प्रत्येकपरिसमाप्तौ चावयविनः कार्येणधिकारात्,
- ३३ तस्य चैकत्वात्, शृङ्गेणापि स्तनकार्यं कुर्यादुरसा च पृष्ठकार्यम् । नचैवं दृश्यते ॥

- प्रागुत्पत्तेश्च कार्यस्यासत्त्व उत्पत्तिरकर्तृका निरात्मिका च स्यात् ।
- ३६ उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकर्तृकैव भवितुमर्हति, गत्यादिवत् । क्रिया च नाम स्यादकर्तृका चेति त्रिप्रतिषिध्येत । घटस्य चोत्पत्तिरुच्यमाना न घटककर्तृका, किंतीर्हि, अन्यकर्तृकेति कल्प्या स्यात् । तथा
- ३९ कपालादीनामप्युत्पत्तिरुच्यमानान्यकर्तृकैव कल्प्येत । तथाच सति, घट उत्पद्यत इत्युक्ते कुलालादीनि कारणान्युत्पद्यन्त इत्युक्तं स्यात् । नच लोके घटोत्पत्तिरित्युक्ते कुलालादीनामप्युत्पद्यमानता प्रतीयते, उत्पन्न-
- ४२ ताप्रतीतेश्च ॥ अथ स्वकारणसत्तासंबन्ध एवोत्पत्तिरात्मलाभश्च कार्यः स्येति चेत्, कथमलब्धात्मकं संबध्येतेति वक्तव्यम् । सतोर्हि द्वयोः संबन्धः संभवति, न सदसतोरसतोर्वा । अभावस्य च निरुपाख्यत्वात्
- ४५ प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति मर्यादाकरणमनुपपन्नम् । सतां हि लोके क्षेत्रगृहादीनां मर्यादा दृष्टा, नाभावस्य । नहि वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा बभूव प्राक्पूर्णवर्मणोऽभिषेकापिल्येवंजातीयकेन मर्यादाकरणेन निरुपाख्ये वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा
- ४८ बभूव, भवति, भविष्यति, इति वा विशेष्यते । यदिच वन्ध्यापुत्रोऽपि कारकव्यापाराद्धूर्ध्वमभविष्यत्, तत इदमप्युपापत्स्यत कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापाराद्धूर्ध्वं भविष्यतीति । वयं तु पश्यामो वन्ध्यापुत्रस्य
- ५१ कार्याभावस्य चाभावत्वाविशेषाद्यथा वन्ध्यापुत्रः कारकव्यापाराद्धूर्ध्वं न भविष्यत्येवं कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापाराद्धूर्ध्वं न भविष्यतीति ॥ नन्वेवं सति कारकव्यापारोऽनर्थकः प्रसज्येत । यथैव हि प्राक्सिद्ध-
- ५४ त्वात् कारणस्वरूपसिद्धये न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते, एवं प्राक्सिद्धत्वादनन्य

- त्वाच्च कार्यस्य स्वरूपसिद्धयेऽपि न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियेत । व्याप्रियते च ।
 अतः कारकव्यापारार्थवत्त्वाय मन्यामहे प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावः कार्यस्येति ।
 ५७ नैष दोषः । यतः कार्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः कारकव्यापारस्यार्थ-
 वत्वमुपपद्यते । कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्यात्मभूत एव, अनात्मभूतस्या-
 नारभ्यत्वात्, इत्यभाणि ॥ नच विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति ।
 ६० नहि देवदत्तः संकोचितहस्तपादः प्रसारितहस्तपादश्च विशेषेण दृश्य-
 मानोऽपि वस्त्वन्यत्वं गच्छति, स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । तथा प्रति-
 दिनमभेकसंस्थानानामपि पित्रादीनां न वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति; मम पिता,
 ६३ मम भ्राता, मम पुत्र, इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । जन्मोच्छेदानन्तरित्वात्
 तत्र युक्तम्, नान्यत्र इति चेत् । न । क्षीरादीनामपि दध्याद्याकारसंस्था-
 नस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । अदृश्यभानानामपि वटधानादीनां समानजातीयाव-
 ६६ यवान्तरोपचितात्तामङ्कुरादिभावेन दर्शनगोचरतापत्तौ जन्मसंज्ञा । तेषा-
 मेवावयवानामपचयवशाद्दर्शनापत्तावुच्छेदसंज्ञा । तत्रेद्वजन्मोच्छेदान्त-
 रित्वाच्चेदसतः सत्त्वापत्तिः, सतश्चासत्त्वापत्तिः, तथा सति गर्भवासिन
 ६९ उत्तानशायिनश्च भेदप्रसङ्गः, तथाच बाल्ययौवनस्थाविरेष्वपि भेदप्रसङ्गः,
 पित्रादिव्यवहारलोपप्रसङ्गश्च ॥ एतेन क्षणभङ्गवादः प्रतिवदितव्यः ॥
 यस्य पुनः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत् कार्यं तस्य निर्विषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यात्,
 ७२ अभावस्य विषयत्वानुपपत्तेराकाशहननप्रयोजनखड्गाद्यनेकायुधप्रयुक्तिवत् ।
 समवायिकारणविषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यादिति चेत् । न । अन्यविष-
 येण कारकव्यापारेणान्यनिष्पत्तेरतिप्रसङ्गात् । समवायिकारणस्यैवात्मा-
 ७५ तिशयः कार्यमिति चेत् । न । सत्कार्यतापत्तेः । तस्मात् क्षीरादीन्येव
 द्रव्याणि दध्यादिभावेनावतिष्ठमानानि कार्याख्यां लभन्त इति न कार-
 णादन्यत् कार्यं वर्षशतेनापि शक्यं निश्चेतुम् । तथा मूलकारणवत्त्वात्
 ७८ न्यात् कार्यात् त्वेनतेन कार्याकारेण नटवत् सर्वव्यवहारास्पदं पदं
 पद्यते । एवं युक्तेः कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वमन्यत्वं च कारणव्यवहारः ॥
 शब्दान्तराच्चैतदवगम्यते । पूर्वसूत्रेऽसद्व्यपदेशिनः शब्दस्यैवोक्त-
 ८१ त्वात् ततोऽन्यः सद्व्यपदेशी शब्दः शब्दान्तरम्— शब्दोक्तं त-
 सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । शब्दोक्तं त-
 इत्यादि [छा०, ६.२.१], शब्दोक्तं त-

८४ तद्वैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीत् ।
इति चासत्पक्षमुपक्षिप्य [छा०, ६.२.१],
कथमसतः सृजासेत ।

८७ इति [छा०, ६.२.२] आक्षिप्य,
सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ।

इति [छा०, ६.२.३] अवधारयति । तत्रेदंशब्दवाच्यस्य कार्यस्य
९० प्रागुत्पत्तेः सच्छब्दवाच्येन कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यस्य श्रूयमाणत्वात्
सत्त्वानन्यत्वे प्रसिध्यतः । यदितु प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत् कार्यं स्यात्, पश्चाच्चो-
त्पद्यमानं कारणे समवेयात्, तदान्यत् कारणात् स्यात् । तत्र—

९३ येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति ।

इति [छा०, ६.१.३] इयं प्रतिज्ञा पीड्येत । सत्त्वानन्यत्वावगतेस्त्वियं
प्रतिज्ञा समर्थ्यते ॥ १८ ॥

पटवच्च ॥ १९ ॥

यथाच संवेष्टितः पटो न व्यक्तं गृह्यते किमयं पटः किंवान्यद्-
द्रव्यमिति, स एव प्रसारितो यत् संवेष्टितं द्रव्यं तत् पट एवेति प्रसार-
३ णेनाभिव्यक्तो गृह्यते । यथाच संवेष्टनसमये पट इति गृह्यमाणोऽपि न
विशिष्टायामविस्तारो गृह्यते, स एव प्रसारणसमये विशिष्टायामविस्तारो
गृह्यते, न संवेष्टितरूपादन्योऽयं भिन्नः पट इति । एवं तन्त्वादिकारणावस्थं
६ पटादिकार्यमस्पष्टं सत् तुरीयेमकुविन्दादिकारकव्यापारादिभिव्यक्तं स्पष्टं
गृह्यते । अतः संवेष्टितप्रसारितपटन्यायेनैवानन्यत् कारणात् कार्य-
मित्यर्थः ॥ १९ ॥

यथाच प्राणादि ॥ २० ॥

यथाच लोके प्राणापानादिषु प्राणभेदेषु प्राणायामेन निरुद्धेषु कार-
३ दिक कार्यान्तरम् । तेष्वेव प्राणभेदेषु पुनःप्रवृत्तेषु जीवनादधिकमाकु-
श्चनप्रसारणमपि कार्यान्तरं निर्वर्त्यते । नच प्राणभेदानां प्रभेदवतः
प्राणादन्वयः, शरीरस्वभावाविशेषात् । एवं कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वम् ।

६ अतश्च कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात् तदनन्यत्वाच्च सिद्धैषा श्रौती प्रतिज्ञा—

येनाश्रुत ५ श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम् ।

९ इति [छा०, ६-१-१] ॥ २७ ॥ इत्यारम्भणाधिकरणम् ॥ ६ ॥

७ इतरव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् ।

इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसाक्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकारणवादः आक्षिप्यते । चेतनाद्धि जगत्प्रक्रियायामाश्रीयमाणायां हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते । कुतः । इतरव्यपदेशात् इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः—

स आत्मा, तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो ।

इति [छा०, ६.८.७] प्रतिबोधनात् ॥ यद्वा । इतरस्य च ब्रह्मणः

६ शारीरात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति—

तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् ।

९ इति [तै० उ०, २.६] स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यानुप्रवेशेन शारीरात्मत्वप्रदर्शनात् ।

अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि ।

इति [छा०, ६.३.२] च परा देवता जीवमात्मशब्देन व्यपदिशन्ती
१२ न ब्रह्मणो भिन्नः शारीर इति दर्शयति । तस्माद्यद्ब्रह्मणः स्रष्टृत्वं तच्छारीरस्यैवेति । अतः स स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता सन् हितमेवात्मनः सौमनस्यकरं कुर्यान्नाहितं जन्ममरणजरारोगाद्यनेकानर्थजालम् । नहि कश्चिदपरतन्त्रो
१५ बन्धनागारमात्मनः कृत्वानुप्राविशति १ नच स्वयमत्यन्तनिर्मलः सन्नत्यन्तमलिनं देहमात्मत्वेनोपेयात् । कृतमपि कथंचिद्यद्दुःखकरं तदिच्छया जह्यात् । सुखकुरं चोपाददीत । स्मरेच्च मयेदं जगद्विम्बं विचित्रं विर-
१८ चितमिति । सर्वो हि लोकः स्पष्टं कार्यं कृत्वा स्मरति मयेदं कृतमिति । यथाच मायावी स्वयं प्रसारितां मायामिच्छयानायासेनैवोपसंहरति, एवं शारीरोऽपिमां सृष्टिमुपसंहरेत् । स्वमपि तावच्छरीरं शारीरो न शक्नोत्य-
२१ नायासेनोपसंहर्तुम् । एवं हितक्रियाद्यदर्शनादन्याय्या चेतनाज्जगत्प्रक्रियेति गम्यते ॥ २१ ॥

आधिकं तु, भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २२ ॥

तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति । यत् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्ध-
बुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं शारीराद्दधिकमन्यत्, तद्वयं जगतः स्रष्टु ब्रूमः । न
३ तस्मिन् हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते । नहि तस्य हितं किञ्चित्
कर्तव्यमस्त्यहितं वा परिहर्तव्यं, नित्यमुक्तस्वभावत्वात् । नच तस्य ज्ञान-
प्रतिबन्धः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो वा कचिदप्यस्ति, सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वशक्तित्वाच्च ।
६ शारीरस्त्वनेवंविधः । तस्मिन् प्रसज्यन्ते हिताकरणादयो दोषाः । नतु
तं वयं जगतः स्रष्टारं ब्रूमः । कुत एतत् । भेदनिर्देशात् ।

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः

९ [बृ०, २.४.५],

सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः [छा०, ८.७.१],

सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति [छा०, ६.८.१],

१२ शारीर आत्मा प्रज्ञेनात्मनान्वाखूढः [बृ०, ४.३.३५],

इत्येवंजातीयक कर्तृकर्मादिभेदनिर्देशो जीवादधिकं ब्रह्म दर्शयति ॥

नन्वभेदनिर्देशोऽपि दर्शितः—

१५ तत् त्वमासि [छा०, ६.८.६],

इत्येवंजातीयकः । कथं भेदाभेदौ विरुद्धौ संभवेयाताम् । नैष दोषः,
आकाशघटाकाशान्यायेनोभयसंभवस्य तत्रतत्र प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात् । अपिच

१८ यदा तत् त्वमासि [छा०, ६.८.६], इत्येवंजातीयकेनाभेदनिर्देशेना-

भेदः प्रतिबोधितो भवति, अपगतं भवति तदा जीवस्य संसारित्वं, ब्रह्म-
णश्च स्रष्टृत्वं, समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य सम्यग्ज्ञा-

२१ नेन बाधितत्वात् । तत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुतो वा हिताकरणादयो दोषाः ।

अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसंघातोपाध्यविवेककृता हि
भ्राष्ट्रिर्हिताकरणादिलक्षणः संसारो, नतु परमार्थतोऽस्तीत्यसकृद-

२४ वोचामि, जन्ममरणच्छेदनभेदनाद्यभिमानवत् । अबाधिते तु भेदव्यव-

हारे—

सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः ।

२७ इति [छा०, ८.७.१] एवंजातीयकेन भेदनिर्देशेनावगम्यमानं ब्रह्मणो-

ऽधिकत्वं हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिं निरुणद्धि ॥ २२ ॥

अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

यथा च लोके पृथिवीत्वसामान्यान्वितानामप्यश्मनां केचिन्महार्हा
 मणयो वज्रवैडूर्यादयोऽन्ये मध्यमवीर्याः सूर्यकान्तादयोऽन्ये प्रहीणाः
 ३ श्वायसप्रक्षेपणार्हाः पाषाणा इत्यनेकविधं वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते, यथा चैक-
 पृथिवीव्यपाश्रयाणामपि बीजानां बहुविधं पत्रपुष्पफलगन्धरसादिवैचित्र्यं
 चन्दनकिंपाकादिषूपलक्ष्यते, यथा चैकस्याप्यन्नरसस्य लोहितादीनि
 ६ केशलोमादीनि च विचित्राणि कार्याणि भवन्ति, एवमेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो
 जीवप्राज्ञपृथक्त्वं कार्यवैचित्र्यं चोपपद्यत इत्यतस्तदनुपपत्तिः, परपरि-
 कल्पितदोषानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । श्रुतेश्च प्रामाण्याद्विकारस्य च वाचारम्भ-
 ९ णमात्रत्वात् ३ स्वप्नदृश्यभाववैचित्र्यवच्चेत्यभ्युच्चयः ॥ २३ ॥ इतीतर-
 व्यपदेशाधिकरणम् ॥ ७ ॥

८ उपसंहारदर्शनाधिकरणम् ।

उपसंहारदर्शनात्नेति चेत्, न, क्षीरवद्धि ॥ २४ ॥

चेतनं ब्रह्मैकमद्वितीयं जगतः कारणमिति यदुक्तं तन्नोपपद्यते ।
 कस्मात् । उपसंहारदर्शनात् । इह हि लोके कुलालादयो घटपटादीनां
 ३ कर्तारो मृद्गण्डचक्रसूत्राद्यनेककारकोपसंहारेण संगृहीतसाधनाः सन्त-
 स्तत्तत् कार्यं कुर्वाणा दृश्यन्ते । ब्रह्म चासहायं तवाभिप्रेतम् । तस्य साध-
 नान्तरानुपसंग्रहे सति कथं स्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्येत । तस्मान्न ब्रह्म जगत्कारण-
 ६ मिति चेत् । नैष दोषः । यतः क्षीरवद्रव्यस्वभावविशेषादुपपद्यते । यथा
 हि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमभावेन परिणमतेऽनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं
 साधनं, तथेहापि भविष्यति ॥ ननु क्षीराद्यपि दध्यादिभावेन परिणममा-
 ९ नमपेक्षत एव बाह्यं साधनमौष्ण्यादिकम्, कथमुच्यते क्षीरवद्धीति । नैष
 दोषः । स्वयमपि हि क्षीरं यां च यावतीं च परिणाममात्रामनुभवति,
 तावत्येव त्वार्यते त्वौष्ण्यादिना दधिभावाय । यदि च स्वयं दधिभाव-
 १२ शीलता न स्यात्, नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्धिभावमापद्येत । नहि वायु-
 राकाशो वौष्ण्यादिना बलाद्धिभावमापद्यते । साधनसामग्या च तस्य
 पूर्णता संपाद्यते । परिपूर्णशक्तिकं तु ब्रह्म, न तस्यान्येन केनचित्
 १५ पूर्णता संपादयितव्या । श्रुतिश्च भवति—

न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते
 न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।
 १८ परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते
 स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥

इति [श्वे०, ६. ८] । तस्मादेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगात्
 २१ क्षीरादिवद्विचित्रपरिणाम उपपद्यते ॥ २४ ॥

देवादिवदपि लोके ॥ २५ ॥

स्यादेतत् । उपपद्यते क्षीरादीनामचेतनानामनपेक्ष्यापि बाह्यं साधनं
 दध्यादिभावः, दृष्टत्वात् । चेतनाः पुनः कुलालादयः साधनसामग्री-
 ३ मपेक्ष्यैव तस्मै तस्मै कार्याय प्रवर्तमाना दृश्यन्ते । कथं ब्रह्म चेतनं
 सदसहायं प्रवर्तेतेति ॥ देवादिवदिति ब्रूमः । यथा लोके देवाः पितर
 ऋषय इत्येवमादयो महाप्रभावाश्चेतना अपि सन्तोऽनपेक्ष्यैव किञ्चिद्बाह्यं
 ६ साधनमैश्वर्यविशेषयोगादभिध्यानमात्रेण स्वत एव बहूनि नानासंस्था-
 नानि शरीराणि प्रासादादीनि च रथादीनि च निर्मिमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते,
 मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणप्रामाण्यात् । तन्तुनाभश्च स्वत एव तन्तून्
 ९ सृजति । बलाका चान्तरेणैव शुक्रं गर्भं धत्ते । पद्मिनी चानपेक्ष्य
 किञ्चित् प्रस्थानसाधनं सरोन्तरात् सरोन्तरं प्रतिष्ठते । एवं चेतनमपि
 ब्रह्मानपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं स्वत एव जगत् स्रक्ष्यति ॥ स यदि ब्रूयाद्य
 १२ एते देवादयो ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता उपात्तास्ते दार्ष्टान्तिकेन ब्रह्मणा न
 समाना भवन्ति । शरीरमेव ह्यचेतनं देवादीनां शरीरान्तरादिविभूत्युत्पा-
 दन उपादानम्, नतु चेतनं आत्मा । तन्तुनाभस्य च क्षुद्रतरजन्तु-
 १५ भक्षणाच्छाला कठिनतामापद्यमाना तन्तुर्भवति । बलाका च स्तनयित्नु-
 रवश्रवणाद्गर्भं धत्ते । पद्मिनी च चेतनप्रयुक्ता सत्यचेतनेनैव शरीरेण
 सरोन्तरात् सरोन्तरमुपसर्पति, वल्लीव वृक्षं, न तु स्वयमेवाचेतना सरो-
 १८ न्तरोपसर्पणे व्याप्रियते । तस्मान्नैते ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता इति । तं प्रति-
 ब्रूयान्नायं दोषः, कुलालादिदृष्टान्तवैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वादिति ।
 यथाहि कुलालादीनां देवादीनां च समाने चेतनत्वे कुलालादयः कार्यारम्भे
 २१ बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षन्ते, न देवादयः, तथा ब्रह्म चेतनमपि न बाह्यं

साधनमपेक्षिष्यत इत्येतावद्वयं देवाद्युदाहरणेन विवक्ष्यामः । तस्माद्यथै-
कस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथा सर्वेषामेव भवितुमर्हतीति नास्त्येकान्त इत्य-
२४ भिप्रायः ॥ २५ ॥ इत्युपसंहारदर्शनाधिकरणम् ॥ ८ ॥

९ कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यधिकरणम् ।

चेतनमेकमद्वितीयं ब्रह्म क्षीरादिवदेवादिवच्चानपेक्ष्य बाह्यसाधनं
स्वयं परिणममानं जगतः कारणमिति स्थितम् । शास्त्रार्थपरिशुद्धये तु
३ पुनराक्षिपति—

कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ॥ २६ ॥

कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिः कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यरूपेण परिणामः प्राप्नोति, निरव-
यवत्वात् । यदि ब्रह्म पृथिव्यादिवत् सावयवमभविष्यत् ततोऽस्यैकदेशः
६ पर्यणंस्यदेकदेशश्चावास्थास्यत । निरवयवं तु ब्रह्म श्रुतिभ्योऽवगम्यते—

निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम् [श्वे०, ६.१९]

दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः [मु०, २.१.२],

९ इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एव [बृ०, २.४.१२],

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा [बृ०, ३.९.२६],

अस्थूलमनणु [बृ०, ३.८.८],

१२ इत्याद्याभ्यः सर्वविशेषप्रतिषेधिनीभ्यः । ततश्चैकदेशपरिणामासंभवात्

कृत्स्नपरिणामप्रसक्तौ सत्यां मूलोच्छेदः प्रसज्येत । द्रष्टव्यतोपदेशानर्थक्यं
चापन्नमयत्नदृष्टत्वात् कार्यस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽसंभवात्, अज-

१५ त्वादिशब्दकोपश्च । अथैतद्वेषपरिजिहीर्षया सावयवमेव ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्येत,

तथापि ये निरवयवत्वस्य प्रतिपादकाः शब्दाः उदाहृतास्ते प्रकुप्येयुः ।
सावयवत्वे चानित्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इति । सर्वथायं पक्षो न घटयितुं शक्यत

१८ इत्याक्षिपति ॥ २६ ॥

श्रुतेस्तु, शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

तुशब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति । न खल्वस्मत्पक्षे कश्चिदपि दोषोऽस्ति ।
न तावत् कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिरस्ति । कुतः । श्रुतेः । यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जग-

३ दुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते एवं विकारव्यतिरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थानं श्रूयते, प्रकृति-
विकारयोर्भेदेन व्यपदेशात्—

६ सेयं देवतैक्ष्ण्यं, हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता, अनेन जीवेनात्म-
नानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि ।

इति [छा०, ६.३.२]

९ तावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायांश्च पूरुषः ।

पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिमादस्यामृतं दिवि ॥

इति [छा०, ३.१२.६] चैवंजातीयकात् । तथा हृदयायतनत्ववच-
नात् सत्संपत्तिवचनाच्च । यदि च कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म कार्यभावेनोपयुक्तं स्यात्—

१२ सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति ।

इति [छा०, ६.८.१] सुषुप्तिगतं विशेषणमनुपपन्नं स्यात्, विकृतेन
ब्रह्मणा नित्यसंपन्नत्वादविकृतस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽभावात् । तथेन्द्रियगोचर-

१५ त्वप्रतिषेधाद्ब्रह्मणो विकारस्य चेन्द्रियगोचरत्वोपपत्तेः । तस्मादस्यविकृतं
ब्रह्म ॥ नच निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपोऽस्ति, श्रूयमाणत्वादेव निरवयवत्वस्या-
प्यभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् । शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म शब्दप्रमाणकम्, नेन्द्रियादि-

१८ प्रमाणकम् । तद्यथाशब्दमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । शब्दश्चोभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रति-
पादयति, अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वं च । लौकिकानामपि मणिमन्त्रौ-

२१ षधिप्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशाच्छक्तयो विरुद्धानेकार्यविषया
दृश्यन्ते ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते,
अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनाश्च शक्तय
इति । किमुताचिन्त्यस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत ।

२४ तथाचाहुः पौराणिकाः [महा० भा०, ६.५.१२]—

अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् ।

प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम् ॥

२७ इति । तस्माच्छब्दमूल एवातीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः ॥

ननु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्धोऽर्थः प्रत्याययितुं, निरवयवं च
ब्रह्म परिणमते, न च कृत्स्नमिति । यदि निरवयवं ब्रह्म स्यान्नैव परिण-

३० मेत, कृत्स्नमेव वा परिणमेत । अथ केनचिद्रूपेण परिणमेत केनचिच्चा-

वतिष्ठेतेति रूपभेदकल्पनात् सावयवमेव प्रसज्येत । क्रियाविषये हि—
अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति ।

- ३३ इति [जै०, १०.८.६] एवंजातीयकायां विरोधप्रतीतावपि विकल्पा-
श्रयणं विरोधपरिहारकारणं भवति, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वाच्चानुष्ठानस्य । इह तु
विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः संभवति, अपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्बस्तुनः ।
३६ तस्माद्दुर्घटमेतदिति । नैष दोषः । अविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदाभ्युपगमात् ।
नह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु संपद्यते । नहि तिमिरोप-
हतनयनेनानेक इव चन्द्रमा दृश्यमानोऽनेक एव भवति । अविद्याकल्पि-
३९ तेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वा-
भ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते, पार-
मार्थिकेन च रूपेण सर्वव्यवहारातीतमपरिणतमवतिष्ठते । वाचारम्भण-
४२ सात्रत्वाच्चाविद्याकल्पितस्य नापरूपभेदस्येति न निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणः
कुप्यति ॥ नचेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनार्था, तत्प्रतिपत्तौ
फलानवगमात् । सर्वव्यवहारहीनब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनार्था त्वेषा, तत्प्रति-
४५ पत्तौ फलावगमात्—

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा ।

इत्युपक्रम्याह [बृ०, ४.२.४]—

४८ अभयं वै जनक प्राप्नोऽसि ।

इति । तस्मादस्मत्पक्षे न कश्चिदपि दोषप्रसङ्गोऽस्ति ॥ २७ ॥

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ॥ २८ ॥

अपिच नैवात्र विवदितव्यं कथमेकस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्दे-
नैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः स्यादिति, यत आत्मन्यप्येकस्मिन् स्वप्नदृशि स्वरू-
३ पानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः पठ्यते [बृ०, ४.३.१०]—

न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवंत्यथ रथान्
रथयोगान् पथः सृजते ।

६ इत्यादिना । लोकेऽपि देवादिषु मायाव्यादिषु च स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैव
विचित्रा हस्त्यश्वादिसृष्टयो दृश्यन्ते । तथैकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुप-
मर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिर्भविष्यतीति ॥ २८ ॥

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ २९ ॥

- परेषामप्येष समानः स्वपक्षे दोषः । प्रधानवादिनोऽपि हि निरवयवमपरिच्छिन्नं शब्दादिहीनं प्रधानं सावयवस्य परिच्छिन्नस्य शब्दादिमतः
- ३ कार्यस्य कारणमिति स्वपक्षः । तत्रापि कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वात् प्रधानस्य प्राप्नोति, निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमकोपो वा ॥ ननु नैव तैर्निरवयवं प्रधानमभ्युपगम्यते, सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि त्रयो गुणा नित्याः, तेषां साम्या-
- ६ वस्था प्रधानम्, तैरेवावयवैस्तत् सावयवमिति ॥ नैवंजातीयकेन सावयवत्वेन प्रकृतो दोषः परिहर्तुं पार्यते, यतः सत्त्वरजस्तमसामप्येकैकस्य समानं निरवयवत्वम् । एकैकमेव चैतरद्वयानुगृहीतं सजातीयस्य प्र-
- ९ ञ्चस्योपादानमिति समानत्वात् स्वपक्षदोषप्रसङ्गस्य । तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात् सावयवत्वमेवेति चेत्, एवमप्यनित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गः । अथ शक्तय एव कार्यवैचित्र्यसूचिता अवयवा इत्यभिप्रायः, तास्तु ब्रह्मवादिनोऽप्यविशिष्टाः ॥
- १२ तथाणुवादिनोऽप्यणुरण्वन्तरेण संयुज्यमानो निरवयवत्वाद्यदि कात्स्न्येन संयुज्येत, ततः प्रथिमानुपपत्तेरणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथैकदेशेन संयुज्येत, तथापि निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमकोप इति स्वपक्षेऽपि समान एष दोषः ।
- १५ समानत्वाच्च नान्यतरस्मिन्नेव पक्ष उपक्षेप्तव्यो भवति । परिहृतस्तु ब्रह्मवादिना स्वपक्षे दोषः ॥ २९ ॥ इति कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यधिकरणम् ॥ ९ ॥

१० सर्वोपेताधिकरणम् ।

- एकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगादुपपद्यते विचित्रो विकारप्रपञ्च इत्युक्तम् । तत् पुनः कथमवगम्यते विचित्रशक्तियुक्तं परं ब्रह्मेति ।
- ३ तदुच्यते—

सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

सर्वशक्तियुक्ता च परा देवतेत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । कुतः । तद्दर्शनात् । तथाहि दर्शयति श्रुतिः सर्वशक्तियोगं परस्या देवतायाः—

- ६ सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः [छा०, ३.१४.४],
- सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः [छा०, ८.७.१],
- ९ यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वधित् [मुण्ड०, १.१.९],

एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गी सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विभृतौ
तिष्ठतः [बृ०, ३.८.९],

१२ इत्येवंजातीयका ॥ ३० ॥

विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत् तदुक्तम् ॥ ३१ ॥

स्यादेतत् । विकरणां परां देवतां शास्ति शास्त्रम् [बृ०, ३.८.८]-
अचक्षुष्कमश्रोत्रमवागमनाः ।

३ इत्येवंजातीयकम् । कथं सा सर्वशक्तियुक्तापि सती कार्याय प्रभवेत् ।
देवादयो हि चेतनाः सर्वशक्तियुक्ता अपि सन्त आध्यात्मिककार्यकरण-
संपन्ना एव तस्मैतस्मै कार्याय प्रभवन्तो विज्ञायन्ते ॥ कथं च—

६ नेति नेति [बृ०, ३.९.२६],

इति प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषाया देवतायाः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवेदिति चेत् ।
यदत्र वक्तव्यं तत् पुरस्तादेवोक्तम् । श्रुत्यवगाह्यमेवेदमतिगम्भीरं ब्रह्म, न
९ तर्कावगाह्यम् । न च यथैकस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथान्यस्यापि सामर्थ्येन भवि-
तव्यमिति नियमोऽस्तीति । प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्ति-
योगः संभवतीत्येतदप्यविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदोपन्यासेनोक्तमेव । तथा च

१२ शास्त्रम् [श्वे०, ३.१९]—

अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः ।

इत्यकरणस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वसामर्थ्ययोगं दर्शयति ॥ ३१ ॥ इति सर्वो-

१५ पेटाधिकरणम् ॥ १० ॥

११ प्रयोजनवत्त्वाधिकरणम् ।

अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकर्तृत्वं जगतं आक्षिपति—

न, प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥

न खलु चेतनः परमात्मेदं जगद्विम्बं विरचयितुमर्हति । कुतः । प्रयो-
३ जनवत्त्वात् प्रवृत्तीनाम् । चेतनो हि लोके बुद्धिपूर्वकारी पुरुषः प्रवर्त-
मानो न मन्दोपक्रमामपि तावत् प्रवृत्तिमात्मप्रयोजनानुपयोगिनीमारभ-
माणो दृष्टः, किमुत गुरुतरसंरम्भाम् । भवति च लोकप्रसिद्धयनुवादिनी
६ श्रुतिः—

न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ।

९. इति [बृ०, २.४.५.] । गुरुतरसंरम्भा चेयं प्रवृत्तिर्यदुच्चावचप्रपञ्चं जगद्विम्बं विरचयितव्यम् । यदीयमपि प्रवृत्तिश्चेतनस्य परमात्मन आत्म-प्रयोजनोपयोगिनी परिकल्प्येत, परितृप्तत्वं परमात्मनः श्रयमाणं वाच्येत ।
 १२ प्रयोजनाभावे वा प्रवृत्त्यभावोऽपि स्यात् । अथ चेतनोऽपि सन्नन्मत्तो बुद्ध्यपराधादन्तरेणैवात्मप्रयोजनं प्रवर्तमानो दृष्टस्तथा परमात्मापि प्रवर्तिष्यत इत्युच्येत, तथा सति सर्वज्ञत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं वाच्येत ।
 १५ तस्मादश्लिष्टा चेतनात् सृष्टिरिति ॥ ३२ ॥

लोकवत् तु लीलाकैवल्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

- तुशब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति । यथा लोके कस्यचिदाप्तैषणस्य राज्ञो राजामाल्यस्य वा व्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमनभिसंधाय केवलं लीलारूपाः
 ३ प्रवृत्तयः क्रीडाविहारेषु भवन्ति, यथा चोच्छ्वासप्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसंधाय बाह्यं किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव संभवन्ति, एवमीश्वरस्याप्यन-
 २ पेक्ष्य किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भवि-
 ६ ष्यति । न हीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतः श्रुतितो वा संभवति । नच स्वभावः पर्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते । यद्यप्यस्माकमियं जगद्वि-
 ३ म्बविरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति, तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयम्,
 ९ अपरिमितशक्तित्वात् । यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित् प्रयोजन-मुत्प्रेक्ष्येत, तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते, आप्तकाम-श्रुतेः । नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तेर्वा, सृष्टिश्रुतेः सर्वज्ञश्रुतेश्च । न चेयं पर-
 १२ मार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः, अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात्, ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥ इति प्रयोजनवत्त्वाधिकरणम् ॥ ११ ॥

१२ वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याधिकरणम् ।

पुनश्च जगज्जन्मादिहेतुत्वमीश्वरस्याक्षिप्यते स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन प्रतिज्ञातस्यार्थस्य दृढीकरणाय—

वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न, सापेक्षत्वात्, तथाहि दर्शयति ॥ ३४ ॥

- ३ नेश्वरो जगतः कारणमुपपद्यते । कुतः । वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गात् । कांश्चिद-
त्यन्तसुखभाजः करोति देवादीन्, कांश्चिदत्यन्तदुःखभाजः पश्वादीन्,
कांश्चिन्मध्यमभोगभाजो मनुष्यादीनित्येवं विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमाणस्येश्वरस्य
- ६ पृथग्जनस्येव रागद्वेषोपपत्तेः श्रुतिस्मृत्यवधारितस्वच्छत्वादीश्वरस्वभावविलोपः
प्रसज्येत । तथा खलजनैरपि जुगुप्सितं निर्घृणत्वमतिक्रूरत्वं दुःखयोग-
विधानात् सर्वप्रजोपसंहाराच्च प्रसज्येत । तस्माद्वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गान्नेश्वरः
- ९ कारणमित्येवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये नेश्वरस्य प्रसज्येते । कस्मात् ।
सापेक्षत्वात् । यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीत,
स्यातामेतौ दोषौ वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च । नतु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति ।
- १२ सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते । किमपेक्षत इति चेत् । धर्मा-
धर्मावपेक्षत इति वदामः । अतः सृज्यमानप्राणिधर्माधर्मापेक्षा विषमा
सृष्टिरिति नायमीश्वरस्यापराधः । ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवद्द्रष्टव्यः । यथाहि
- १५ पर्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति, व्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु
तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति, एवमीश्वरो
देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति । देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्त-
- १८ जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति । एवमीश्वरः
सापेक्षत्वान्न वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याभ्यां दुष्यति ॥ कथं पुनरबगम्यते सापेक्ष ईश्वरो
नीचमध्यमोत्तमं संसारं निर्मिमीत इति । तथाहि दर्शयति श्रुतिः—
- २१ एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं, यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषत,
एष उ एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं, यमधो निनीषते ।
इति [कौ० ब्रा०, ३.८],
- २४ पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन ।
इति [बृ०, ३.२.१३] च । स्मृतिरपि प्राणिकर्मविशेषापेक्षमेवेश्वर-
स्यानुग्रहीतृत्वं निग्रहीतृत्वं च दर्शयति—
- २७ ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् ।
इति [भ० गी०, ४.११] एवंजातीयका ॥ ३४ ॥
६ [ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्]

न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्न, अनादित्वात् ॥ ३५ ॥

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।

इति [छा०, ६.२.१] प्राक् सृष्टेरविभागावधारणान्नास्ति कर्म, यद-
 ३ पेक्ष्य विषमा सृष्टिः स्यात् । सृष्ट्युत्तरकालं हि शरीरादिविभागापेक्षं कर्म,
 कर्मापेक्षश्च शरीरादिविभागः, इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वं प्रसज्येत । अतो विभा-
 गादूर्ध्वं कर्मापेक्ष ईश्वरः प्रवर्ततां नाम । प्राग्विभागाद्वैचित्र्यनिमित्तस्य
 ६ कर्मणोऽभावात् तुल्यैवाद्या सृष्टिः प्राप्नोतीति चेत् । नैष दोषः । अनादि-
 त्वात् संसारस्य । भवेदेष दोषो यद्यादिमान् संसारः स्यात् । अनादौ तु
 संसारे, बीजाङ्कुरवद्धेतुहेतुमद्भावेन कर्मणः सर्गवैषम्यस्य च, प्रवृत्तिर्न
 ९ विरुध्यते ॥ ३५ ॥

कथं पुनरवगम्यतेऽनादिरेष संसार इति । अत उत्तरं पठति—

उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ॥ ३६ ॥

उपपद्यते च संसारस्यानादित्वम् । आदिमत्त्वे हि संसारस्याकस्मादुद्भूते-
 ३ र्मुक्तानामपि पुनः संसारोद्भूतिप्रसङ्गः, अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गश्च, सुखदुः-
 खादिवैषम्यस्य निर्निमित्तत्वात् । न चेश्वरो वैषम्यहेतुरित्युक्तम् । न चा-
 विद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणं, एकरूपत्वात् । रागादिक्लेशवासनाक्षिप्त-
 ६ कर्मापेक्षा त्वविद्या वैषम्यकरी स्यात् । न च कर्मान्तरेण शरीरं संभवति,
 न च शरीरमन्तरेण कर्म संभवति, इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः । अनादित्वे
 तु, बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनोपपत्तेर्न कश्चिद्दोषो भवति ॥ उपलभ्यते च संसा-
 ९ रस्यानादित्वं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः । श्रुतौ तावत् [छा०, ६.३.३]—

अनेन जीवेनात्मना ।

इति सर्गप्रमुखे शरीरमात्मानं जीवशब्देन प्राणधारणानिमित्तेनाभिलपन्न-
 १२ नादिः संसार इति दर्शयति । आदिमत्त्वे तु प्रागनवधारितप्राणः सन्
 कथं प्राणधारणानिमित्तेन जीवशब्देन सर्गप्रमुखेऽभिलप्येत । न च धार-
 यिष्यतीत्यतोऽभिलप्येत, अनागताद्धि संबन्धादतीतः संबन्धो बलवान्
 १५ भवति, अभिनिष्पन्नत्वात् ।

सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् ।

इति च मन्त्रवर्णः [ऋ० सं०, १०.१९०.३] पूर्वकल्पसद्भावं दर्श-
१८ यति । स्मृतावप्यनादित्वं संसारस्योपलभ्यते [भ० गी०, १५.३]—

न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते

नान्तो न चादिर्न च संप्रतिष्ठा ।

२१ इति । पुराणे चातीतानागतानां च कल्पानां न परिमाणमस्तीति स्थापि-
तम् ॥ ३६ ॥ इति वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याधिकरणम् ॥ १२ ॥

१३ सर्वधर्मोपपत्त्यधिकरणम् ।

चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्मिन्नवधारिते वेदार्थे परैरुप-
क्षितान् विलक्षणत्वादीन् दोषान् पर्यहार्षीदाचार्यः । इदानीं परपक्षप्रति-
३ षेधप्रधानं प्रकरणं प्रारिप्समाणः स्वपक्षपरिग्रहप्रधानं प्रकरणमुपसंहरति—

सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३७ ॥

यस्मादस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि कारणे परिगृह्यमाणे प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण सर्वे
कारणधर्मा उपपद्यन्ते सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति महामायं च ब्रह्मेति, तस्माद-
६ नतिशङ्कनीयमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनमिति ॥ ३७ ॥ इति सर्वधर्मोपपत्त्य-
धिकरणम् ॥ १३ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यगोविन्दभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्य-
श्रीमच्छङ्करभगवत्पादकृतौ शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये
द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः स्मृतिपादः समाप्तः ॥



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BRAHMASŪTRAS II. I.

WITH

THE COMMENT OF ŚANKARA



NOTES

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1954

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

FOR THE YEAR ENDING 1954

1955

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

ADHYAYA SECOND

PĀDA FIRST

—A Sūtra is defined as—

स्वल्पाक्षरमसंदिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।

अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

“ A statement of few words, free from doubt, conveying an important sense, having a universal application, free from padding words (such as we find in certain Vedic litanies) and free from any blomish (grammatical or logical).” The sūtras were concise mnemonic rules originally intended as helps to memory and possibly designed to cover deficiency of writing material. There are Śrauta, Gṛihya and Dharma sūtras, sūtras of Vyākaraṇa, Chhandas, Nāṭya and Alankāra, and sūtras for the various Darśanas or Systems of Philosophy. In time the sūtras tended to become more and more condensed and even enigmatic, so that the taunt—

अर्धमात्रालाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः ।

was taken as a deserved compliment. Some of the later pseudo-sūtras, however, were written in a diffuse style, thereby defeating their original purpose. The sūtra form of literature as devoted to the codification of religious and secular law and the condensing of various Śāstric subjects must have been fairly established even before the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, seeing that the canonical texts of these religions are designated as “suttas” though their outward form has none of the characteristics of a sūtra proper. The sūtras must have been from the very beginning accompanied by an oral traditional explanation.

—A Bhāshya or comment is defined as—

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुसा(का)रिभिः ।

स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

The Bhāshya thus shares the dignity and precision of the sūtra. It makes brief statements which it itself proceeds to explain and expand according to the needs of the discussion. An imaginary disputant is the person to whom the Bhāshya is directly addressed.

—One or more continuous sūtras form an Adhikaraṇa or topic. The largest number of sūtras subsumed under one topic in the Vedānta sūtras is, according to Śaṅkarāchārya's Bhāshya, 17. An Adhikaraṇa is thus defined—

विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरम् (रः) ।

निर्णयश्चेति पञ्चाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥

The five members of an Adhikaraṇa are : i, Vishaya or general subject-matter ; ii, Viśaya or Saṁśaya, the specific occasion for doubt ; iii, the *prima facie* view taken by the opponent, who is thus called the Pūrvapakhin or Chodaka, the starter of the query ; iv, the Uttaram, rejoinder, or the Uttarah (pakshah), otherwise called the Siddhānta, representing the view maintained by the Siddhāntin in opposition to the view of the Pūrvapaksha ; and v, Nirṇaya or ultimate decision after a weighing of the two views by arguments for and against. This is given by the judge or the chairman or the Madhyastha (non-partisan) arbitrator and it is on the side of the Siddhāntin. In theory every Adhikaraṇa ought to be capable of being presented in this five-fold division, although (the best illustrative examples of them occur in the first Adhyāya and in portions of the third and the fourth) where the question is that of mīmāṅsā or exact interpretation of a given Vedic text open to divergent interpretations.

—While it was regarded as the duty of the Bhāshyakāra to fully explain the intention of the Sūtrakāra, he had also full latitude to start new "utsūtra" discussions, *i. e.*, those not actually expressed in the sūtras but capable of being deduced from them, or at any rate not inconsistent with the implications of them. But he could not modify the sūtras. This latter was the function of the so-called Vārttikas, which are defined as—

उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तानां चिन्ता यत्र प्रवर्तते ।

तं ग्रन्थं वार्त्तिकं प्राहुर्वार्त्तिकज्ञा मनीषिणः ॥

The Vārttikas, in other words, were sūtras intended to correct, modify, and supplement the original sūtras. We have no Vārttikas for the Vedāntasūtras as such, although the sūtrapāṭha as given by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, and other Bhāshyakāras shows considerable variation and addition.

—The 556 (555) sūtras given by Śaṅkarāchārya are held to have been the work of Bādarāyaṇa (also called Vyāsa). Whether he is the actual author of these aphorisms, or whether the sūtrapāṭha, like a family-book of the R̥gveda, is made of chronologically disparate units, is a question that we need not take up here for the present. Consult on the point my Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy, Lecture IV.

—Sūtra 1, line 1. — Śaṅkarāchārya himself reviews (apud I. iv. 1 and I. ii. 1) the contents of the first four pādas of the first chapter in the following words—

प्रथमे पादे ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय ब्रह्मणो लक्षणमुक्तम्—जन्माद्यस्य यतः (१.१.२) इति । तल्लक्षणं प्रधानस्यापि समानमित्याशङ्क्य तदशब्दत्वेन निराकृतम्—ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् (१.१.५) इति ॥ अर्थान्तरप्रसिद्धानां च केषांचिच्छब्दानां ब्रह्मविषयत्वे हेतुप्रतिपादनेन कानिचिद्वाक्यानि स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानि संदिह्यमानानि ब्रह्मपरतया निर्णीतानि । पुनरप्यन्यानि वाक्यान्यस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानि संदिह्यन्ते, किं परं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्त्याहोस्विदर्थान्तरं किंचिदिति । तन्निर्णयाय द्वितीयतृतीयपादौ ॥ चतुर्थे पादे कासुचिच्छाखासु श्रूयमाणानां प्रधानसमर्पणाभासानां शब्दानामन्यपरत्वं प्रतिपादितम् ॥

The title “Samanvaya” or “oneness of purport” given to the first Adhyāya is thus fully justified.

—Sūtra 1, line 2. — The mṛit or clay forms the material cause (upādāna) of the jar, while the potter is the agent (nimitta). In the case of the universe the Brahman is both the upādāna and the nimitta (efficient) cause *in one*. Compare Br. Sū. I. iv. 23 and II. i. 4, lines 1f. below.

—Sūtra 1, line 4. — The four classes of beings are: jāraja or jarāyuja (viviparous or born of womb), andaja (oviparous or born of egg), svedaja (born of sweat), and udbhijja (born after

tearing up the soil). The bodies of these, after being separated from the immortal soul that temporarily inhabits them, " return to dust. " See Manusmṛiti, i. 43 ff.—

पशवश्च मृगाश्चैव व्यालाश्चोभयतोदतः ।

रक्षांसि च पिशाचाश्च मानुषाश्च जरायुजाः ॥

अण्डजाः पक्षिणः सर्पा नृका मत्स्याः सकच्छपाः ।

यानि चैवंप्रकाराणि स्थलजान्यौदकानि च ॥

स्वेदजं दंशमशकं यूकामक्षिकमत्कुणम् ।

उष्मणश्चोपजायन्ते, यच्चान्यत् किञ्चिदीदृशम् ॥

उद्भिज्जास्तरवः सर्वे बीजकाण्डप्ररोहिणः ।

ओषध्यः फलपाकान्ता बहुपुष्पफलोपगाः ॥

— Sūtra 1, line 6. — Smṛitinyāyavirodhaparihāra is the topic of the first pāda : the smṛitivirodha occupying sūtras 1-3 and perhaps sūtra 12 also, the nyāyavirodha being answered in the rest of the sūtras. Pāda 2 attacks the various Darśanas or Systems of Philosophy on their own grounds. The remaining two pādas of the chapter try to establish a unity of purport in the apparently divergent and inconsistent cosmological and psychological speculations of the several Vedāntic texts. The title " Avirodha " or " absence of contradiction " given to this chapter is thus quite adequate, at any rate for pādas 1, 3 and 4. As to pāda 2, see the introduction of Śaṅkarāchārya to II. ii. 1, and our note thereon. — The word nyāya here denotes argumentations based on grounds of reason alone and not claiming any scriptural or traditional authority. It is almost synonymous with tarka (II. i. 11), yukti (II. i. 18), or upapatti (II. i. 36-37). Compare the similar use of tarka-smaraṇa in II. i. 3⁴². Nyāya does not here denote Nyāyadarśana.

— Sūtra 1, line 11. — Is Śaṅkarāchārya here by the words " Smṛitiś cha Tantrākhyā " referring to an actual Sāṅkhya work ? The context makes it clear that by " Paramarshi " he intends Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya system, whose sage-like vision is extolled by the Veda. The earliest extant Sāṅkhya work — the Sāṅkhyakārikās of Īśvarakṛishṇa — speaks of a " Tantra " in the following words (Kārikā 70)—

एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन बहुलीकृतं तन्त्रम् ॥

“Pañchaśikha expanded (or gave increased vogue) to the ‘Tantra.’”— This would imply either that the work that reached Pañchaśikha through Kapila and Āsuri was already known as a Tantra, or that it was originally known by some other name, Pañchaśikha’s expanded form being for the first time called Tantra. Now, a work known as “Shashtitantra” or the “Tantra of the Sixty” is mentioned by name in Kārikā 72—

सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चेति ॥

Īśvarakṛishṇa here tells us that his seventy kārikās are an exact epitome of the larger work named the Shashtitantra. A verse expressly as from the Shashtitantra, and also as from Bhagavān Vārshaganya, is preserved, viz.—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत् तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायैव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

But a Chinese tradition speaks of Pañchaśikha as being the author of the Shashtitantra. A number of citations (about 20) from Pañchaśikha have been preserved; but they are all in prose. Since the existence of the Shashtitantra as an actual Sāṅkhya work is undeniable, we have therefore to fall back upon the supposition either that the ascription of this work to the authorship of Vārshaganya (or to that of Pañchaśikha) is false, or else, with Dr. F. Otto Schrader (ZDMG, LXVIII, pp. 101ff.) believe in the existence of two Shashtitantras, one in prose and the other in verse, one theistic and the other atheistic. This reduplication is however a counsel of despair. It merely proves confusion in tradition. Witness in proof the following verses quoted as from Padmapurāṇa—

कपिलो वासुदेवाख्यः सांख्यं तत्त्वं जगाद ह ।
ब्रह्मादिभ्यश्च देवेभ्यो भृग्वादिभ्यस्तथैव च ॥
तथैवासुरये सर्ववेदार्यैरुपबृंहितम् ।
सर्ववेदविरुद्धं च कपिलोऽन्यो जगाद ह ॥

That Śaṅkarāchārya therefore had access to definite Sāṅkhya works no longer available to us has in any case to be admitted, although all his citations invariably come from the Sāṅkhya-kārikās of Īśvarakṛishna. In II. i. 1, line 95 below, he appears to have used the word *tantra* in the sense of system.

—Sūtra 1, line 14. — Jaimini (Mīmāṃsāsūtra I. i. 2) defines Dharma as—

चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ।

Chodanā or scriptural injunction is thus explained by Śabara in his Bhāshya on the above sūtra—

‘ चोदना ’ इति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनमाहुः । चोदना हि भूतं भवन्तं भविष्यन्तं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टमित्येवंजातीयकमर्थं शक्नोत्यवगमयितुम् । यत्किञ्चन लौकिकं वचनं—यथा नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति—इति तत् तथ्यमपि भवति, वितथमपि भवति । नच—स्वर्गकामो यजेत—इत्यतो वचनात् संदिग्धमवगम्यते, भवति वा स्वर्गो, न वा भवतीति । विप्लवते हि खल्वपि कश्चित् पुरुषकृताद्वचनात् प्रत्ययः, नतु वेदवचनस्य मिथ्यात्वे किञ्चन प्रमाणमस्ति । तस्माच्चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः श्रेयस्करः ॥

—Sūtra 1, line 17. — The “Purushārthas” are four : Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Moksha. The first three require that *specific acts* be performed in a specific manner by the properly qualified persons : and the detailed instructions concerning these can be had from texts like the Manusmṛiti, which can accordingly have some use at least, and so be sāvakāśa. The fourth “Puru-shārtha” depends upon our getting correct knowledge, *i.e.*, knowledge corresponding to the Reality, and this is not a matter for action or prescription. The nyāya applied in the present case by the Pūrvapakshin is—

सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशं बलीयः ।

—Sūtra 1, line 21. — The argument from “seeing” takes its stand upon passages like—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजा-
येयेति । तत् तेजोऽसृजत ।

—छान्दोग्य ६.२.१-३;

आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । नान्यत् किञ्चन मिषत् । स ईश्वर
लोकान् नु सृजा इति । स इमाँ लोकानसृजत । —ऐतरेय १.१.१.

The passages imply that the Creator was sentient and capable of reflection, and not *inert* like the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna.

—Sūtra 1, line 27. — The full stanza from the Śvetāśvatara is—

यो योनिं योनिमधितिष्टत्येको विश्वानि रूपाणि योनीश्च सर्वाः ।

ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् ॥

The context makes it clear that the topic in the passage is Īśvara or Lord, the Creator. Kapila (like the *yonis* or receptacles) is mentioned only incidentally. As Śāṅkarāchārya later explains (II. i. 1⁷¹) the “darśana” or revealed text is “anyārtha” or has another than Kapila as its *principal* topic. The stanza has therefore no “prāpti” or relevancy in connection with the greatness of Kapila. Furthermore, texts like—

यो देवानां प्रभवश्चोद्भवश्च विश्वाधिपो रुद्रो महर्षिः ।

हिरण्यगर्भं जनयामास पूर्वं स नो बुद्ध्या शुभया संयुनक्तु ॥

—श्वेताश्वतर ३.४;

यो देवानां प्रभवश्चोद्भवश्च विश्वाधिपो रुद्रो महर्षिः ।

हिरण्यगर्भं पश्यत जायमानं स नो बुद्ध्या शुभया संयुनक्तु ॥

—श्वेताश्वतर ४.१२;

यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।

तं ह देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ॥

—श्वेताश्वतर ६.१८;

make it quite clear that the “Kapila” or the tawny-coloured being is to be identified with Hiranyagarbha, the Demiurge or the Brahmadeva who, himself the off-spring of the Eternal All-creator, creates the subsequent creation.

Sūtra 1, line 37. — For “Kshetrajña” compare the Bhagavadgītā (Xiii. 1ff)—

इदं शरीरं कौन्तेय क्षेत्रमित्यभिधीयते ।

एतद्यो वेत्ति तं प्राहुः क्षेत्रज्ञ इति तद्विदाः ॥

क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत ।

—Sūtra 1, line 45. — Śāṅkarāchārya must have derived the passage from some Purāna. It also occurs in the Mahābhārata. There are many passages which are common to the Epic and to more than one Purāna. Hari Dikshita in his *Brahmasūtravṛitti* (Ānand. ed., No. 82) says that it comes from the *Vishnu-purāna*.

—Sūtra 1, line 54f. — The third pāda of the first adhyāya of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* discusses what we can take as authoritative besides Scriptural injunctions. The first two sūtras —

धर्मस्य शब्दमूलत्वादशब्दमनपेक्ष्यं स्यात् ॥ १.३.१ ॥

अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रमाणमनुमानं स्यात् ॥ १.३.२ ॥

answer the Pūrvaśakṣa view that every statement not coming directly from the Veda is to be discarded (or rather, secondarily interpreted), by arguing that even non-scriptural statements can be authoritative inasmuch as they emanate from sages having similar infallible knowledge; and we can always infer that, corresponding to the smṛiti in question, there was once a śruti text which happens not to have been preserved. The sūtra quoted in the Bhāshya limits the application of this conclusion. It is not every smṛiti text that we can pronounce authoritative. When a given smṛiti text runs counter to an existing śruti text, the smṛiti text has to be subordinated. It is only where the smṛiti does not go against a definite śruti text that we can accept it as authoritative and *infer* the existence of a lost original as the ground of its ultimate validity. — Jaimini goes on to further limit the scope of this procedure. A smṛiti might not go against the śruti and yet might prescribe a course of worldly prudence or something the motive for which is too obvious. From a text regarded as an authority in the matter of Dharma we expect directions regarding something which ordinary uninspired reason cannot lay down. — And yet again not every smṛiti can be accepted as authority which, without clashing with existing śrutis, teaches something apūrva or extraordinary. Certain heretics might promise wonderful things to be enjoyed after death by those who follow their specific practices. But these heretic smṛitis cannot be authoritative, because the followers of Vedic religion and people of approved respectability—the śiṣṭas—spurn those practices. Practices universally followed by śiṣṭas we can always

take as our guide, even where not only the śruti but even the smṛiti text prescribing them is absent. From śiṣṭāchāra we can infer smṛiti, and from smṛiti the corresponding śruti — At the same time, however, we can learn something even from hēretics and Mlechchhas, especially where the ordinary sources of knowledge fail us. As Śābara says—

चोदितमशिष्टैरपि शिष्टानवगतं प्रतीयेत । यत् प्रमाणेनाविरुद्धं तदव-
गम्यमानं न न्याय्यं त्यक्तुम् ।

This shows how logical and broad-minded these ancient Bhāshya-kāras were—so different from some of their mediæval successors.

—Sūtra 1, line 59 ff.— We go to scriptures only in matters where ordinary avenues of knowledge fail us; and this is true as much of the prescriptions intended to secure the first three Purushārthas as of the knowledge of the Reality which is to win the mokṣhā, the fourth purushārtha. The Reality, the knowledge of which gives mokṣha, transcends the ordinary gateways of knowledge, is transphenomenal. In the absence of special merit or divine grace none can attain that knowledge. The special merit that secures unimpeded vision one can accumulate by following specified courses of conduct such as are prescribed in the scriptures. Thus—

Scriptures lay down prescriptions;

Prescriptions lead to merit;

Merit secures transphenomenal knowledge.

Now this transphenomenal knowledge, as being the product of the already existing and authoritative injunctions of the scriptures, cannot go against their teaching. Nor can it claim to be the sole guide in the interpretation of the scriptural prescriptions. This is the gist of the argument. As will be seen, it involves a fallacy. The atīndriyavijñāna or transphenomenal knowledge would not of course be justified in asserting that *the particular prescription* which secured that knowledge was false. But *other* prescriptions can well come under the purview of the adept's unimpeded vision. In fact he would be better placed than the mere layman in interpreting the other scriptures aright. To this it is of course possible to make the rejoinder by urging that there cannot be any "ardhajaratiyatva" or half-hearted attitude as regards

“Śrutiprāmānya”. To concede the prāmānya of one text is to concede the prāmānya of all texts. But this is not a very satisfactory attitude to take. Hence perhaps Śāṅkarāchārya, conceding the justice of our seeking the guidance of the perfect sages in interpreting the scriptures, brings in the ultimate argument as to difference amongst the Doctors themselves.

—Sūtra 1, line 70. — Compare Mahābhārata (Kumbh. Ed.) iii, 107. 2 ff.—

ततः क्रुद्धो महाराज कपिलो मुनिसत्तमः ।

वासुदेवेति यं प्राहुः कपिलं मुनिपुंगवम् ॥

स चक्षुर्विकृतं कृत्वा तेजस्तेषु समुत्सृजन् ।

ददाह सुमहातेजा मन्दबुद्धीन् स सागरान् ॥

—Sūtra 1, line 72. — The scriptural passage extolling Manu has this advantage over the Kapila passage that it is unambiguous and purports *primarily* to praise Manu. Hence its cogency (prāpti) in the argument before us. On the other hand the primary topic in the Kapila passage is the Lord, referred to by the relative pronoun “yah.” That the passage, besides its assertion about the main topic, should also be made to convey information about an additional subordinate topic (e. g., wisdom of Kapila) involves what is called Vākya-bheda, or the splitting up of one sentence into two, which is a fault in interpretation.

—Sūtra 1, line 97. — That the authoritativeness of the Veda is self-evident, not deducible from extraneous confirmatory proofs, is the well-known “svataḥ-prāmānya” theory, which constitutes the corner-stone of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system. Opposed to that is the “parataḥ-prāmānya” Theory, which is willing to concede the correctness of even an ordinary sense-perception of water only after it is tested by a subsequent confirmatory perception, as when the man actually goes to the water and is able to quench his thirst. But this amounts to summoning one sense-perception as witness for the truth of another sense-perception. Why may not both be wrong? And if the second is to be believed in, why not as well believe the first? In fact, argues the Mīmāṃsist, one’s faith is not a thing to be argued about. If that were so, it would have been easy to argue all into, or out of, any faith. All attempts therefore to lend additional support to Scriptures by

ratiocination have everywhere ended by undermining men's faith in the Scriptures themselves. Hence the dictum—

विभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रतरिष्यति ।

—Sūtra 2, line 2. — The words of the sūtra are variously interpreted. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Vallabha agree in taking " itareshām " to mean " itareshām Mahadādinam tattvānām. " Madhva does the same : only, the smṛiti he particularly alludes to is the Śaiva or Pāsupata smṛiti, and consequently the tattvas are not Mahat and others but incidental statements regarding fruits etc., taught in the Śaiva texts and not warranted by (Vaishṇava) experience. Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Śrīkanṭha understand " itareshām " to refer to other Smṛitikāras (like Manu), whose prophetic vision (upalabdhi) never once vouchsafes for the correctness of the Sāṅkhya view of creation. But this is saying what was already said in sūtra 1, viz., that the Smṛitis of Kapila and of Manu differ in their teachings. Looking to the wording of sūtras 1 and 2 it is clear that " itareshām " can refer only to the " Smṛitis " or the " doshas. " The first is impossible grammatically, since we read " itareshām " and not " itarāsām. " The second can possibly mean : " Other defects urged by the Sāṅkhyas (against the Vedāntic position) are untenable "—an extremely forced interpretation. If the word " Smṛiti " in sūtra 1 is to mean " Pradhāna smṛiti ", Śaṅkara's interpretation would seem most natural. For Rāmānuja's interpretation " smṛiti " will have to be taken to signify " Kapila-smṛiti. " If a word not present in the first sūtra is to be referred to by the " itareshām " of the next sūtra, the fact can possibly become more natural if, following Vallabha, sūtra 2 is taken to constitute a distinct adhiṅkaraṇa, although that does not very much improve matters.

—Sūtra 2, line 5. — All systems of Indian Philosophy agree in giving the number of sense-organs as five. If a new system were to assert a sixth sense contrary to all authority and unwarranted by actual experience, there could be no possibility whatsoever of that system gaining a hearing.

—Sūtra 2, line 6. — The word *mahat* actually occurs in the following Upanishadic passages—

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अयेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।

मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः ॥

महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः ।

पुरुषात् परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥—कठ१.३.१०-११

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनो मनसः सत्त्वमुत्तमम् ।

सत्त्वादधि महानात्मा महतोऽव्यक्तमुत्तमम् ॥

* अव्यक्तात्तु परः पुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च ।

यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते जन्तुरमृतत्वं च षच्छति ॥ —कठ२.३.७-८.

Śāṅkarāchārya has attempted to prove that by the word *mahat* we have to understand either the cosmic intellect alias the Demiurge (Hiranyagarbha) or the individual soul, but in no case the Mahat of the Sāṅkhya system, i. e., as the first product of the Prakṛiti.

—Sūtra 2 line 7.— Śāṅkarāchārya's point is that if the smṛiti teaching creation has gone wrong about the later stages of the creation, it can be presumed to be no more correct as to the initial stage or the starting point of the creation. If the effect, Mahat, is disproved, the cause, Pradhāna, has also to be discarded.

—Sūtra 3, line 1.— The specific mention of the Yoga in this sūtra implies that the first adhikaraṇa dealt with the allied system of the Sāṅkhyas, and not that of the Pāśupatas, as Madhva understands. Yoga is called "Seśvara-Sāṅkhya." ¹

—Sūtra 3, line 2.— An atideśa or analogical transference of qualities, conditions or arguments is thus defined—

अन्यत्रैव प्रणीतायाः कृत्स्नाया धर्मसंहतेः ।

अन्यत्र कार्यतः प्राप्तिरतिदेशः स उच्यते ॥

—Sūtra 3, line 5.— Ignoring their nebulous beginning (according to Hauer : *Die Anfänge der Yoga-praxis*, 1922) in the Vedas, the Yoga ideas first make their appearance, amongst the Upanishads, in the Kāṭha and the Śvetāśvatara, and also here and

¹This line might have been an interpolation, the "yat" of the third line referring to "avyakta." Translators often translate as though they read *yam* for *yaj*. The description of the Purusha as "vyāpaka" and "aliṅga" is reminiscent of Sāṅkhya technicalities : Cp. S. Kārikā 55.

there in the Mundaka. As a recognised method of securing concentration of the mind with a view to God-vision, it is much earlier than the Yogasūtras of Patañjali (150 B. C.): it is even pre-supposed by Buddhism (500 B.C.). The "Yogaśāstra" from which Śaṅkarāchārya is apparently quoting (line 16) the first sūtra is otherwise unknown to us.

—Sūtra 3, line 18. — In his German translation of the Brahma-sūtras published in 1887, Deussen took "Ashtakādi-smṛiti" to mean Pāṇini's Ashtādhyāyī [Achtwerke des Pāṇini]—an error which we ought to ignore in the case of this pioneer and pre-eminent Vedāntic scholar of Europe. The Ashtakas are kinds of śrāddhas so called because they were to be performed on three successive kṛishṇa-ashtamis following the Agrahāyanī or Mārgaśīrshī Paurṇamāsī. Compare Manusmṛiti, IV. 150. There is no extant Vedic prescription about them, but on the strength of the śmṛitis the corresponding śruti passages have to be inferred. The Ashtakā-smṛiti is here adduced as an illustration of its "anapavadaniyatva," and not of its "sampratipannārthaikadeśatva."—The reading abhyadhikā for apyadhikā, given in some Mss., is perhaps to be preferred in view of line 4 above.

—Sūtra 3, line 23. — Śabara defines *liṅga* (III. iii. 14) as—

यत् तावच्छब्दस्यार्थमभिधातुं सामर्थ्यं तल्लिङ्गम् ।

Elsewhere it is defined as—

सामर्थ्यं सर्वभावानां लिङ्गमित्यभिधीयते ।

A śrauta liṅga means actual 'usage' of a word in the Veda in the sense of the thing in question. This use of the word liṅga here is to be distinguished from its more usual use in the sense of an "inferential mark" as in II. 1. 6²⁶, II. 1. 11²⁹, etc.; and from its Sāṅkhya use in the sense of the transmigratory body (cp. S. Kārikās 40-41).

—Sūtra 3, line 35. — The "pratyāsatti," proximity, or passage in immediate context to Śvetāśvatara vi. 13, is—

एको वशी निष्क्रियाणां बहूनामेकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति ।

तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषाम् ॥

—श्वेताश्वेतर ६.१२.

The word " Sāṅkhya " means etymologically—

संख्या बुद्धिः, तन्निवृत्तं सांख्यम् ।

—Sūtra 3, line 39. — Compare—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ —सांख्यकारिका १९.

—Sūtra 3, line 41. — Vairāgya is defined in Yogasūtra, i. 15—

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ।

and thus recommended in Yogasūtra, ii. 15—

परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ।

Compare also Yogasūtra, ii. 30.

—Sūtra 4, line 5. — According to the mīmāṃsā view the Veda is " kriyārtha " only :—

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शानाम्.....।—जै० १.२.१.

It teaches what ought, and what ought not to be, *done* for obtaining certain rewards and averting certain punishments after death ; and as to the exact nature of the act in question, Veda is, and can be, the only and the final authority. According to the Vedāntins a part of the Veda at any rate describes the nature of the Brahman, the highest Reality. Now, if Brahman be an eternally existing Reality, and not a process or action which is to be brought into operation, it must be within the reach of pramāṇas like Pratyaksha, or of Anumāna which is based on Pratyaksha, which both concern themselves with the knowledge of the reality. If so, the Veda ought never to describe the reality in a manner opposed to ordinary Pratyaksha and Anumāna. And if certain passages seem to go *prima facie* against the testimony of the senses, we ought to interpret them differently. As Śaṅkarāchārya says elsewhere (Gitābhāshya under xviii. 67)—

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानुपलब्धे हि विषयेऽग्निहोत्रादिसाध्यसाधनसंबन्धे श्रुतेः प्रामाण्यम्, न प्रत्यक्षादिविषये, अदृष्टदर्शनार्थत्वात् प्रामाण्यस्य । न हि श्रुतिशतमपि शीतोऽग्निप्रकाश इति ब्रुवत् प्रामाण्यमुपैति । यदि ब्रूयाच्छीतोऽग्निप्रकाशो वेति तथाप्यर्थान्तरं श्रुतेर्विवक्षितं कल्प्यम्, प्रामाण्यान्यथानुपपत्तेः, न तु प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धं स्ववचनविरुद्धं वा ॥

—Sūtra 4, line 9. — The Pūrvapakshin further maintains that in obtaining the knowledge of an existential reality Śruti and Pratyaksha—and therefore Anumāna as being based on Pratyaksha, and so having a more intimate linkage with reality than is possible for mere Śruti—are not “*tylyabala*” or of equal value and importance, but the latter is distinctly on a higher plane by its very intimate connection with reality. If the aim of Śruti is to give the direct knowledge of reality, we cannot then ignore these two *pramāṇas* which have such a vital contact with reality.

—Sūtra 4, line 22f. — The Prakṛiti or Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas is constituted of three *guṇas*,—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,—which are thus described (Sāṃkhyakārikā, 3)—

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥

“Sattva is regarded as buoyant and effulgent, Rajas as stimulating and mobile, Tamas as heavy and overwhelming; like (the wick and oil of) a lamp, their function is for one (common) purpose, *viz.*, giving light, (although they are opposed in nature).” Compare also the *Bhagavadgītā* (xiv. 6-8)—

तत्र सत्त्वं निर्मलत्वात् प्रकाशकमनामयम् ।

सुखसङ्गेन बध्नाति ज्ञानसङ्गेन चानघ ॥

रंजो रागात्मकं विद्धि तृष्णासङ्गसमुद्भवम् ।

तन्निबध्नाति कौन्तेय कर्मसङ्गेन देहिनम् ॥

तमस्त्वज्ञानजं विद्धि मोहनं सर्वदेहिनाम् ।

प्रमादालस्यनिद्राभिस्तन्निबध्नाति भारत ॥

Because everything in the world is capable of itself having—or at any rate capable of exciting in the individual—under differing conditions, the physical qualities of buoyancy and so forth, the ethical qualities of purity and so forth, the intellectual qualities of clearness and so forth, or the hedonistic qualities of happiness and so forth, the Sāṃkhyas argue that everything must be ultimately composed of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. As Vāchaspatimīśra says in his commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā above quoted—

तद्यथा एकैव स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशीलसंपन्ना स्वामिनं सुखाकरोति । तत् कस्य हेतोः । स्वामिनं प्रति तस्याः सुखरूपसमुद्भवात् । सैव स्त्री सपत्नी-
र्दुःखाकरोति । तत् कस्य हेतोः । ताः प्रति तस्या दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्दमानं सैव मोहयति । तत् कस्य हेतोः । तं प्रति तस्या मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया सर्वे भावा व्याख्याताः ॥

—Sūtra 4, line 27 ff. — For “kāryakaraṇa” (not kāraṇa) in the sense of “ body and the senses ” compare (Śvetāśvatara vi. 8)—

न तस्य कार्ये करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥

—Sūtra 4, line 31. — It is to be noted that “Buddhi” is regarded by the Sāṅkhyas as “achetana” or non-sentient. Whatever, like the mind and the intellect, serves as a means to an end, viz. as a means to knowledge, and whatever is capable of motion (as the mind) and growth (as the intellect), cannot be self-subsisting entity like the Purusha. Activity involves change, and hence and Sāṅkhyas have denied all activity to the Purusha. Even knowledge through the ordinary gateways of the senses involves an activity which the manas and the buddhi can undertake, but never the Purusha. He can have an intuitive perception—a sort of an illumination by mere presence—of the whole process; and therein alone lies his chetanā or sentient character. In this view of the achetana character of the Buddhi the Vedāntin agrees with the Sāṅkhya.

—Sūtra 4, line 35 ff. — The objection on the score of vilakshana-
tva can be removed by taking (i) the achetana Pradhāna as the cause of the achetana world, or (ii) the chetana Brahman as the cause of the chetana world. It is the latter alternative which is now being considered in the rest of this sūtra and the next.

—Sūtra 5, line 16. — The word “viśeṣa” in the sūtra Śāṅkarā-
chārya takes in two ways: (i) difference [between bhoktri and bhogya and (ii) specific mention, as in the Kaushītaki version of the story concerning the “Dispute of the Faculties.”

—Sūtra 5, line 24. — Mantras, defined as—

प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकाः मन्त्राः ।

are those groups of vocables—not necessarily possessing any meaning, or any meaning connected with the ritual to accompany which they are recited—which invariably remind us, through constant association, of the various entities, objects, or utensils that are employed in the ritual. The majority of the Mantras come from the Vedic Samhitās. An Arthavāda is defined as—

प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरपरं वाक्यमर्थवादः ।

Its function is (i) to praise a given prescription, e. g.—

वाय्व्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामः । वायुर्वै दे पिष्ठा देवता ।

where the praise of the Wind as most swift serves as a recommendation for the offering of a white (animal) to that God; (ii) to censure a prohibited conduct, e. g.—

बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम् । अश्रुजं हि रजतम् ।

where the gift of silver is prohibited and the prohibition emphasised by telling us that silver sprang from the tears (of Rudra or Agni in the form of lightning); (iii) to describe the doings of another (parakṛitiḥ); and (iv) to narrate the happenings of another time (purākālpaḥ). Arthavāda has three varieties—

विरोधे गुणवादः स्यात्, अनुवादोऽवधारिते ।

भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ॥

The corresponding illustrations are—

आदित्यो यूपः—गुणवादः,

because the statement contradicts Pratyaksha;

अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्—अनुवादः,

because Veda here affirms what is otherwise known;

इन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुदयच्छत्—भूतार्थवादः,

because it neither confirms nor contradicts. — The Arthavāda, be it noted, is not an independent authority. It is always subservient to another injunctive or prohibitive statement. As Jaimini says (I. ii. 7)—

विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः ।

The "Arthavāda" in the present passage would include the majority of the Brāhmanas. Itihāsa (iti + ha + āsa = thus it was) includes all collections of stories and legends such as those in the Māhābhārata: while the normal contents of a Purāna embrace all topics from Creation to Dissolution:

सर्गश्च प्रतिसर्गश्च वंशो मन्वन्तराणि च ।

वंशा(श्या)नुचरितं चैव पुराणं पञ्चलक्षणम् ॥

—Sūtra 5, line 31. — This is not an actual quotation from Brīh., but the topic is dealt with in the passage referred to.

—Sūtra 6, line 3 ff.— A somewhat longer list of this type is given by Keśava Kāsmīrin in his com. on the text—

दृश्यते हि विलक्षणयोरपि कार्यकारणभावः । यथा भुक्तादन्नात् केश-
नखादिरूपस्य विलक्षणस्य, गोमयाच्च वृश्चिकस्य, मृक्षिकादिभ्यः कृम्यादेः,
द्रव्याद्गुणादेः, शृङ्गाच्छरस्य, दावाग्निदग्धकदलीकाण्डाद्वेत्राङ्कुरस्य, श्वमस्त-
कोत्तगोधूमयावनालादेः पलाण्डुलशुनाङ्कुरस्य कार्यस्वोत्पत्तेरुपलम्भात् ॥

—Sūtra 6, line 15 f.— World, the product, is alleged to be different in nature from Brahman the cause: Is it intended to assert that not even one attribute of Brahman is to be found in the world (second paksha); or, even though some one attribute like sattā may be common to the two, chetanatva, the most important attribute, is present in the cause and absent in the effect (third paksha); or that each and every attribute of Brahman without exception is not found in its effect the world (first paksha)? The first paksha assumes that cause and effect must agree in every single respect, which is impossible. The second paksha goes against facts. The third paksha can be exhibited thus—

प्रतिज्ञा—जगत् अब्रह्मप्रकृतिकम् ।

हेतुः (लिङ्गम्)—अचेतनत्वात् (चैतन्येनानन्वितत्वात्) ।

दृष्टान्तः—यच्चैतन्येनानन्वितं तदब्रह्मप्रकृतिम्, यथा (?)

No drishtānta, which is defined as—

लौकिकपरीक्षाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः ।

and which has to be acceptable to both the parties, can be given, and so the argument falls down.

—Sūtra 6 line 43 ff. — The valid reasonings conformable to the Scriptures are : (i) that the conditions and presentations belonging to the dream consciousness and of the waking consciousness, although associated with one and the same soul, do not either of them constitute his real nature, as the soul can do away with each in turn. — This is rather defective. You can say of a wall that is repainted that the old blue colour does not constitute the essence of the wall any more than the new green colour : but some sort of a colour the wall must have. Similarly, some kind of a relation there must be between consciousness and the soul, even though it be that of *tādātmya* or identity, as the *Advaita Vedānta* avers. Hence we have to supplement argument (i) by argument (ii) which tells us that the real essence of the soul's nature is to abide unruffled by the phenomenal world. This raises the inevitable question as to how the phenomenal appearance does appear at all. Argument (iii) which denies any distinction between the world and the Brahman, the phenomenon and the noumenon, seeks to answer the question, although the answer may not be equally convincing to all.

—Sūtra 6 line 45f. — Śāṅkarāchārya has made the Sūtrakāra argue that Brahman has produced a world which seems to exhibit certain attributes absent in the Brahman, and also that Brahman = world. This seems to contain a *prima facie* inconsistency which we will have to comment upon later. For the present be it noted that he does not speak of — “*jagad-brahmanor aikyam*” nor of “*brahmanah jagad-avyatirekah*” but of “*jagatah brahmāvyatirekah*”. As he ultimately wants to raise the world to the level of the Brahman, he thinks it necessary to put in a word for the “*eka-deśīya*,” who, after all, is “*sva-yūthya*” or belonging to the Āchārya's own persuasion. Whether Śāṅkara has in view here any particular school of thought, or is merely putting forth a possible position that can be maintained, is more than what we know.

—Sūtra 6 line 53. — According to the Sāṅkhyas, the world, the product, is “*jada*,” but so also is *Pradhāna*. What they cannot explain is the bifurcation of the product-world by the Śruti itself into classes like *sat* and *asat*, *vijñāna*, and *avijñāna*, *satya* and *anṛita*. *Vijñāna* in the bifurcation cannot mean the soul or *Purusha* who according to the Sāṅkhyas is not an entity that can

be produced: but as contrasted with *avijñāna*, *viññāna* must signify a sentient product, and therefore must have a sentient cause from which alone it can spring, and not a non-sentient cause like *Pradhāna*.

—Sūtra 7, line 3.— The objection raised against the Vedāntins in this sūtra is distinct from that of the last three sūtras, although a corollary from it. Some Bhāshyakāras (e. g., Vallabhāchārya) commence a new *adhikāraṇa* with sūtra 7; others (e. g., Śrīkanṭha) with sūtra 8; Madhvāchārya, however, is most peculiar in making sūtras 4 to 12 into four distinct *adhikāraṇas*, adding an extra sūtra, “*Dr̥syate tu*” between our sūtra 4 and sūtra 5, and reading our sūtra 6 with a “*cha*” instead of the “*tu*”. His interpretation of the various sūtras is also peculiar to him. The other commentators agree as to the general drift of the *adhikāraṇa*. It is sūtra 7 which has given rise to differences of interpretation. Vallabha makes the sūtra refer to *Chhāndogya Upanishad vi. 2. 1-2*:—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तद्वैक आहुरसदेवेमग्र आसी-
देकमेवाद्वितीयं, तस्मादसतः सद्जायत ॥ १ ॥ कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति
होवाच, कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । सत् त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवा-
द्वितीयम् ॥ २ ॥

and says that the sūtra rebuts the argument that the “*asat*” (= *Pradhāna*) is the cause of the world, because the Śruti passage asserts the “*asat*” just to deny it forthwith. This interpretation of Vallabha is open to the objection that even the *Pūrvapakshin* would not be so blind to the words of the Śruti as to rear up on their basis the *Pūrvapaksha* at all; and further the proper explanation of the passage ought to have been given in the first or the *Samanvaya* chapter and not here. — *Rāmānuja*, *Nimbārka*, and *Śrīkanṭha* make the “*pratishedha*” refer to that implied in sūtra 6, where the rule “*like cause like effect*” was denied; but the denial leaves room for the cause and the effect being of one substance—

दृश्यते तु—इति सूत्रमुपादानोपादेययोः सालक्ष्यनियमप्रतिषेधमात्रपरम,
न त्वेकद्रव्यत्वप्रतिषेधपरमपि ।

Śāṅkarāchārya takes the "pratiśhedha" to be that implied in the Purvapakṣa of this very sūtra, "asad iti." To the objection: "But then the kārya will become 'asad' prior to creation," the reply is—"Your contingency as to the 'non-existence' of kārya is like the contingency of the 'non-existence' of the hare-horn or the barren-woman's son, as when somebody takes the trouble to formally deny this in a sentence like—The hare-horn (or the barren-woman's son) does not exist. This cannot be taken to imply that the hare-horn (or the barren-woman's son) once did exist, but now no longer does so. If kārya never truly exists apart from the kāraṇa, both before and after the creation, the objection that kārya will become "asad" is no objection at all. It is the mere verbal denial of the 'existence' of a thing that never really exists by itself. Śāṅkarāchārya's interpretation, subtle as it is, points to the illusory character of the world, while Rāmānuja and others imply the reality of the world and its unity in substance with the Brahman, as well as difference in minor attributes. The following extract from the Bhāmati brings out the exact point intended by Śāṅkarāchārya—

कार्यं स्वरूपेण सदसत्त्वाभ्यां न निर्वचनीयम्, अपि तु कारणरूपेण
शक्यं सत्त्वेन निर्वक्तुम् । एवं कारणसत्तैव कार्यस्य सत्ता, न ततोऽन्या,
इति कथं तत् उत्पत्तेः प्राक् सति कारणे भवत्यसत् ॥

—Sūtra 8, line 5. — The word "tadvat" in the sūtra is interpreted in five different ways, viz.—

- (i) कारणस्य कार्यवत्प्रसङ्गः । (ii) भोक्तृभोग्ययोरन्यतरस्य इतरवत्प्रसङ्गः ।
(iii) मुक्तामुक्तयोरन्यतरस्य इतरवत्प्रसङ्गः । (iv) अपीतौ स्थितिवत्प्रसङ्गः ।
(v) कार्यस्य कारणवत्प्रसङ्गः ।

—Sūtra 9, line 9. — Chaturvidho bhūtagrāmaḥ : see our Note on II. i. 1, line 4, above.

—Sūtra 9, line 11 f. — The familiar lines from Śāṅkarāchārya's Shaṭpadī-stotra might be recalled—

सत्यपि भेदापगमे नाथ तवाहं न मामकीनस्त्वम् ।

सामुद्रो हि तरङ्गः कचन समुद्रो न तारङ्गः ॥

The point is that kārya and kāraṇa are not co-terminus. Kāraṇa includes the kārya and transcends it. See below, II. i. 27, lines 3ff.

—Sūtra 9, line 23ff. — The majority of the older Upanishads do not contain the “vivarta” illustrations that Śāṅkarāchārya adds here to the usual “pariṇāma” illustrations that are the current coin of the Upanishadic texts. Hence perhaps the Bhāshyakāra finds it necessary to invoke the aid of Gaudapāda, who is traditionally known as his “parama” guru or the teacher’s teacher (or possibly the founder of the school). Some scholars are inclined to doubt the existence of an actual teacher called “Gaudapāda” in view of the fact that there is found at times a mention of “Gaudāchāryāḥ” or “Gaudāḥ” or “Gaudīyakārikāḥ,” which might signify a Gauda or Bengal school of Vedāntins, whose tenets are contained in the so-called “Gaudapāda” kārikās. These kārikās show a strong influence of Buddhism and are frequently quoted in Buddhistic commentators of the Mahāyāna school (e. g. Bhāvaviveka, cir. 600 A.D.) and that too at dates which raise a suspicion as to the traditional ascription of the kārikās to a writer of the early decades of the eighth century, as Śāṅkarāchārya’s teacher’s teacher must be supposed to be. We will not discuss here this intricate problem in all its bearings, and we will ignore the question as to whether the first prakaraṇa of the Gaudapādiya kārikās (which is commented upon even by non-Advaita commentators like Kūranārāyaṇa) belongs to an author different from that of the later prakaraṇas. The problem has been dealt with by me in my fifth Basu Mallik Lecture, Poona, 1929. Śāṅkarāchārya is often nicknamed crypto-Buddhist or “prachchanna-Bauddha” for his Māyāvāda, which has certain affinity to the Śūṅgyavāda of the Madhyamika school of Nāgārjuna ; and now it would seem that this title belongs to Śāṅkarāchārya’s spiritual prāchārya, Gaudapāda,—unless we argue (what is very probable) that Buddhism and Vedānta (and even Sāṅkhya for the matter of that) arose out of a philosophical Anschauung of view-point which contained in it germs of both the nihilistic and illusionistic philosophies ; or, failing this, are content to hold (what is also just possible) that Gaudapāda purposely used Buddhistic arguments against Buddhism itself, and established a new philosophy, more or less allied to Buddhism, which Śāṅkarāchārya later adopted after him.

—Sūtra 9, line 35. — The word “svābhāvika” or “svābhāviki” Śāṅkarāchārya uses sometimes in the sense of what is truly real, but sometimes also in the sense of what is natural and normal and therefore *not* truly real. Here of course the first sense is intended. See also II. i. 14, line 46 and line 73.

—Sūtra 9 line 45. — If, as Śāṅkarāchārya argued above (line 20), kārya is non-different from kāraṇa in all the three times alike, wherein does the Pralaya state differ from the Sthiti? We cannot say that there is avidyā in the latter but not in the former; for we have just argued (line 36, 44) that the seeds of avidyā are dormant in the un-liberated soul, and hence there is no confusion between the liberated and the un-liberated souls. We can perhaps say that in the Apīti or Pralaya state the avidyā is in a seed-form and there it no *consciousness* of it, whereas in the Samsāra or Sthiti state the avidyā is in its developed condition, putting forth all the false appearances that we know. As Śāṅkara expressly says in his Bhāshya to I. iii. 30—

प्रलीयमान्मपि चेदं जगच्छक्त्यवशेषमेव प्रलीयते । शक्तिमूलमेव च
प्रभवति । इतरथाकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥

—Sūtra 10, line 12. — The rule is (Ślokavārttika, p. 341)—

यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोपि वा समः ।

नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥

—Sūtra 11, line 3. — Compare the Vākyapadiya of Bhartrihari (i. 34)—

यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपद्यते ॥

—Sūtra 11, line 8. — Kanabhuk, or more usually Kanāda, the founder of the Vaiśeshika Philosophy, may have obtained his name from the fact that his philosophy deals with atoms or “kanas,” but more probably from the circumstance of his having belonged to a sect of ascetics who lived on “kanas” or grains left in the field after the harvest was gathered and taken home. This mode of life is known as the “uñchhavṛitti.” It is supposed that the founder practised this mode of life in order to propitiate

God Maheśvara, who, in the form of an owl or "ulūka," revealed this philosophy to him, hence called the Aulūkya darśana. But this tradition must have been of a secondary origin, as the primitive Vaiśeṣhika did not recognise God. Another tradition explains the name "Owl Philosophy" from the circumstance that the founder, in the day-time, meditated in a dense forest, secluding himself from worldly affairs, and at night, when people went to rest, he wandered about for food. Young women were frightened at his appearance, and this gave the night-wanderer the opportunity to enter into the granaries and mills and eat the corn found there. None of these traditions have any historical value.

—Sūtra 11, line 13 f.—The same sentiment is well expressed in the R̥igveda (vii. 58 3c)—

ग॒तो ना॒ध्वा वि ति॑ रति॒ ज॒न्तुम् ।

—Sūtra 11, line 15. — Vṛitti is the denotative power (or Śakti) of a word or a sentence. It is Abhidhā or primary, Lakṣhaṇā or secondary (figurative), and Vyañjanā or suggestive. Just which of these is to be understood in a given word, or sentence (which is a specific group of words) can only be settled by argumentation or ratiocination. The whole of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is just such a rational science of exegesis.

—Sūtra 11, line 28. — Bhāva-yāthātmya. The corresponding Buddhistic expression is " Dharmatathatā."

—Sūtra 11, line 30. — The word " avimokṣa " in the sūtra is interpreted in two ways : (i) non-release from the deficiency inherent in reasoning ; and (ii) non-liberation from the bondage of Saṃsāra.

—Sūtra 11, line 41 ff. — To the expected retort that there is wrangling enough amongst the expositors of the Vedic Philosophy, who thus are not in a better boat than the avowedly Rationalistic Philosophers, the reply given is that the Veda is eternal and not the product of any specific time author or conditions—like the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. Its teaching may reasonably be expected to be true of all times, assuming, of course, that the Veda can convey a meaning (that the Veda is not *nirarthaka*, as Kautsa maintained), and that the meaning is determinable by us. As Ānandagiri says—

स हि स्वसामर्थ्यादेकरूपार्थधीप्रसवहेतुः पुरुषमतिदोषात् तु अन्यथा प्रतिभासत इत्यर्थः ।

—Sūtra 12, line 8. — It is clear that by Vyāsa Śāṅkarāchārya means the author of the Mahābhārata, since under I. iii. 29 and II. iii. 47 he quotes as of Vyāsa or Veda-Vyāsa stanzas which come from the Epic. The Kṛishṇa-Dvaipāyana referred to in III. iii. 32 seems to be the same as the Author of the Epic. Here however he is spoken of as an incarnation of the "Vedāchārya" named Apāntaratamas. Śāṅkara associates Manu and Vyāsa together under III. i. 14 also, and in his comment on Sūtra I. iii. 33, where Bādarāyana is actually named, he tells us—

तथा च व्यासादयो देवादिभिः प्रत्यक्षं व्यवहरन्तीति स्मर्यते ।

Śāṅkarāchārya seems to keep Vyāsa distinct from Bādarāyana whom he regards, in the opening of his Bhāshya on the last Vedānta sūtra, IV. iv. 22, as the Author of the Vedānta Sūtras. It is Vāchaspatimīśra who,—as also Sarvajñātman in his Saṁkshepa-sārīraka i. 6 — identifies Bādarāyana with Vyāsa.

—Sūtra 13, line 1 ff. — The sūtra has called forth considerable differences of opinion amongst the Bhāshyakāras. Śāṅkara, Vallabha, and Bhāskara give one interpretation, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Śrīkanṭha, another, and Madhva quite a third. Taking the last first, according to Madhva—

भोक्त्रापत्तिः = भोक्तुर्जीवस्य ब्रह्मापत्तिः,

according to the śruti (Mundaka III. ii. 7)—

कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति ।

Madhva concludes that the śruti passage is to be taken in the same sense as the statement—

सायं गोष्ठे गाव एकीभवन्ति,

and does not dis-establish the difference between the Lord and the souls. Of course it is easy to see that the goshṭha or cowpen bears to the cows a relation different from that of the Lord to the souls. Rāmānuja and others, who regard the world (achit) and the souls (chit) as forming the "body" of the Lord, understand—

भोक्त्रापत्तिः = ब्रह्मणः (सशरीरत्वेन) भोक्तृत्वापत्तिः,

which means that Brahman would be liable to pain and pleasure according to the Śruti (Chhândogya, viii. 12. 1)—

न वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति । अशरीरं वाच सन्तं
न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः ।

Rāmānuja meets the Pūrvapaksha by declaring that it is the body brought into existence by merit and demerit that alone can yield pleasure and pain, the instance given being that of the king who, because he has a body, does not necessarily suffer heat etc., these being warded off by his umbrella-bearers. The instance chosen is certainly not very happy. Servants or no servants, the king must feel hungry; and sleep in his own body, and must in any case feel the pleasures to which his retinue contributes. Finally, the interpretation of Śaṅkarāchārya and others, viz.—

भोक्त्रापत्तिः = भोग्यस्य (कार्यस्य कारणानन्यत्वद्वारा) भोक्त्रापत्तिः,

भोक्तुः (कारणस्य कार्यानन्यत्वद्वारा) भोग्यापत्तिः,

is open to the charge that it raises a point already discussed under Sūtras 8-9. Nor do the illustrations chosen, the froth and the wave and the bubble and the ripple, stand to each other in the relation of the Bhoktri and the Bhogya. — Another possible interpretation can also be suggested. —

• भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागः = भोक्तृणां ब्रह्मणा सह ऐक्यापत्तेः एको भोक्ता

भोक्त्रन्तरादविभक्तः स्यात् । ते च कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमौ प्रसज्येताम् ।

The "ordinary" illustration to rebut the objection can be that of a king and his various officers, who are individually portions of the king, as deriving their authority from him; and yet we can keep one officer distinct from the other for practical purposes.

—Sūtra 13, line 2. — Anyaparā, which we have translated as 'conforming to another means-of-knowledge' can also be rendered as 'possessing a secondary significance, i. e., a significance other than the primary. Ratnaprabhā renders the word by "gaurārthaka," Ānandagiri by "Upacharitārtha," and Vāchaspati by—

मुख्यार्थात् प्रख्याव्य जघन्यवृत्तितां नीयते ।

Compare on the point the passage from Śaṅkara's *Gitābhāṣya* quoted at the end of our Note on *Sūtra* II. i. 4, line 5, above.

—*Sūtra* 13, line 3.—For the nature of *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* see our Note on II. i. 5, line 24. When the words of a *Mantra* do not fit the ritual in which they are prescribed, the words have to be secondarily interpreted. Compare the *Mantra* prescribed for *dadhi-snāna*.

—*Sūtra* 13, line 21 ff.—The Advaita system of Śaṅkara is peculiar in this that while it is prepared to regard the world as a creation by the Lord it is at pains to exclude the individual soul from the Lord's creation—"Jivo Brahmaiva nāparaḥ." The point is fully discussed in *Brahmasūtra* II. iii. 17. Compare also II. i. 21, lines 3 ff.—Other Vedāntins, following the *Bṛihadāranyaka* (II. i. 20) and *Mundakā* (II. i. 1) Upanishads, conceive of *Jivas* as real emanations from the Lord, like sparks from the fire. As Śaṅkarāchārya himself says at the beginning of the next *sūtra*, this answer to the *Pūrvapakshin* is from the *vyavahāra* point of view. As the *Ratnaprabhā* says—

एवं प्राप्ते परिणामदृष्टान्तेनापाततः सिद्धान्तमाह—स्याल्लोकवदिति ।

In addition to the strictly "Pariṇāma" illustration of the ocean and its waves Śaṅkara however thinks it fit to add the "vivarta" illustration of space-in-the-jar. Cp. below, II. i. 14, line 27-30.

—*Sūtra* 14, line 11.—An apter example would be that of a piece of timber which you call a 'pillar' when erect and a 'beam' when transverse, the piece being just the same, the name alone constituting the difference. In the process of acquiring knowledge, it is an important event for the child to know the name of a new object, say, an animal. Before you named it a 'hare' it might have been a cat, and so not distinguishable from the specimens of that class. The name introduces the difference and the child thereafter begins to note differences rather than resemblances. It is the name that transforms One into the Many. "What is in a name?"—The whole universe is in the name!

—*Sūtra* 14, line 26ff.—It will be noted that the Āchārya starts with "pariṇāma" illustrations of the clay and the jar, and con-

cludes with "vivarta" illustrations beginning with ghaṭākāśa, which is a "vivarta" illustration inasmuch as space is not really divided.

- Sūtra 14, line 31ff.—The "Bhedābheda" Pūrvaśakha view which Śaṅkara here raises seems to have been an ancient doctrine not unknown to the Sūtrakāra, who ushers in Āśmarathya (I. iv. 20) as an ancient champion of the same. Bhartriprañcha, who seems to have preceded Śaṅkara by a couple of centuries, seems to have accepted the same view, several of Śaṅkara's arguments here and elsewhere being specifically directed against this renowned Vedāntin. See for Bhartriprañcha Professor Hiriyanna's papers in the Ind. Ant., vol. LIII, 1924, pp. 77-86, and Report of the Madras Oriental Conference, pp. 439-450.

—Sūtra 14, line 44.—By declaring the identity between the soul and Brahman as "svayam-prasiddha" Śaṅkarāchārya alludes to the view, discussed by him at length under I. i. 4, that the Moksha state of oneness with the Absolute is neither "utpādyā" or capable of production, like a jar from clay; nor "vikāryā" or capable of being brought about through modification, like curds from milk; nor "āpyā" or capable of being reached, like his own house by a traveller; nor, finally, "saṁskāryā" or capable of being attained by internal purification, like cleanliness by a dust-soiled mirror. As the Bṛihadāraṇyaka (iv. 4. 6) says—

न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति । ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति ।

—Sūtra 14, lines 46, 48.—For the different uses of the word "svābhāvika" see Note to sūtra 9 line 35 above; compare also the use of the same word in II. i. 14⁷³ below. In Gītā, v. 15 where the word occurs Śaṅkarāchārya explains it as—

स्वोभावः स्वभावः, अविद्यालक्षणा प्रकृतिः, माया ।

—Sūtra 14, line 66ff.—As Śaṅkarāchārya remarks under I. i. 4, the true function of the Śāstra is negative only—

किमर्थानि तर्हि —आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः—इत्यादीनि विधि-
च्छायानि वचनानि । स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषयविमुखीकरणार्थानीति ब्रूमः । यो
हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः—इष्टं मे भूयादनिष्टं मा भूदिति, नच तत्रा-
त्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तमात्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थवाञ्छिनं स्वाभाविककार्यकरण-

संघातप्रवृत्तिगोचरादिमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति—आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः—इत्यादीनि ।

Of a like purport is the parable in the Aitareyopanishadbhāshya, on II. i.—

अत्राख्यायिकामाक्षचते । कश्चित् किल मनुष्यो मुग्धः । कैश्चिदुक्तः कस्मिंश्चिदपराधे सति—अधिकं त्वाम् । नासि मनुष्यः । इति । स मुग्धतयात्मनो मनुष्यत्वं प्रत्याययितुं कंचिदुपेत्याह—ब्रवीतु भगवान् कोहमस्मीति । स तस्य मुग्धतां ज्ञात्वाह—क्रमेण बोधयिष्यामीति । स्थावराद्यात्मभावमपोह्य न त्वममनुष्यः, इत्युक्त्वोपरराम ।

And if the foolish fellow yet wants to know who he is, one has to confess one's inability to teach; for, the man has to find it out for himself. In the same way Brahman cannot be made known by the Śāstra: and it need not be; for it is self-revealing. Bhāmāti is most explicit on the point—

श्रवणाद्युपाय आत्मसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तो वेदान्तसमुत्थोऽपि ज्ञाननिचयोऽसत्यः । यस्तु ब्रह्मस्वभावसाक्षात्कारोऽसौ न कार्यः । तस्मादचोद्यमेतत्कथमसत्यात् सत्योत्पाद इति । यत् खलु सत्यं न तदुत्पद्यते, यच्चोत्पद्यते, तत् सर्वमसत्यमेव ॥

Compare also Śāṅkara's Bhāshya on Br. Sū, III. ii. 21—

द्रष्टव्यादिशब्दा अपि परविद्याधिकारपठितास्तत्त्वाभिमुखीकरणप्रधाना, न तत्त्वावबोधविधिप्रधाना भवन्ति । लोकेऽपीदं पश्येदमाकर्णयति चैवंजातीयकेषु निर्देशेषु प्रणिधानमात्रं कुर्वित्युच्यते, न साक्षाज्ज्ञानमेव कुर्विति । । ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यं यथाभूतविषयं च । न तन्नियोगशतेनापि कारयितुं शक्यते, नच प्रतिषेधशतेनापि वाययितुं शक्यते । नहि तत् पुरुषतन्त्रं, वस्तुतन्त्रमेव हि तत् ॥

—Sūtra 14; line 17ff — Professor Hiriyanna refers me on the point to Bhātriari's Vākyapadiya (II. 240)—

उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामपलापनाः ।

असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥

—Sūtra 14, line 85. — This is a refutation in passing of the Materialists (cp. II. i. 18⁷⁰, II. i. 29^{12ff}, II. ii. 2^{14ff}, 20^{ff}. etc.); the words "Tathā cha Śrutih" continue the main thread of the argument, ignoring the parenthetical interruption. — The Materialist for whom the soul is just the body will find it impossible to explain how, when the external organs of sense are inactive, in dream-condition, a knowledge of the dream at all takes place, unless he posits an internal organ of knowledge, the mind. But even so, as the mind in turn is inactive in deep-sleep, the fact of the persistence of the dream-impression, and of the memory of it carried over across the gulf of the deep-sleep necessarily demands the existence of some entity enduring through all the three states which, in deep-sleep, swoon, and similar states acts as the unconscious retainer of the subliminal memory-impressions, revivable at call. As the Ratnaprabhā on the passage puts it—

स्वप्नस्थावगतेः स्वप्नदेहधर्मत्व उत्थितस्य मया तद्दृशः स्वप्नोऽवगत
इत्यत्राधितावगतिप्रतिसंधानं न स्यात् । अतो देहमेदेऽप्यनुसंधानदर्शना-
दन्योऽनुसंधातेत्यर्थः ॥

Cp. above, II. i. 6, lines 43ff, and our Note thereon.

--Sūtra 14, line 98. --The true "अ" is the sound "अ"; the letter "अ" is a mere symbol which varies in different scripts and which in the same script might by convention have been otherwise—to say nothing of its palæographic modification.

—Sūtra 14, line 98ff. — "Nātaḥ param" etc. does not mean that this is the very last argument and nothing further should thereafter be demanded by way of an argument. What is meant is that the knowledge conveyed by a statement like "That thou art," the moment its truth is realised, becomes self-convincing and leaves no unfulfilled ākāṅkshās or expectations, as in an ordinary injunction. The following extract from the Arthasamgrahā will explain the technique of a Scriptural injunction—

यजेत स्वर्गकामः—इत्यादिवाक्येन स्वर्गमुद्दिश्य पुरुषं प्रति विधीयते ।
तथाहि । यजेत—इत्यत्रास्त्यंशद्वयम् । यजिधातुः, तत्प्रत्ययश्च । प्रत्ययेप्यस्त्यं-
शद्वयम् । आख्यातत्वं लिङ्गत्वं च । उभाभ्यामप्यंशाभ्यां भावनैवोच्यते ।
भावना नाम भवितुर्भवन्नानुकूलो भावायितुर्व्यापारविशेषः । स च व्यापार-

विशेषो लौकिकवाक्ये पुरुषनिष्ठोऽभिप्रायविशेषः । वैदिकवाक्ये तु पुरुषा-
भावात् लिङ्गादिशब्दनिष्ठ एव । अत एव शाब्दी भावनेति व्यवहियते । सा
च भावना अंशत्रयमपेक्षते, साध्यं साधनमितिकर्तव्यतां च—किं भावयेत्,
केन भावयेत्, कथं भावयेदिति । किं भावयेदिति कर्माकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गो
भाव्यत्वेनान्वेति । ततः केनेति करणाकाङ्क्षायां यागः करणत्वेनान्वेति ।
ततः कथंभावाकाङ्क्षायामग्र्यन्वाधानावहनादिजन्यदृष्टोपकारेण प्रयाजादि-
जनितादृष्टोपकारसहितेन यागेन स्वर्गं भावयेदिति अग्र्यन्वाधानप्रयाजादि-
कर्मज्ञजातमितिकर्तव्यतयान्वेति ॥

As the Bhāmati puts it--

तत्त्वमसीत्यैकात्म्यावगतिः समस्तप्रमाणतत्कलतद्वयवहारान् अपवाधमानै-
वोदीयते । नैतस्याः परस्तात् किञ्चिदनुकूलं प्रतिकूलं चास्ति यदपेक्षेत येन
चेयं प्रतिक्षिप्येत । तत्रानुकूलप्रतिकूलनिवारणान्नातः परं किञ्चिदाकाङ्क्ष-
मिति ॥

—Sūtra 14, line 112. — Compare Śāṅkarāchārya's statement at
the very opening of the Brahmasūtrabhāshya—

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरित-
रेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्...अप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्मा-
श्चाध्यस्य...मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य अहमिदं ममेदमिति
नैसर्गिकोयं लोकव्यवहारः ॥

—Sūtra 14, line 120. — The word "Kūṭastha" is unknown to the
major Upanishads. The Gītā uses the word thrice, the most im-
portant passage being xii. 3—

सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यं च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम् ।

"Kūṭa" signifies both a riddle or deception, and the bone of the
forehead, and a mountain-peak; in the latter sense the word is
spelt as "kuṭa" also. Vedānta may have borrowed the word
from Buddhism. "Kūṭattho" occurs frequently in the Buddhist
Canon and is explained by—"pabbatakūṭam viya ṭhito." Kūṭa
in the sense of māyā as in kūṭaprasna or kūṭasākshin, and kūṭa
in the sense of top or summit as in Gridhrakūṭa, Chitrakūṭa etc.
may have been two distinct words later fused together in sense.

—Sūtra 14, line 134. — The fourth pāda of the fourth adhyāya of Jaimini's Mimāṃsāsūtras gives several illustrations of the application of this maxim. Thus sūtra IV. iv. 7 says—

फलवत्...इतरस्य प्रधानं स्यात् ।

while part of sūtra IV. iv. 84 is—

तत् पुनर्मुख्यलक्षणं यत् फलवत्त्वम्, तत्संनिधावसंयुक्तं तदङ्गं स्यात् ।

The actual wording of the maxim quoted by Śāṅkarāchārya occurs in Śabarāsvāmin's Bhāshya under IV. iv. 19. A śrauta illustration of the maxim is furnished by the following Brāhmaṇa passage—

राजसूयेन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेत ।.....प्रष्टौहीं दीव्यति, राजन्यं जिनाति, शौनःशेषमाख्यापयति, अभिषिच्यते ।

The question is, Do the various requirements such as gambling away a young cow, vanquishing princes in a tournament, recital of the story of Śunaḥśepa, ablution, and so forth, constitute a subordinate ritual to the Rājasūya, or have they an independent status? The conclusion is that, as no special reward is declared in connection with them, and as, in close proximity to them, occurs the royal sacrifice for which "svārājya" is assigned as a reward, that which has no reward becomes subordinate to that which has it.

—Sūtra 14, line 135 ff. — In the Bālāki-Ajātaśatru dialogue in Brih. ii. 1 and Kaush. iv, several upāsanas of Brahman as "Atishthāh," "Tejasvin," "Pūrṇam," "Vishāsahi," "Pratirūpa," "Rochishṇu," "Anapaga," "Ātmanvi," etc. are mentioned, and in each case the corresponding fruit of the upāsana makes the upāsaka himself endowed with the above attributes :

तेजस्वीति वा अहमेतमुपासे...स ग एतमेवमुपास्ते तेजस्वीह भवति ।

The principles which the Pūrvapakshin here introduces as regards pariṇāmitva knowledge resulting in the Ātman's being made liable to pariṇāma is accordingly a recognised Upanishadic principle which has been here turned to an absurd use. — In the Vedāntic system, "Saguṇa-upāsanas" or meditations on certain qualified aspects of Brahman are prescribed as means or steps leading to the upāsana of the Nirguṇa or quality-less Brahman.

—Sūtra 14, line 143. — A definition, according to the Advaita philosophy, is of two kinds: “ svarūpa-lakṣhaṇa ” and “ tatastha-lakṣhaṇa. ” The first describes the real essence of a thing, *e. g.*, when Brahman is defined as “ sat, chit, and ānanda ; ” the second is defined as—

यावलक्ष्यकालमनवस्थितत्वे सति व्यावर्तकम् ।

Thus, it is only when the Brahman is “ Māyāśabala ” or viewed as obscured by cosmic illusion that it produces, controls, and re-absorbs the universe: the “ śuddha ” Brahman is absolutely unrelated in any way to the universe. Thus the definition in Brahmasūtra I. i. 2 is not true of the “ śuddha ” Brahman; but as no other cause to the world is possible, the definition serves to distinguish Brahman from other alleged first principles like the Pradhāna.

—Sūtra 15, line 5 ff. — Although smoke is the kārya or effect of fire, as we ordinarily understand the relation—so that it is only when fire is there that smoke can arise — fire is not the material or upādāna out of which smoke is evolved, just as clay is the material out of which the jar is formed. Fire, at the most, becomes one of the essential conditions for the production of smoke and does not therefore differ from other conditions like air or ākāśa, in the absence of which also smoke cannot arise.

—Sūtra 15, line 8. — The special qualifications, viz., avichchhinamūla-dīrgharekhāvastha, or bahalordhvāgratva, are suggested by the circumstance that the smoke in the cow-boy’s pipe is cold, not copious, and not steadily rising upwards in a thick column.

—Sūtra 15, line 9. — To have a “ kāryakāraṇa ” relation leading to identity between two things, it is not enough that one of them should exist only when the other exists; it should be so much infused or interpenetrated with the characteristic attributes of the other as to raise a vivid mental picture of it, so that one could equate the two as when it is said: the jar is clay. We cannot however say: the smoke is fire. Smoke can possibly suggest humid fuel, but never the heat and brightness of fire.

—Sūtra 15, line 11. — The alternative reading of the text of the sūtra might have been suggested by the Sāmkhyakārikā 9—

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥

“Because non-existence can never be brought into existence; because people use (definite) materials (for definite ends); because everything does not spring from everything; because a capable cause must produce what it is capable to produce; and because (the effect) is of the nature of the cause; therefore the effect pre-exists (in the cause).” Śāṅkarāchārya's interpretation of the word is, however, different. — Vallabhāchārya, who interprets the sūtra as preaching the reality of the world (the world, the effect, is perceived by us because it exists, bhāve), roundly accuses Śāṅkarāchārya of wilful perversion—

इदं सूत्रं मिथ्यावादिना न ज्ञातमेव । अत एव पाठान्तरकल्पनम् ।

—Sūtra 16, line 6. — For the idea compare Māthara's explanation under the Sāṅkhyakārikā quoted in the preceding note—

इह लोके यद्यस्मिन् विद्यते तस्मादेव तदुत्पद्यते । यथा तिलेभ्यस्तैलं दध्नो घृतम् । यदि वा असत् कार्यं स्यात् तत् सर्वं सर्वत्र संभवेत् ।

—Sūtra 16, line 8 ff. — The argument is rather subtle. We might recall the instance of a reasoning conformable to scripture which Śāṅkarāchārya gave under II. i. 6^{44,45}, which implies that the essence of a thing is what never leaves it under all circumstances. What in a jar is this essence that endures? Not its colour or shape; for these might wear away. Not even its jar-ness; for it was not there before production, and will vanish away after its destruction. Only earth or clay remains. Working backwards to the cause of clay and to the First Cause of the world, the only thing that endures in the world and therefore forms the essence of the totality of effects is mere existence, and not particularised existence. And we know that the kāraṇa or Brahman is existence, intelligence and bliss. Now a mere existence cannot be further discriminated. It is, and can be, only “akhandāikarūpā.” Hence the essence of a kārya is kāraṇa, and of the totality of the kāryas, the Kāraṇa, viz., Brahman.

—Sūtra 17 line 10. — This maxim of interpretation is given in Mimāṃsasūtra I. iv. 29—

संदिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात् ।

Sabara's comment on it runs thus—

अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति । तेजो वै घृतम्—इति श्रूयते । तत्र संदेहः—
किं घृततैलवसानामन्यतमेन द्रव्येणाञ्जनीयाः शर्कराः उत घृतेनैव—इति ।
कथं संदेहः । अञ्जनसामान्येन वाक्यस्योपक्रमः । घृतेन विशेषेण निगमनम् ।
यथोपक्रमं निगमयितव्यमेकस्मिन् वाक्ये । . . . । संदिग्धेष्वेवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—
सामान्यवचनेन विशेषापेक्षिणा उपक्रमो वाक्यस्य, विशेषे निगमनवशेन ।
तस्माद्घृतविधानम् ॥

The same rule is to be applied to statements like—

वासः परिधत्ते । एतद्वै सर्वदेवत्यं वासो यत् क्षौमम् ।

—Sūtra 17, line 15— See below, II. i. 18, lines 44 ff.

—Sūtra 18, line 2. — The “yukti” used in the next few lines is the same that we have in Sāṅkhyakārikā 9, above quoted, viz., “Upādānagrahanāt.” — The assumption of an “atīśaya” or a subtle-form of the effect in the cause practically amounts to “satkāryavāda.” The assumption of some “śakti” or potency avoids, it is true, a direct reference to the effect, as it is a something inherent in the cause. But that something must have at least existence. If it be a *non-existent* something, you cannot say that it is peculiar to clay or milk or any specific cause. The śakti therefore must be an existing something; and we now inquire if it is distinct from (i) cause, and from (ii) effect. If it be altogether distinct from cause, how can you say that it is peculiar to cause and always inheres in it? Also if it is altogether distinct from the effect, why should such a *tertium quid* entirely unrelated to the jar be taken to be the determinant of the jar any more than that of cloth or of curds, seeing that the quality of “anyatva” or distinctness is possessed by the śakti with reference to all these effects? Hence the conclusion.

—Sūtra 18, line 13. — The doctrine of Samavāya is peculiar to the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, which regards it as an independent category. Samavāya is a “padārtha” which is defined as—

नित्यसंबन्धः समवायः ।

and which is said to exist between the following five “ayuta-siddha” pairs—

ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमविनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते नावयुतसिद्धौ यथा—
अवयवावयविनौ, गुणगुणिनौ, क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ, जातिव्यक्ती, विशेषनित्य-
द्रव्ये च ॥

It is the first pair in particular that comes into discussion in the ordinary causal relation. The threads are the parts or "avayavas" out of which cloth, the "avayavia" is produced. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that threads are distinct from the cloth and that the cloth is a new something which is generated in consequence of the "kāraṅkavyāpāra" or causal operation. The threads have merged their independent existence as threads into the cloth which is generated: but in course of time, when the cloth is destroyed, the threads are what remain behind. Hence we cannot say that the threads are really non-existent in the cloth. They are there, but in an inseparable condition. The moment you try to separate them the cloth vanishes. That two distinct things like threads and cloth should remain so inseparably united together calls, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, for a special explanation; and this they attempted to furnish by imagining a special link or relation between the two in the form of what they call Samavāya, which is like glue holding two pieces of paper tightly together. The glue is by nature adhesive and nothing more is needed to keep the paper on either side and the glue together. Śaṅkarāchārya is about to discuss the inadequacy of the explanation: but, such as it was, it has served to give a common-sense, realistic turn to the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, both in its explanation of the causal relation and of the relation between substance and its qualities. A much fuller refutation of the Samavāya is given under II.ii. 13.

—Sūtra 18, line 17. — Saṁyoga or conjunction is one of the twenty-four qualities or guṇas enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy—

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्व-
स्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्काराश्चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः ।

Every guṇa exists upon the dravya or guṇin by a samavāya relation. If samavāya as well as saṁyoga is a sambandha or a relation of connection, Śaṅkarāchārya rightly protests against the unlike treatment given to each. Compare II. ii. 13, lines 11-15.

—Sūtra 18, line 19 ff. — We can at any time see only parts of a jar : the side of the jar turned away from us, its inside, bottom, etc.—as the case may be—remain invisible in any single act of seeing. If, therefore, jar, the avayavin, resides in all the avayavas taken together, we can never visualise the jar because we can never take in all the avayavas together in one effort of vision [case i. a]. If the avayavin jar (which means a totality of avayavas) is to reside in such a manner that each of its own avayavas comes seriatim into contact with the corresponding avayava of its cause the clay (as does the thread with the flowers woven into a garland), so that in one glance we can take in the whole avayavin, although only a few of its avayavas are in contact with the eye (as we can lift up the whole garland by grasping only a few of its flowers), we in that case get rid of the earlier difficulty but fall into another, inasmuch as we are arguing as if the avayavas which go to make up the totality of the jar are different from the avayavas in which that totality is to reside as a whole. And the same hypothesis and the same difficulty will have to be repeated about this new totality and its constituent avayavas [case i. b]. If, finally, the whole jar is to reside in each single constituent avayava, turn by turn, the difficulty just alluded to, viz., positing a double series of avayavas, remains just the same, and there arises another new difficulty that, while the bottom of the jar is having the jar-ness on it so that water does not leak downwards, its sides will have no jar-ness on them and will therefore—as mere particles of clay—fall asunder [Case ii].

—Sūtra 18, line 28. — Śāṅkarāchārya mentions the two cities of Srugghna and Pāṭaliputra once more under IV. ii. 5 —

योपि सुम्नामथुरां गत्वा मथुरायाः पाटलिपुत्रं व्रजति सोपि सुम्नात्
पाटलिपुत्रं यातीति शक्यते वक्तुम् ।

The late Justice Telang argued that this offhand allusion to these cities must be taken to imply that both these cities were in existence in Śāṅkarāchārya's days. Now we know that Pāṭaliputra, once the capital of India, and mentioned by Patañjali (B. C. 150) and several Greek and Chinese writers, was washed away about the year A. D. 750 by excessive floods. The city formerly stood

of the tongue of land formed by the confluence of the Sona and the Ganges, on the southern bank of the latter, the modern city of Patna dating only from the time of Sher Shah (A. D. 1514). Srughna also is a very ancient city situated near Thaneshwar on the Jumna and identified with modern Sugh, which barely contains a few hundred houses. This latter city was in ruins at the time of the visit of Hiuen Tsang. "It possessed five monasteries containing one thousand monks who discussed clearly and ably the most profound and abstract questions; it also possessed one hundred temples of Brahmins, whose followers were extremely numerous." Both these cities must have been in a flourishing condition in the days of Śāṅkara, whose date can therefore be not later than about 750 A. D.—argued Telang. But why must the cities be in a *flourishing* condition? And might not these examples have been used by others before Śāṅkara? As a matter of fact Patañjali, commenting upon Vārttika 12 to Pāṇini I. i. 1 and Vārttika 48 to I. ii. 64 uses an allied illustration, viz.—

न ह्येको देवदत्तो युगपत् सुध्ने भवति, मथुरायां च ।

The Sāṅkhyasūtra I. 28 names the same two cities as our text—

न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि देशव्यवधानात् सुध्नस्थपाटलि-
पुत्रस्थयोरिव ।

—Sūtra 18, line 30. — The Jāti or Sāmānya (genus or generality) is defined as —

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यम् ।

It is believed to have a real existence independent of the species, herein resembling the Ideas of Platonic Philosophy. A Jāti is one, and is found existing at one and the same time on all the species. Hence the point of the illustration.

—Sūtra 18, line 34. — A thing is what it is because it functions in a particular manner. The hand cut off from the body is no longer the hand, as Aristototele said long ago. The avayavin therefore must act as a full-fledged avayavin before we are prepared to assume that every one of its constituent particles contains the whole avayavin. This of course is impossible.

—Sūtra 18, line 35. — A verb or an ākhyāta implies a process of happening, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, and a definite sequence : As Yāska says (Nirukta i. 1)—

पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे—वृजति, पचतीति—उपक्रमप्रभृत्य-
पवर्गपर्यन्तम् ।

Now, the verbal action implied in the statement, " the jar is produced," involves a " kāraka-vyāpāra," that is to say, a series of complicated movements to which the product-in-the-making is being subjected by a definite agent working with the help of specific instruments and accessories. And Śāṅkarāchārya pertinently asks, who or what is being subjected to this " kāraka-vyāpāra," which begins much prior to the exact moment of the " production " of the jar as popularly understood ? The production of the jar is an assemblage of activities such as refining, kneading, moulding, whirling on the wheel, drying, baking and what not. If the clay is to undergo these processes, as the sum-total of the processes is equal to production, we will have to say that clay is being produced and not the jar. If the jar is declared as being produced, it must exist throughout the whole process, in which case there cannot be any antecedent non-existence of the effect. If neither clay nor jar nor anything else is to be the subject of the action, the action becomes "soul-less."

—Sūtra 18, line 43. — The Pūrvapakshin tries to get over the difficulty by declaring that the multiform kāraka-vyāpāra is nothing but a process of establishing the relation (of samavāya) between the cause clay, and the effect jar ; or—as an alternative supposition—between the jar and its own existence. The latter supposition, although apparently maintained by certain older Vaiśeshikas, is hardly convincing. Śāṅkarāchārya, however, objects to it by pointing out that since the causal operation is a process occupying several moments, and commencing much prior to the moment of the so-called production of the jar, this would amount to an attempt to connect existence with non-existence.

—Sūtra 18, line 45.—Abhāva or non-existence as a padārtha is divided by the Vaiśeshikas into four varieties :

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः, उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः,
उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः,
यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽन्योन्या-
भावः, यथा घटः पटो न भवतीति ॥

Now, the point of Śaṅkarāchārya's contention is that if jar is to be produced, let us say, to-morrow, to say that there is its non-existence to-day, and that this non-existence is to end after 24 hours is an abuse of language. "To-day" is not any the poorer or the richer for the non-existence of the jar or for a host of other non-existences. The non-existences being mere voids, how can you distinguish the non-existence of to-morrow's would-be jar from the non-existence of the day-after-to-morrow's would-be jar or plate or piece-of-cloth ?

—Sūtra 18, line 47. — The king Pūrṇavarman is also alluded to by Śaṅkarāchārya in his Bhāshya on the Chhāndogya Uparishad, i. 23 (Ānandāśrama ed., page 115)—

यथा पूर्णवर्मणः सेवा भक्तपरिधानमात्रफला, राजवर्मणस्तु सेवा राज्य-
तुल्यफलेति ।

Are we justified in regarding Pūrṇavarman and Rājavarman as names of actual kings ; and even if they are the names of actual kings, must we regard them as more or less contemporaries of Śaṅkarāchārya ? There are also names of other kings mentioned by Śaṅkarāchārya. Thus under II. iv. 1 he says—

यथा सिंहस्तथा बलवर्मेति ।

and under IV. iii. 5—

गच्छ त्वमितो बलवर्माणं ततो जयसिंहं ततः कृष्णगुप्तमिति ।

One of these, Balavarman, has been with great probability identified with a Chālukya prince of that name who can be assigned to the period, cir. 767 to 785 A.D. (see Indian Antiquary for 1912, p. 200). Jayasimha and Krishnagupta are more dubious figures. We know of no names that would exactly fit the time. The late Justice Telang tried to identify Pūrṇavarman with a Magadha prince of that name belonging to cir. 600 A.D. But as a considerable mass of recent evidence marks the end of the eighth

century as the *floruit* of the Āchārya, we have to leave the attempt to more precisely locate Jayasimha, Kṛishṇagupta Pūrṇavarman, Rājavarman, and the rest as impracticable in the present state of our knowledge. The identification of Balavarman with the Chālukya prince we might accept, because it harmonises with other facts independently ascertained.

—Sūtra 18, lines 53 to 58. —The Brahmavidyābharṇakāra thus clearly explains the point at issue—

तार्किकेण हि उपादानुत् कपालद्वयादतिरिक्तमेव घटाख्यं द्रव्यं जायते, तस्य च कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वं संस्थानं धर्म इत्युच्यते ।...। तथा सति कपालपरिमाणं घटपरिमाणं चेति परिमाणद्वयं तथैव रूपद्वयं गुरुत्वद्वयं चोपलभ्येत । न चोपलभ्यते । अतो न द्रव्यद्वयं तत्र । अपितु एकस्यैव मृद्द्रव्यस्य पूर्वं पिण्डावस्था, तदनन्तरं कपालाकारः, तदाच्छादनेन घटाकारः । तथाच आकारविशेषसिद्ध्यर्थं कारकव्यापार उपपद्यते ॥ नच सत्कार्यवादे आकारविशेषस्यापि प्राक्सत्त्वात् न तदर्थमपि कारकव्यापार इति वाच्यम् । आकारविशेषाणां प्रागसत्त्वोपपत्तेः । नच तथा सति सत्कार्यवादहानिः । कार्यानुस्यूतकारणस्य प्राक्सत्त्वेनैव सत्कार्यवादोपपत्तेः ॥ यदितु प्रागसतः कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वाकारस्योत्पत्तिर्न संभवति, असत् उत्पत्तेर्निराकृतत्वात्, तर्हि सतोऽप्युत्पत्तिर्न संभवतीति सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां प्राङ् निरूपयितुमशक्त्या आकारा अनिर्वचनीया एव भवन्तु । का नः क्षतिरिति । अतो दुर्निरूपत्वादपि प्रपञ्चस्वरूपस्य स्वप्नादिवन्मिथ्यात्वमिति सिद्धम् ॥

The ultimate view that is endorsed by Śāṅkarāchārya is not “satkāryavāda” but “satkāraṇavāda”—if we may coin the term to denote the antecedent existence of the kārya not as kārya but as kāraṇa. As the Bhāmatikāra has declared with his usual lucidity—

यथा भुजङ्गतत्त्वं न रज्जोर्भिद्यते, रज्जुरेव हि तत्, काल्पनिकस्तु भेदः, एवं वस्तुतः कार्यतत्त्वं न कारणान्भिद्यते, कारणस्वरूपमेव हि तत्, अनिर्वाच्यं तु कार्यरूपं भिन्नमिवाभिन्नमिव चावभासत इति ॥

Production, in other words, is no *physical* happening of any kind; it is a *mental* or *intellectual* fact comparable to the imaginings of the dream-world. Cause = Effect, *minus* Time; Effect = Cause,

plus Time ; and for an absolute intellect Time does not exist. Hence, Cause = Effect. This takes us as near the Kantian view-point as one can ever wish.

—Sūtra 18, line 7 i. — For detailed refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine of the momentariness of things see II. ii. 18-27. Since there endures a permanent substance or Vastu amidst modifications in form, size, and so forth, we cannot say that all things are momentary only.

—Sūtra 18, line 72. — There is not much appreciable difference between the earlier argument that production will be “akartrika” and the present argument that the causal-operation will be “nirvishaya,” seeing that “ghaṭa” is both the (grammatical) kartri of the verb “utpadyate” and the vishaya of the “utpatti.” They are merely two ways of looking at the same fact.

—Sūtra 19, line 7. — All Bhāshyakāras understand the simile in this and in the next sūtra in the same manner as Śāṅkarāchārya. Rāmānuja, however, takes sūtra 19 to mean—

यथा तन्त्व एव व्यतिषङ्गविशेषभाजः पट इति नामरूपकार्यान्तरादिकं
भजन्ते तद्वत् ।

Madhvāchārya's mode of interpretation is peculiar to himself—

पटवच्च = पटसृष्टिवद्विश्वसृष्टिरपि कर्तृभिन्नसाधनान्तरसाध्या ।

यथा प्राणादि = यथा प्राणदेहेन्द्रियादिकं न स्वतन्त्रम्, एवं प्रकृत्यादि-
साधनान्तरमपि ।

This only shows how ingenious writers could make the sūtras mean any and everything to suit their own theory.

—Sūtra 20, line 1. — As regards the five breaths—Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna, and Samāna—they are regarded as different names given, according to location and function, to one and the same Vital-principle. The locations are given in the familiar stanza—

हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंज्ञितः ।

उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥

Prāṇāyāma, as a process of controlling breath, has three stages—

रेचनम् = कौष्ठ्यवायोर्विरेच्य बहिर्धारणम् = प्रश्वासः ।

पूरणम् = बहिर्वायोराचम्यान्तर्धारणम् = श्वासः ।

कुम्भनम् = श्वासप्रश्वासयोः सकृत्प्रयत्नात् स्तम्भनम् ।

In the last process the wind, Vāchaspati tells us,—

बलवद्विधारकप्रयत्ननिरुद्धक्रियः शरीर एव सूक्ष्मीभूतोऽवतिष्ठते ।

—The “Ārambhana” adhiḥkaraṇa as a whole has evoked considerable differences of opinion amongst the Bhāshyakāras, and quite naturally. First as to the extent of the adhiḥkaraṇa, while Bhāskara and Vallabha agree with Śāṅkara in making it consist of seven sūtras (14-20), Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Śrīkaṇṭha read our sūtras 17 and 18 as one continuous sūtra, Śrīkaṇṭha further including in the topic of this adhiḥkaraṇa sūtras 21, 22 and 23. The Upanishadic passage intended by sūtra 14 is given identically by all Bhāshyakāras except Madhva, who makes the “ārambhana” passage refer to Rīgveda x. 81. 2—

किं स्विदासीदधिष्ठानमारम्भणं कतमत्स्वित् कथासीत् ।

यतो भूमिं जनयन् विश्वकर्मा विद्यामौर्णेन्महिना विश्वचक्षाः ॥

And in accordance with that passage makes the sūtra raise the question as to whether the material out of which God fashioned the world—distinct from him as it was—was independent of him or subservient to him.—Nimbārka in the same sūtra makes the word “an-anything” to mean “an-anything-bhinnatva,” *i. e.*, not *absolute* distinction between cause and effect, but only partial distinction from certain points of view only. Nimbārka, it will be noted, champions what is called the “Bhedābheda” view, which Śāṅkarāchārya finds it fit to introduce as a pūrvapaksha in II. i. 14³¹⁻³⁷. The interpretation, as we saw, had been current even before the days of Śāṅkarāchārya; but it seems to be rather forced. Against Śāṅkarāchārya’s interpretation we would say this much that while professedly essaying to answer all the logical objections against the Advaita position, he is compelled to throw logic overboard and take his stand indubiously upon pure Scriptural authority. Śāṅkarāchārya could point to the wording of sūtra 27 in defence. He, however, is forced to keep continually shifting from the “vyāvahārika” to the “pāramārthika” view in his interpre-

tation of the sūtras. This was inevitable from his own philosophical position, although one is inclined to raise at times the question as to whether the Sūtrakāra himself really intended all that. Rāmānuja and Vallabha, having Śāṅkara's interpretation before them, make it a point to deliver a studied attack against him, Rāmānuja introducing the discussion with the words—

तदेतदविदिताद्वैतयाथात्म्यानां भेदवादश्रद्दालुज्जसवहुमानावलोकनलि-
प्साविजृम्भितम् ।

Vallabha is even more unrestrained—

ये पुनर्भिथ्यात्वं तामसबुद्धयः प्रतिपादयन्ति तैर्ब्रह्मवादाः सूत्रश्रुतिनाशनेन
तिलापःकृता वेदितव्याः । अन्तःप्रविष्टचोरवधार्थमेवैष आरम्भः ।

On the whole one is inclined to agree with Bhāskara's cogent remarks against the Māyāvādin—

कार्यकारणयोरनित्यत्वादित्यनेन हेतुनात्मैकत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते भवता । स
चायमसिद्धो हेतुः, सर्गानभ्युपगमे वियदादि सर्वं नित्यं मीमांसकानामिव
प्रसज्यते । । कथमिदं मायामात्रं प्रमाणमन्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातुं
शक्यम्, त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकं करवाणीति बहुद्विपूर्वं परदेवताप्रवृत्तेः । तदभि-
प्रायमज्ञात्वा को नामादृष्टनिर्भयः सर्वं मिथ्येति कल्पयितुमर्हेत् । ।
का चेयमविद्या सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीया ।

यस्याः कार्यमिदं कृत्स्नं व्यवहाराय कल्पते ।

निर्वक्तुं सा न शक्येति वचनं वञ्चनार्थकम् ॥

Noteworthy also are the words of Keśava Kāśmīrin—

किञ्च ईश्वरस्यातात्त्विकत्वे निरीश्वरसांख्यादिभ्योऽवैदिकेभ्यस्तव सिद्धा-
न्तस्य परवञ्चनं विना को वा विशेषः । । यदि प्रपञ्चमिथ्या-
वादः श्रौतः स्यात् तर्हि शुक्तिरजतादिदृष्टान्ता वेद उपन्यस्ता स्युः ।

If sūtra 13, giving a popular drishtānta, be conceived from the "vyavahāra" point of view, sūtra 14 at least must give the "pāramārthika" view. But inasmuch as, in Śāṅkarāchārya's interpretation, the creation as such is a fiction, the sūtra need not have taken the trouble to declare the effect to be non-different from the cause.

—Sūtra 21 line 3. — The first word in the sūtra has been variously interpreted:

इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वव्यपदेशात्	}	शंकर ;
इतरस्य ब्रह्मणः शारीरात्मत्वव्यपदेशात्		
इतरस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावव्यपदेशात्	}	रामानुज, श्रीकण्ठ,
इतरस्य जीवकर्तृत्वस्य [श्रुतौ] निर्देशात्		धल्लभ, निम्बार्क, भास्कर ;
		मध्व.

The "śruti" passage on which Madhva bases his peculiar interpretation, viz. —

जीवान्द्रवन्ति भूतानि जीवे तिष्ठन्त्यचञ्चलाः ।

जीवे प्रलयमृच्छन्ति न जीवात् कारणं परम् ॥

I have been unable to trace to its "śruti" source.

—Sūtra 22, line 22.—In spite of Śāṅkarāchārya's attempt to dub the whole Samsāra and the distinction between the souls and the Brahman as a fiction or illusion, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the wording of the present sūtra clearly contemplates the distinction by pronouncing the Lord-and-Creator as superior. There are several other sūtras that equally assert this distinction. For instance—

३. ४. ८—अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् ।

१. १. १६—नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

१. ३. १८—इतरपरामर्शात् स इति चेन्न, असंभवात् ।

२. ३. २१—नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्न, इतराधिकारात् ।

१. १. १७—भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ।

२. ३. ४१—परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः ।

१. २. ११—गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ।

४. ४. १७—जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च ।

Are all these sūtras, and many others of an allied nature, merely meant to be true from the "vyāvahārika" point of view, and no more? When cornered, the Āchārya would say that he is prepared

to recognise the distinction between the soul and the Creator (=aparābrahman), but not that between the soul and the Para or the Kūtastha Brahman.

—Sūtra 23, line, 8. — Śaṅkara, Nimbārka and Bhāskara take the word "tat" in this sūtra to refer to "para-parikalpita-dosha" or "parokṭā," which presumably means "hitākaraṇādi-dosha" alleged in sūtra 21. In an expanded form the sūtra would read—

अश्मादौ इव ब्रह्मणि हिताकरणादिदोषाप्रसक्तिः ।

अश्मादीनामिव जीवानां हिताकरणादिदोषाप्रसक्तिः ।

But the way in which the above Bhāshyakāras understand the simile does not bring out clearly how "hitākaraṇa" is at all applicable to the stones or to the earth. The same remark applies to the explanation of Vallabha. The point is not to prove that different effects can arise out of the same cause (this was the topic of sūtra II. i. 6), but to bring in the "hitākaraṇa" in the explanation of the simile. The Ratnaprabhā, accordingly, misses the mark when it introduces sūtra 23 thus—

नन्वखण्डैकरूपे ब्रह्मणि कथं जीवेश्वरवैचित्र्यमित्यनुपपत्तिं दृष्टान्तैः परिहरति सूत्रकारः ।

With this explanation, the first illustration of Śaṅkarāchārya explains *svarūpa-vaichitrya*; the second, *dharma-vaichitrya*; the third, *arthakriyā-vaichitrya*. Brahmānandasarasvatī has probably perceived the difficulty and so offers an explanation of his own, which is, however, a little forced.

यथाश्मादिरूपमण्यादिगतस्य मुखादिप्रतिबिम्बस्य तद्रतस्यामत्वप्रतीतिर्न तु मुखादेः, तथाविद्यानिमित्तकहिताहितादिप्रतीतिर्जाव एव, न तु ब्रह्मणीत्यतस्तस्या उक्तप्रसक्तेरनुपपत्तिः ।

The other commentators seem to understand the simile somewhat differently—

१. यथा अश्मादिषु (अचिद्विकारेषु) ब्रह्मैक्यव्यपदेशानुपपत्तिः तथा (चिद्विकारेषु) जीवेषु सर्वथा ब्रह्मैक्यव्यपदेशानुपपत्तिः—श्रीकण्ठरामानुजौ;

२. अश्मादेरिव जीवस्य (चेतनत्वेऽप्यस्वातन्त्र्यात्) स्वतःकर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिः

—मध्व.

In explanation (2) "tat" = "itaravyapadeśa;" but "itara" curiously enough is taken to denote not jīva but "jīvakartritva." As to Rāmānuja's explanation, it has the weak-point of (indirectly, it may be) denying the very fact of "itaravyapadeśa" which was the starting point of the Pūrvapaksha. Can the point of the simile be this? — We hammer and chisel stones in order to shape them into images of gods. The process of hammering is extremely painful; but it elevates the stone to a superior position. Similarly the so-called miseries and restrictions of life are meant for the elevation of the soul, and he need not chafe at them. Sorrow is the necessary condition, the complement, the other side, of happiness; and we cannot have the one without the other, any more than we can have light without darkness. Hence the "hitākaranadosha" does not hold good because there is no "ahita" in the world at all, our world being the best of all possible worlds. We can accordingly, on the analogy of the hammering of the stone and the transforming of it into an image, explain each pain or misery as the inevitable harbinger of good or happiness, and so absolve God from the fault alleged.

—Sūtra 24, line 6. — It will be noted that Śāṅkarāchārya here declares world-creation as forming the very nature of Brahman; and yet the world he has declared as being unreal! — According to Madhvāchārya's dvaitavāda, Brahman can have "upasambhāra" and so the objection cannot be raised at all. As a consequence he makes sūtra 24 and 25 continue the preceding discussion as to the possibility of the soul having created the world. Sūtra 24 according to him would mean: If a man can gather material to create home, why cannot he do the same and create the universe? The reply is that what man thinks he does unaided, he does only with the help and the approval of the Lord. It is not the cow who unaided produces milk; it is the Lord who created her digestive organism, who is ultimately the author of the milk. And this Lord, the next sūtra according to Madhvāchārya avers, can work unseen, as gods and ghosts are known to do, in daily experience. The boldness of the Pūrvapakshin who maintains the soul to be the creator of the Universe is certainly very remarkable, and would easily put to shame the vauntings of modern science!

—Sūtra 24, line 8. — "As milk by nature, and without other accessories, becomes curds, so Brahman by nature produces the

world without any external material or means." This illustration—Śāṅkarāchārya is going to tell us later (II. i. 3¹²)—is to be taken not as declaring any inherent power in the milk, unaided by a sentient controller, to produce curds. The sentient controller is there; only he does not add anything to milk (we can dispense, with buttermilk that it is usual to add to the milk to make it curdle), whereas in normal causal operations a number of extraneous materials and instruments are required. This introjection of a sentient-creator almost takes away the very point of the illustration. It is clearly an after-thought which goes to prove that Śāṅkarāchārya at times uses against his opponents arguments that tell against his own position. It is to be noted in this connection that it is Śāṅkarāchārya himself who notices the deficiency and seeks to explain it away: he would not give the opponent the first chance.

—Sūtra 25, line 4. — Śāṅkarāchāryā takes the word "loke" in the sūtra in three different senses—

१—लोके = व्यवहारे;

२—लोके = शास्त्रे बृद्धव्यवहारे च (लोक्यते ज्ञायतेऽर्थोऽनेनेति);

३—लोके = स्वयंप्रकाशे ब्रह्मणि.

—Sūtra 25, line 15ff.—The folk-lore concerning the female crane conceiving at the mere hearing of the sound of thunder does not seem to be a biological fact. And as to the explanation for the fact of a lake full of lotuses making an adjoining lake (that had no lotuses before) in time full of similar lotuses, we have to remember the part played by wind and by birds in transplanting seeds.

—Sūtra 26, line 14.—If Brahman is wholly used up in the totality of the products, whenever we see products we see the Brahman. Of course we may not see all the products at a time and consequently not obtain a full-orbed vision of Brahman; but provided it is a vision, the extent covered by it is immaterial: thus apparently the gist of the argument.

—Sūtra 27, line 10f.—The "Sat-sampatti" passage is quoted in the next line. The "Hṛidayāyatana" passage is Chhāndogya viii. 3. 3—

स वा एष आत्मा हृदि । तस्यैतदेव निवक्तुम्—हृदि-अयमिति । तस्मा-
द्दृढयम् ।

As a "hṛidaya" is a "vikāra" of Brahman, as being created by it, and as Brahman is to abide in one of its creations, the Creator and the creation must be conceived as distinct; otherwise they would not have the "ādhārādheya" relation.

—Sūtra 27, line 24. — Having once conceded that the Veda is authoritative, especially in transcendent matters, the maxim "credo quia impossibile" seems to be a logical deduction from the premises. Surely we cannot presume to expect that the mystery of the Universe was planned by the Creator in such a manner that it might be readily intelligible to the finite and vacillating intellect of man, who is verily the tiniest atom in the whole universe. Man is ceaselessly trying to know and his knowledge is steadily increasing. He discards old hypotheses and invents new ones, merely to have them supplanted by still newer ones. Although in this way man's knowledge, one might imagine, has its own limitations, he at least has a right to expect that the added knowledge will merely exhibit a difference in degree, not in kind; that it will not compel him to unlearn the "eternal" truths, for instance, the law of contradiction. But Śāṅkarāchārya is not willing to concede even that. Human reason has its own inherent contradictions, what Kant styled the "antinomies." In the words of Hegel, "Reason returns upon itself," and even śruti cannot help man with any better solution than Śāṅkarāchārya's "aghaṭitaghaṭanāpatiyasi" or "sattvāsattvābhāvam anirvachaniyā" māyā. Śāṅkarāchārya, however, does not stop with this negative, despondent, almost sceptical attitude. There are regions which are inaccessible to human reason, but which *faith* can penetrate and *realise*. Although man's reason is admittedly weak, his *faith* is immense, is infinite. With that faith he can aspire to transcend the bonds of the flesh and *be* the Divinity itself. There is valid testimony to the reality of this experience, which is not beyond anybody's reach,—given sustained patience and an earnestness of endeavour.

—Sūtra 27, line 33. — The point is discussed by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsāsūtra X. viii. 6. When we have two contradictory

statements with reference to the same ritual, what are we to do?
To quote Śabara—

ननु परस्परं विरुद्धौ विधिप्रतिषेधौ न संभवतः । उच्यते । वचनप्रामा-
ण्यात् प्रतिषेधो विधिं बाधित्वा भविष्यति, विधिरपि प्रतिषेधम् ।..... ।
तदा विधिर्यदा न प्रतिषेधः, तदा प्रतिषेधो यदा न विधिरिति ।..... ।
एकं कल्पं गृहीत्वा न द्वितीयमपि गृह्णातीति । तस्मादन्यतरेण कल्पेन
सिध्यतीति ॥

—Sūtra 27, line 45. — See note to sūtra II. i. 14, line 134, above.

—Sūtra 28, line 2. — Most Bhāshyakāras understand Ātman = Jiva. If the individual soul contains within himself so many strange and contradictory powers, why should one object to God's having them? Others who take Ātman = Brahman practically intend to convey the same idea. Aṣ Vallabha says—

अर्वाचीनविकल्पविचारकुतर्कप्रमाणाभासशास्त्रकलिलान्तःकरणदुरवग्रह-
वादिनां वादानवसरे सर्वभवनसमर्थे ब्रह्मणि निरोधाभावात् ।

Madhva includes our sūtra 26 under the "Jivakartritva" adhi-
karana and discusses "Īśvarakartritva" only with sūtra 27.

—Sūtra 29, line 1.—Under II. ii.11, 13 Śaṅkarāchārya has urged the objection in question against the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśe-
shika systems.—While in the case of the Vedāntins śrutis declared both "niravayavatva" and "pariṇāmitva," the Sāṅkhyas assume "sāvayavatva" of the Pradhāna and hope thereby to escape the fault of "kritsnaprasakti." And our argument against the assumed "sāvayavatya" they brush aside as not valid, being based on mere reason (line 9f). But this lands them into further troubles.

—Sūtra 29, line 13. — The Vaiśeshikas explain that when two atoms are united to produce a dvyanuka or binary-atom, there arises in the binary a magnitude or dimension distinct from that of the atom. But this is not due to the addition of the dimension of one atom to that of the other. The new dimension is due to the fact that there are two atoms: to the 'sāṅkhyā' of the atoms. These are mere words, and Śaṅkarāchārya has not lost the opportunity to expose their vacuity.

—Sūtra 29, line 16. — With sūtra 29 Śāṅkara fittingly brings the *adhikarāna* to a close, thereby disposing of the dilemma or the *ubhayatahpāśā rajjuh* (the double-noosed rope) involved in sūtra 26. Rāmānuja, Śrīkantha, Bhāskara, Nimbārka and Madhva regard the next two sūtras also as a part of this *adhikarāna*. — Apart from this, the Viśiṣṭādvaita school must find it somewhat hard to declare for the “*niravayavatva*” of the Lord when his body consists of *chit* and *achit* as its constituents. Rāmānuja’s theory is —

सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कारणम्, स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कार्यम् ।

Creation in other words is the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in a subtle and imperceptible form. If creation is *sāvayava*, the *sāvayavatva* must also be supposed to be immanent in the Creator. Hence ultimately all Bhāshyakāras have to appeal to *śruti*. It is *not* correct to say that the theory of Rāmānuja appeals to reason while that of Śāṅkara negates it altogether. On this point all are in the same boat.

—Sūtra 30, line 4. — It is somewhat strange that the sūtra should use the feminine word “*sarvopetā*.” The “*Parā Devatā*” referred to in *Chhāndogya* (vi. 8. 6) and elsewhere is naturally suggested as the *viśeshya*. Madhva, however, has discovered a *śruti*, viz.—

सर्वैर्युक्ता शक्तिभिर्देवता सा ।

which it is perhaps vain to try to trace in any extant *Samhitā*. The *Śvetāśvatara* passage (vi. 8) —

परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते ।

is the one pointedly referred to by most Bhāshyakāras. Advantage has also been taken of the use of the feminine epithet in the sūtra, which is declared to teach the doctrine which assigns a *real śakti* (and not merely the power of illusion) to the Lord.

—Sūtra 31, line 5. — The objection beginning with “*kathamcha*” (line 5) is a characteristic insertion designed to introduce the *Māyāvāda* (see line 11 below). While sūtra 24 answers the objection on the score of the absence of any *external* means and instruments, the present sūtra considers the objection based upon the absence of all limbs and sense-organs belonging to God’s own body.

—Sūtra 32, line 6. — This seems to be the *popular* explanation of the śruti passage. It has also a deeper metaphysical significance: The love that you show to others is a reflex of your love for your own Self. In loving others you feel that you are more fully and more truly realising your own Self.

—Sūtra 32, line 1. — While the argument from design is popularly put forward to suggest an intelligent Author to the world, the same argument, it must not be forgotten, reduces the Creator to the level of the ordinary man who is immersed in a ceaseless chase after ends and after means to those ends.

—Sūtra 33, line 11. — Apravṛtitiḥ: this may imply a total disinclination to create, or passivity; or even the occasionalness or kādāचित्कत्वा of the Pravṛitti, seeing that there is no Prayojana or motive either for the God's creating or for his not-creating.

—Sūtra 33 line 12. — Like sūtra 24 this sūtra asserts creative activity as being the "svabhāva" of the Lord. This implies not unconscious or involuntary action, but action which involves no effort and no hesitation whatsoever. Our breathing becomes naturally heavy and short as we climb a hill; so the "svabhāva" can show natural adaptation to circumstances. What God does in the normal course of things appears to us as his most carefully balanced activity undertaken after the fullest deliberation. As in the case of the truly wise man, so in the case of the Lord—

यास्त्वेषां स्वैरकथास्ता एव भवन्ति शस्त्राणि ।

Śaṅkarāchārya, however, characteristically brings in his Māyāvāda and declares the whole creation as not a physical fact but an intellectual perception: see above, II. i. 18, lines 53-58, Notes.

—Sūtra 34, line 1. — In sūtra 21 the point under discussion was the Lord's treatment unto himself; in the present sūtra, it is his treatment of the other souls.

—Sūtra 34, line 15. — The analogy of the rain fails us, because while the characteristic differences of the seeds can exist independently of the rain, in the case of God there can be no diversity in the world for which he is not himself responsible.

—Sūtra 34, line 21. — The Kaushitaki passage, which seems at first sight to go against Śaṅkarāchārya, is to be so interpreted as

to conform with the Bṛihadāraṇyaka passage next quoted, inasmuch as the Veda can never teach contradictory things. Understand *kārayati* to mean, therefore,—

पूर्वकर्मानुरोधेन कर्तयति ।

Nor is the Lord's independence in any way endangered by his paying attention to the karmaṇ of men. As the Bhāmatīkāra says—

नच कर्मापेक्षायामीश्वरस्यैश्वर्यव्याघातः । नहि सेवादिकर्मभेदापेक्षः फल-
भेदप्रदः तत्रप्रभुर्भवति ।

—Sūtra 35, line 7.—Even in Śāṅkara's Māyāvāda the following six objects are regarded as without a beginning—

जीव ईशो विशुद्धा चित् तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा ।

अविद्या तच्चित्तोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः ॥

The last of these, the relation of Chit and Avidyā, is responsible for the Samsāra, which as a consequence is without a beginning.

—Sūtra 36, line 1. — Rāmānuja and Nimbārka read sūtras 35 and 36 as one sūtra, while they seem to have been both ignored by Śrīkanṭha.

—Sūtra 36, line 5. — Kevalā-avidyā is like the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna in a state of equipoise of its constituent guṇas: is incapable of occasioning any karmaṇ or bhoga, the offspring of inequality leading to a disturbance of the balanced pose. In the condition of sushupti (deep-sleep) or of Falaya (cosmic "involution") the Avidyā is "kevalā" and occasions no continuance of activity for the time.

—Sūtra 36, line 8. — Any inquiry started as to the ultimate origins of the Samsāra, it must not be forgotten, is bound to be started by one who himself is already in the Samsāra, floating with the stream. He cannot possibly review the stream from a detached position any more than can the denizen of the earth step outside the earth so as to weigh it or to move it with a fulcrum. The Mīmāṃsā position—Na kadāchid anidraṃ jagat—can in some sense be regarded as a confession to the same point of view.

—Sūtra 36, line 14.—An anticipatory reference to a future fact one should resort to only when there is no other way out. Thus, to take a śrauta example, we are told in one context—

पुरोडाशकपलेन तुषान् उपवपति ।

“ That the husks are to be rubbed off or removed by means of the ‘Purodāśa’ plate.” This is a direction to be observed soon after the grains are pounded in order to separate the husks. The purodāśa cakes are to be prepared out of this very grain. How can we therefore speak of a ‘purodāśa’ plate before the purodāśa is cooked? But as there is no way out, we have to suppose that the plate is called ‘purodāśa’ in anticipation of its being used to cook the grain after the husk is removed and the grain turned into flour. Similar is the case with the injunction—

गृहस्थः सदृशीं भार्यामुपेयात् ।

In those cases however, where, a relation with what has gone before and what is to come is *equally* possible, the former has necessarily to be preferred.

—Sūtra 37, line 5.—That Brahman has certain “ dharmas ” or “ śaktis ” is unhesitatingly declared in this sūtra again, as in sūtra 30 before. And yet the commentary Brahāmṛitavarshinī remarks—

तस्मान्निर्गुणत्वे ब्रह्मणो विवर्तजगदुपादानत्वमविरुद्धमिति ।

ADDITIONAL NOTES

- Sūtra 3, line 31.**—“Darśana”, translated by us as Śruti-text, can also mean “intuitive-realisation,” on the evidence of the Śvetāśvatara passage 6-13.
- Sūtra 9, line II i.**—Compare also the Bhāshya on III. ii. 21—
ब्रह्मैवभावो हि प्रपञ्चो न प्रपञ्चस्वभावं ब्रह्म ।
- Sūtra 8, line 10.**—कारणाव्यतिरिक्तं (=कारणाकारं) कार्यं is the hypothesis of (the सिद्धान्तिन्, but under the supposition made, that becomes impossible.
- Sūtra 23, line 8.**—Another possible interpretation of this perplexing sūtra can also be suggested by taking the word अश्मन् to mean “magnet” as in Sūtra II. ii. 7. As the magnet, the source of movement in the iron-needle, is not itself agreeably or disagreeably affected by the movement and so cannot be charged with doing and not-doing what is disagreeable and agreeable respectively, so the soul (and *a fortiori* the God) cannot be liable to any similar contingency, seeing that the so-called हित or अहित belongs to the body only. The body, through ignorance, identifies itself with the soul, and fancies that it can do हित or अहित to itself, just as the iron-needle, being temporarily magnetised, may imagine itself as the source of its own movements and worry about them.
- Sūtra 27, line 24.**—The frequent appeals to लौकिक दृष्टान्त in the Sūtras (even Sūtra 28 is an appeal to “loka”) serve to emphasise the fact that even ordinary experience is capable of affording us fleeting glimpses or intimations of the Absolute.
- Sūtra 32 line 1.**—The प्रयोजनवत्त्व or purposiveness of actions or प्रवृत्ति is a rule applicable only to finite (human) beings. To generalise it and to attribute it to the infinite God or Absolute is unwarranted. Hence the पूर्वपक्ष is sufficiently answered by saying that it does not arise at all.
- Sūtra 34 line 1.**—The argument of Sūtras 34-36 of this Pāda recurs also in Sūtras II. iii. 41-42.

Errata to the Notes

Page	line	Correct	Incorrect
4	15	Pūrvapakshin	Pūrvapakhin
4	25	(and in the portions	and in the portions
9	31	तद्विदः ॥	तद्विदाः ॥
13	26	sūtra, such as. " "tattvānām,"	sūtra
15	11	Ashtakās	Ashtakas
17	15	stimulat-	stimula-
18	16	Sāmkhyas	and Sāmkhyas
19	9	वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा	वायुर्वै पिष्ठा]
20	11	Kāsmīrin	Kāsmīrin
23	24	four	five
23	26	omit —(v) कार्यस्य कारणवत्प्रसङ्गः ।	
25	<i>last</i>	propitiate	propitiat
49	19	the soul (and <i>a fortiori</i> God)	God
54	6	—Sūtra 33,	—Sūtra 32,

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- 1 Bhavabhūti's Uttara-Rāma-charita, Sanskrit Text with Marāthi Translation, Introduction, etc.—The Text and the Translation were originally published separately and are now no longer available. In the new edition the Translation is thoroughly revised. A few copies of the Text alone will also be made separately available.
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